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Executive Summary 
Borneo is a unique island, with unique charismatic wildlife, such as the clouded leopard, 
bearded pig and five langur species. The Malaysian state of Sarawak on Borneo is also in 
a singular situation. Rainfall on its mountain ranges near central Borneo is so plentiful 
that in 1962, Australian engineers marked out 155 sites the state for hydropower 
potential, then further narrowed down to 51 sites by the Sarawak government and then 
reduced further to 12 key sites that will form the power generation backbone of 
Sarawak’s industrialisation (Suhakam, 2009; Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority, 
1962). More than 40 years later, this potential is becoming reality. One of the largest 
dams in the world, the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam (BHD), came online in August 2011. 
The dam is built across the Batang Balui and forms a 700 square kilometre lake as its 
reservoir. Being a hilly area, old hilltops have become islands of various sizes. Of these, 
some are considered large enough by the Malaysian government to develop into eco-
tourism sites (Sibon and Ling, 2013). However, little is known about the after-effects of 
the dam project. 
Related to the environmental and zoological issues facing the wildlife is the problem of 
human development. Due to the inundation from the dam, some fifteen indigenous 
longhouse communities have had to move from ancestral lands along the banks of the 
former Batang Balui. The government has relocated these peoples to a resettlement site 
some 60kms away by road (about an hour’s drive due to the hilly terrain and poor road 
condition) from the dam. Perhaps the most prominent opposition to this relocation 
comes from foreign NGOs such as the Bruno Manser Fund, who are working to preserve 
and protect the cultural integrity and rights of the Penan, one of the indigenous groups 
affected. Others may see the relocation of these groups out of the forest as a chance to 
advance the “human development” aspect of the lives of the indigenous people. Human 
development and well-being are difficult concepts to define and measure as they include 
immeasurable values such as freedom of movement and ‘satisfying leisure hours’ (UNDP, 
1990). Nevertheless, various amenities have been provided to the communities, such as 
boarding schools up to secondary level, electricity and telecommunication services, and 
a clinic with at least one resident doctor. On the other side of the scale, they have poorer 
access to their ancestral hunting, fishing and gathering grounds, are less able to grow 
their own food due to poor land in the resettlement area, and are no longer living on 
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their ancestral lands. This means that the indigenous communities must become more 
engaged with the greater Malaysian economy, and the effect of this can be either that 
these communities may get left far behind or that they may adapt to the new economic 
situation and pressures on their cultural identity quickly.  
This study uses a political ecology approach to look at the dam and its effects. It starts 
by looking at the relationship that the resettled communities have with the land and the 
state and how this has affected their livelihoods and access to food, especially the 
economically and culturally significant bearded pig.  Camera traps were placed at five 
locations to look at how the distribution of the animals has changed, and further 
ethnography was conducted with hunters to determine the differences in exploitation 
strategies. Finally, the history of the dam and the role and characteristics of international 
actors (Australia and China) in the process of the dam construction are examined. The 
tensions between the domestic interests of these international actors and the Malaysian 
and Sarawak governments are used to explain how seemingly minuscule and local scale 
decisions on the exploitation of natural (food) resources can be linked to other political 
decisions made elsewhere. 
The study finds that the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam is an Australian-initiated 
infrastructural endeavour delivered through the Colombo Plan that had its roots in the 
early years of Malaysian independence from British colonialism and the northern threat 
of communism. Due to various reasons, the BHD project only started building in the early 
2000s, with Hydro Tasmania playing a central role and Australian-Canadian Rio Tinto 
Alcan agreeing to buy power from the dam. Domestic politics in Australia intervened to 
cause the Australian interests and community support expertise to pull out of Sarawak. 
The vacuum was filled by Chinese interests, which were neither as equipped nor 
interested to continue support for what they considered Sarawak’s internal issues. The 
lack of support from the Chinese for livelihood reconstruction resulted in the longhouse 
communities being left to their own devices to adapt to new lands and the new economy. 
Hunters in the resettlement scheme play a central role in supplying protein to the 
communities. Yet, they face difficulties in fulfilling their role due to the relocation from 
their traditional grounds. As they once used to be strung out along the river, harvesting 
bushmeat as a food resource was a diffuse pressure. Now access to hunting grounds 
along the banks and on the islands of Bakun lake is a single point. The long shape of the 
vii 
 
lake means that it is more economical to hunt from the areas close to the jetty first, and 
the insecurity of access to the lake itself meant that hunters tried to hunt as much as 
they could in case there was no longer access. Hunters find that successful hunts rely 
more and more on good hunting dogs. Camera trap information reveals that bearded 
pigs and mousedeer changed their activity habits at some heavily disturbed areas, while 
beyond a certain point where hunting becomes uneconomical, the encounter rates for 
favoured species such as the bearded pig about six times higher than in a heavily 
disturbed area. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 A Brief History of Hydropower 
Hydropower, the kinetic energy that is in moving water bodies, has come a long way 
since its early beginnings as part of an ancient Chinese invention used to pound grain, 
metal ore and paper pulp (Needham, 1986). Ancient Greco-Romans also used water-
powered machinery from the third century BC (Wilson, 2002). The world heritage site at 
Derwent Valley Mills in Derbyshire in England consists of over 200 hydropowered mills 
used to spin cotton on an industrial scale before the advent of electricity supplies (Knight, 
2016). The kinetic energy of water was also used in since 75 AD and has been refined to 
the hydraulic mining seen at some coal mining sites today. England was also the 
birthplace of the first hydroelectricity plant, which was built in Northumberland and 
used to light a house of a gun-maker, Lord Armstrong (IEE Review, 1989). 
Hydropower-generated electricity was first conceived in the mid-1700s when a French 
artillery officer and military engineer Bernard Forest de Bélidor wrote Architecture 
Hydraulique. The French continued to lead hydroelectricity development through the 
1800s when Benoît Fourneyron first invented a 4.5kW dual-curved blade turbine in 1827. 
Within ten years, he had refined his one-foot wide turbine to produce 45kW, which 
oscillated at 2,300 rotations per minute. Fourneyron turbines were widely taken up in 
industries, and by 1895, Fourneyron turbines were installed at the Niagara Falls to 
generate electricity (Constant, 1983).  
The Fourneyron turbines were not the first to be installed in the United States. In 1882, 
A paper manufacturer, H.F. Rogers, built the first hydroelectric plant in the world with 
the help of Western Edison Light Company, the Vulcan Street Plant, by damming the Fox 
River in Appleton, Wisconsin, generating 12.5kW of direct current (DC) (Davis, 2006).  
Alternating current (AC) won the ‘War of the Currents’, in the late 1880s and this 
ushered a new era of electricity distribution. Alternating currents could be transported 
for longer distances, and this allowed for the construction of the first commercial 
hydroelectric power station in California in 1893. Pelton turbines were used, and the 
three-phase generator that is still used in power generation today eliminated the 
current inconsistency that plagued the Vulcan Street Plant (Henderson, 1998). Germany 
installed her first three-phase hydroelectric system in 1891 (Neidhofer, 2007). Australia 
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followed in 1895 with the Southern Hemisphere’s first, as well as the first publicly-
owned hydroelectric plant, which was built in Tasmania (Pierce, 2007). Together with 
the added benefits of flood and irrigation control, much financial support was put into 
hydropower by the United States federal government (Pelton, 2008). By the 1940s, 
hydropower generated 40% of the electricity produced in the United States. 
The Francis turbine was invented in the mid-1800s by James Francis. This turbine design 
has proved, in comparison to Pelton and Kaplan turbines to be efficient over a wider 
range of conditions and account for the generation almost 60% of hydropower 
generated today (General Electric, 2017). This is also the turbine generating power in 
the Bakun and Murum Dams. The former is fitted with eight such turbines rated at 
300MW each. 
The United States and Canada led the world in hydropower engineering in the first half 
of the 20th century, building iconic dams such as the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, 
which recently had new turbines placed to produce more power, and Washington’s 
Grand Coulee Dam, which also has been upgraded. Hydroelectricity’s attraction as a 
means of fuel free energy production was enhanced further in the post-WWII years as 
developing areas such as Latin America and Australia began to expand their 
hydroelectricity capacities. 
In the 21st century, hydroelectricity has become a widely adopted method of energy 
production, accounting for 21% of the world’s generating capacity. It is arguably one of 
the most popular choices for governments not just to produce cheap electricity, but also 
to burnish their green credentials, as well as to make a statement about their intent to 
place their country on the global map through the large infrastructure investments that 
typically goes into such projects. It arguably has been the driving force behind the rapid 
economic transformation of large, developing economies such as Brazil, which produces 
80% of its electricity from hydropower (Giles, 2006). China, which has close to half of 
the 50,000 dams in the world, has, under the leadership of former Sinohydro 
hydropower engineer President Hu Jintao, accelerated the export of its dam building 
expertise all around the developing world, especially to Chinese government-friendly 
developing nations such as Burma, Cambodia and Laos (Watts, 2010).  In Malaysia, 
Chinese dam builders increased their involvement after Australian companies reduced 
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their involvement in the Bakun and Murum dams after Malaysian government missteps 
in the resettlement of indigenous groups were revealed. 
1.2 Types of Hydropower 
Commercial hydroelectricity generation can be divided into four types: Tidal, run-of-the-
river, pumped-storage and conventional.  Tidal energy is typically associated with ocean 
water and uses the highly predictable daily changes in the heights of the water to 
produce electricity. In this thesis, I am not concerned with tidal energy. Pumped-storage 
hydroelectricity is a type of generation that is typically only used during peak loads. 
During off-peak times, water is pumped from a lower reservoir to a much higher one, 
storing potential gravitational energy. This stored energy is converted to kinetic energy 
during peak loads when water in the higher reservoir is released back into the lower one, 
which generates electricity in the process. Due to the need to pump water against 
gravity to a higher reservoir, this method is actually a net consumer of energy and is 
unsuitable for baseload purposes. It also has very specific geographical requirements. 
Nonetheless, pumped-storage hydropower (PSH) remains the most commercially 
important way to store large amounts of energy, and at the same time allows the grid 
to temporarily expand its capacity for a while. Run-of-the-river hydroelectricity (RORH) 
is a way of generating electricity that requires little or no creation of a reservoir. This 
requires that rivers maintain certain minimum flow rates or are regulated by an 
upstream lake or small reservoir. A small reservoir can be built using small dams, which 
also help channel water into the turbines. Such RORH generation methods are suitable 
for baseload uses, and in the right locations can often rival large conventional 
hydroelectric dams in terms of capacity. Other RORH schemes that do not involve 
creating the reservoir can be used like PSH schemes, for peak load use or at certain times 
of the year, and the absence of a reservoir greatly reduces the likelihood of maintained 
flow rates throughout seasonal changes.  
By far the most common hydropower schemes are the conventional hydropower 
schemes. These are the iconic dams built across rivers and hold back large amounts of 
water, often creating massive reservoirs. The volume and height of the water held 
behind dam walls translates to large amounts of potential energy. The more water being 
stored in the reservoir and the higher the water level, the greater the potential energy. 
Conventional hydropower is also considered the largest power-producing facility in the 
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world by capacity. For example, the Three Gorges Dam in China and Itaipu Dam at the 
border of Brazil and Paraguay have generating capacities of 22,500MW and 14,000MW 
respectively (Sovacool et al., 2014). In contrast, the largest nuclear power station, the 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan, has a capacity of only 7,965MW 
(Butler, 2011).  Conventional hydropower, also the most operationally flexible way to 
produce electricity as it is less subject to seasonal fluctuations due to the large amount 
of stored water, also opens further economic possibilities. The large body of water 
allows other uses such as channelling for irrigation, and other activities to be conducted 
on water. The presence of the dam and regulated operations of the spillways also 
provide flood control capabilities to authorities. 
1.3 Hydropower Concerns 
In general, hydropower has some significant advantages. Firstly, it is considered a form 
of renewable energy. Secondly, it produces far less carbon dioxide emissions compared 
to fossil fuel-powered generation. Thirdly, it is an extremely responsive and flexible 
system. It takes a few minutes for a hydroelectric plant to start electricity production, to 
raise or lower production, or shut down. Coal-fired power plants take up to 12 hours to 
complete a cold start (Lefton and Besuner, 2006). This makes smaller scale hydropower, 
or pumped-storage schemes (section 1.2 above) suitable as forms of backup power 
generation. Fourthly, well run and well-planned hydroelectric schemes are very 
economical over the long run. These plants do not require fuel, have low operating costs 
due to a high level of automation and can possibly run for many decades. 
1.3.1 Environmental Concerns 
Hydroelectric schemes, especially conventional hydroelectric schemes, also bring about 
several potential problems to governments intending to build them. Rivers have always 
been important to civilisation and human settlements. The environmental damage 
caused by dams can also be massive. Damming rivers cause water levels to rise, 
drastically flooding forests and farmland. Indigenous and farming communities will 
inevitably be displaced. Besides economic losses, these communities also lose their 
cultural spaces and infrastructure.  
Upstream, flooding of large areas of land to great depths means that many habitats are 
destroyed. Small streams that harbour unique freshwater communities are inundated, 
fisheries disappear, and lowland forests and their accompanying species assemblages 
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are destroyed. As ideal dam sites are often hilly or mountainous, water bodies may 
isolate hill or mountain tops, forming land-bridge islands that trap species that are 
unable to disperse across vast gaps in the forest (Terbough et al., 2001).  The expansion 
of the gaps from river to lake proportions also disrupts migratory movements of various 
species. The larger water surface also traps solar energy. Warmer water presents two 
major problems (Dake and Harleman, 1969). Firstly, convection cycles are disrupted, as 
the significantly warmer top layer of water is less dense and does not allow deeper water 
to rise and circulate. Secondly, water contains less dissolved gases as temperature 
increases, which means that the water may become hypoxic, except around areas where 
tributary rivers or streams feed into the lake.  
Downstream of the dam, the remainder of the river system becomes affected by the 
irregularity of the water flow (Zdankus et al., 2008). Where once a river flowed 
continuously at steady flow rates (albeit with seasonal variation), this section of the river 
now experiences the arrival of water in bursts, when water behind the dam is released. 
Water released from hydroelectric reservoirs tends not to carry any sediment, as the 
period of stagnation behind the dam causes water to drop its sediment load. The rush 
of water results in the scouring of river beds and river banks downstream and reduces 
the fertility of downstream river deltas or riverside farmland. Conversely, the settling of 
fertilising sediment behind the dam results in it silting up. The unpredictability of water 
release added to the scouring effect means that there is an extremely high level of 
disturbance to riverine habitats downstream of hydroelectric dams. Finally, many fish 
species head upstream to spawn, and the dam in the absence of fish ladders seriously 
disrupts the breeding of such species. Even the use of fish ladders has been known to 
cause injuries to fish. 
A great part of hydropower’s attraction to policy makers can be attributed to the 
marketing of ‘renewable’ or ‘green’ energy. Clearly, in hydropower, no fuel is combusted 
in electricity generation. Combustion is a chemical process that has proven to be a 
remarkably wasteful way of generating electricity, often scoring under 40% for coal-fired 
power plants and just over 40% for gas fired ones (IEA, 2009). On the other hand, 
hydropower is extremely efficient. The efficiency of modern hydroelectric plants are 
around 90% (US Department of the Interior, 2005). In recent years, however, much 
environmental opposition arose to counter these claims. Although no fossil fuel is burnt 
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to generate electricity, it is possible for hydroelectric plants to produce higher levels of 
greenhouse gases than some fossil fuel-fired plants. Greenhouse gases in hydroelectric 
plants are produced by the anaerobic decomposition that happens underwater, 
especially in tropical areas where there are large areas of rainforests or other areas such 
as farmland that contain large amounts of plant biomass (Rosa et al., 2004; Fearnside, 
2002).  
1.3.2 Financial Concerns 
Conventional hydroelectric projects are often monumental, both in terms of scale as 
well as cost. Governments often treat such projects as ‘crown jewel’ projects, projecting 
their intent to industrially develop their country. Large hydropower projects have long 
lead times due to the scale of feasibility, planning and engineering studies required 
before a dam site is selected. Hydropower costs can be split into three parts: project 
development, civil works and electromechanical costs (Sovacool and Cooper, 2013).  
The project development phase is the early phase of the project where various pre-
construction activities are required. These include and are not restricted to feasibility 
studies, ecological impact assessment and mitigation studies and sociological, cultural 
and historical impact assessment and mitigation. This is the phase that provides 
significantly to the long lead times of hydropower plant projects. In the case of the Bakun 
Hydroelectric Plant, the long lead time has led to the repeated shelving and resurrection 
of the project due to the cyclical boom and bust periods in the economic growth of 
Malaysia. Local opposition to dam-induced displacement also affects project 
development time as the authorities grapple with issues of cultural rootedness, land 
tenure issues and compensation packages. 
Civil works costs cover the various costs of constructing the physical infrastructure of 
the hydroelectric power plant, including site access and grid connection. The variability 
of the costs at this stage depends greatly on the agreements made between the 
government and the constructors of the project. Thus far, Chinese hydroelectric dam 
construction project contracts fall into four categories: Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction (EPC) or Turnkey; Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT); Construction-only; 
Project Management only. Under EPC arrangements, the contractor designs, procures 
and constructs for the project, meaning that a lot more legal liability lies with the 
contractor, compared to construction-only projects. It is possible that a different 
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contractor is used for the three EPC phases. Turnkey projects are similar to EPC projects, 
but these involve the additional financial clause of a price-limit for the contractors to 
finally produce a fully functional hydroelectric power plant. In practice, true turnkey 
projects rarely exist. Semi-turnkey projects are more common, where only some areas 
of the construction have a price-cap. Increasingly, Chinese hydroelectric power plant 
constructors are pursuing BOT projects. These projects mean that host government 
where the plant is to be built gives concessions to the Chinese companies to first build, 
and then run the project for a fixed amount of time before it is turned over to the locals. 
The construction company bears the cost of designing, constructing and financing the 
project (meaning little cost to the host government), but recovers these costs over the 
operation phase of the contract. This can translate to long run profitability and financial 
sustainability of the constructors. Project management contracts are rare, and simply 
involve coordinating the various sub-contractors to keep within time and cost 
constraints. 
The construction of large scale hydroelectric projects has historically been beset by 
records of staggering time and (often as a result) cost overruns averaging mean overrun 
costs of 96% of initial budgets. The Three-Gorges Dam in China overran its cost 
projections by US$47 billion (402% of initial budget), and the final nominal cost of the 
Visegrad Dam in Yugoslavia ended up being 110-times its initial budget. A review of 
hydroelectric dam construction (Ansar et al., 2014) found a number of factors that result 
in time and cost overruns. The first are psychological biases, such as the “planning 
fallacy”, where panel experts often underestimate the time it will take to complete 
various phases of the construction, due to an over-reliance on heuristics or theoretical 
timeframes, instead of consulting historical timeframes for similar tasks. Timeframes are 
often over-optimistically compressed by project promoters trying to win projects for 
their firms. These sales pitches often include subtle deceptions that play to various 
political agendas that result in biased decision-making by authorities.  Secondly, the 
nations that embark on hydroelectric mega-dam projects tend to be developing nations 
that are not on a strong fiscal footing. The scale and cost of the project require the 
governments of these states to borrow heavily. External debt-driven construction of 
hydroelectric dams has two dangers. First is the sheer amount of debt required to 
complete the project in nominal terms. Second is the distinct possibility of the national 
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currency declining alarmingly against the debt denomination due to various economic 
and political factors both internally and internationally. Thirdly, there is the concept of 
inflation creep. This is often the result of time overruns affecting the cost overruns of 
the hydroelectric project. When projects experience delays, it is not just the cost of the 
civil works that is accumulated. Delays severely impact the operational date of these 
dams, and therefore the date where governments start recouping the capital costs and 
repaying the debts associated with such construction. Further accumulated interests 
then add to cost overruns.   
Another review of cost overruns in electricity infrastructure discusses the effect of time 
overruns translating into cost overruns in hydroelectric projects (Sovacool et al., 2014). 
The mean construction period in their sample of 61 hydroelectric projects was over 118 
months. This exposes hydroelectric projects to various risks and uncertainty which lead 
to financial overruns as discussed in the preceding paragraph. The capital-intensity of 
hydroelectric dams is also related to their high material-intensity, requiring on average 
almost three times more materials to build than a nuclear power plant (Sovacool, 2014). 
1.3.3 Social Concerns 
As hydroelectric reservoirs flood a large area of land, construction of a dam is often 
associated with the massive displacement of communities. The Three Gorges Dam in 
China is thought to have displaced 1.4 million people (Wee, 2012), while the Aswan High 
Dam in Egypt uprooted more than 100,000 (Fahim, 1981). ‘Forced’ or ‘involuntary’ 
migration (Li et al., 2001). Dam-induced displacement is a subset of development-
induced displacement, which itself is one of three types of forced migration, the other 
two being political and conflict displacement, and environmental and disaster 
displacement (Oxford Institute of International Development, 2010). Therefore, the 
social effects of dam-induced displacement are also development-induced displacement. 
Development-induced displacement most fundamentally dislocates a community from 
their own cultural and physical space (Penz et al., 2011). It is an imposed event, and 
therefore it is not surprising that often these communities would prefer not to have 
been moved (Parnwell, 1993). One important distinction between dam-induced 
displacement and the other forms of displacement is that the inundation of their 
ancestral lands means that there is no chance of returning and reconstructing what was 
in the same places. The social effects of displacement can greatly vary. Occasionally, 
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projects report positive outcomes, such as the resettlement projects in China’s Shuikou 
and Yantan dam constructions (Picciotto et al., 2001). On the other hand, some greatly 
unbeneficial outcomes are commonly seen. For instance, in India, it is found that women 
displaced by the Tehri dam had become disempowered due to gender-biased 
resettlement policies (Bisht, 2009). The reduced ability of women to become 
economically productive meant that the family had to depend on a single salary, which 
led to spikes in domestic violence cases (Fernandes and Raj, 1992). Impoverishment risks 
that lead to further social problems are discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.4 The Politics of China’s Dam Exports 
Urban and Novensgard (2014) wrote that three conditions have caused China to start 
exporting technology such as hydropower on massive scales: access to resources, access 
to new markets and technological advances. First, there is a need to continue to fuel 
economic growth by expanding its resource base, which is quickly depleting after years 
of rapid economic growth (Urban and Mohan, 2011). The Chinese government facilitates 
such access via the “Going Out Strategy” and state-assisted financing, which encourages 
Chinese companies to invest in overseas energy and resource sectors (Bosshard, 2009). 
Secondly, sectors such as hydropower have become saturated within the Chinese 
domestic market and, as such, the first generation of large state-owned companies 
operating under liberalised markers needed to move towards international markets 
(Huang, 2008).  Thirdly, Chinese engineering standards have also improved rapidly 
within sectors such as energy generation, and this has provided them with attractive 
products for a lucrative energy market. Increasing public awareness of the dangers of 
carbon emissions, climate change and renewable energy also help create the conditions 
for exporting hydropower technology. All these factors combined to result in Chinese 
power generation equipment exports becoming one of the best performers in the 
Chinese export economy. In 2000, power generation equipment exports totalled $26.8 
billion and by 2010 it had become China’s second largest export, accounting for $309.8 
billion (Dinh et al., 2013:52). 
As of November 2014 (International Rivers, 2014), there are 308 dams completed, under 
construction or proposed worldwide with Chinese involvement, of which 123 are in 
South-east Asia (forming 40% of Chinese dams worldwide). Of the South-east Asian 
dams, one in Brunei is for maintaining water supplies while one in Vietnam is for 
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irrigation. The explosion in Chinese dam-building endeavour is startling when one 
realises that, prior to the turn of the millennium, there had only been 6 dams built by 
them.  
As mentioned at the start of this section, a number of factors had resulted in China 
becoming a supply-side leader. On the demand side, another set of factors had led to an 
increased acceptance and demand for Chinese-engineered hydropower. Firstly, Chinese 
dam-builders are invariably state-owned. This gives it virtually incomparable financial 
and political influence. Chinese dam corporations are able to offer reasonably well-
engineered dams with other Chinese government sweeteners such as trade deals, 
foreign aid or other investments. Secondly, in contrast to other governments, the 
Chinese government is noted for being extremely pragmatic regarding the geopolitics of 
the region of new dam projects, remarkably detached regarding internal affairs of the 
host state, and very fluid in terms of corporate social responsibility depending on where 
they are. This means that very often China displays almost no interest regarding the 
social and environmental costs of their projects to host governments. In contrast, 
assistance by non-state organisations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) are often tied to conditions that try to increase government 
transparency and raise governance levels by World Bank standards. Clearly, the Chinese 
offer a much more parsimonious path for host politically and economically isolated 
governments. 
1.5 Aims of the Thesis 
Many developing nations have had a requirement to build hydroelectric dams to fulfil 
various requirements of their development (Fearnside, 2006; Kaygusuz, 2002; Dudgeon, 
2000; Sarkar and Karagöz, 1995). These requirements may be energy security, the need 
for renewable energy, and to provide jobs and attract the foreign private investment 
that is associated with such large-scale projects (Gurbuz, 2006; Kaygusuz, 2002). Various 
organisations and individuals, from NGOs to academics, have argued against such 
projects, due to the perceived negative impacts that the inundation of land from dams 
cause.  Many such arguments have, however, at least two drawbacks. The first is that 
these tend to be very narrow in scope. For example, environmental NGOs will argue for 
the loss of forest habitats and alteration of the freshwater environment (Dudgeon, 2000; 
Rosenberg et al., 1997; Dudgeon, 1992) while, separately, indigenous community 
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advocates will argue against the need for a project that will uproot entire settlements 
(Suhakam, 2009; Colm, 1997). The second drawback is that the arguments are based on 
what is visible within the short term of the construction of the large dams. 
Little work has been done to assess the effects of these projects in the longer term after 
the dam has been built. Have the communities developed faster due perhaps to better 
access to education and medical facilities after being moved out of their old forest 
homes, for example? How have wildlife communities restructured after the 
fragmentation of the habitat caused by the inundation? How have keystone species 
adapted to the new environments? How have relations between the community and 
both their old and new lands changed and have these brought about a difference in 
power relations between communities with each other and the government? These 
questions are essentially wide-ranging, thus requiring a political ecology approach, in 
order to bring together such different disciplines. Not forgetting that political ecology 
fundamentally assumes politics and the environment (or ecology) are “everywhere 
thoroughly interconnected” (Bryant, 1998: 82). 
The aims of the thesis have two interconnected strands, ecological and social.  In the 
ecological study (Chapter 6), there are two aims. The first is to inventorise ground 
mammals in the study area. The second is to compare their occurrence with the baseline 
data, the information collected from the environmental impact assessment and the 
animal rescue attempts during the impoundment and inundation of the dam by Sarawak 
Forestry Corp. This gives us a picture of the recovery (or collapse) of the various species 
that were originally present in the pre-impoundment locations. Ground mammals are 
chosen because they are important protein sources for the native communities, as well 
as being the major seed dispersers in tropical rainforests. The activity of hunting these 
animals also represents a link between the displaced communities and their ancestral 
lands. The primary locations for fieldwork are the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam Reservoir 
and Sungai Asap Resettlement Scheme, Sarawak, Malaysia.  
The ‘human’ part of the project (Chapter 5 and 6) looks at the adaptability and 
'mainstreaming' of the indigenous peoples of Sarawak that have been relocated because 
of the construction of the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam. How have the lives and well-being 
of the indigenous people been (both positively and negatively) impacted, and how have 
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their options in life changed? How have they adapted to being integrated into a modern, 
monetary economy and having reduced access to their ancestral lands and natural 
environment? Has their attitude to being moved changed? Has their interaction with the 
government changed? 
The ultimate goal, and where the originality of this thesis lies, is that it tries to 
understand how the ecology, the politics and the lives of the indigenous displaced 
communities have been altered by the BHD and their neglected links to events beyond 
the local scale as a result of today’s globalised world. In this thesis, we hypothesise that 
politics and competing interests from faraway places like Australia and China play out in 
Sarawak, through the international aid channel, which result in sociological and 
environmental problems. Empirical data and methodology is discussed in Chapter 4. 
The significance of this study lies in a number of areas:  
1) It will be the most complete study of the effects of such projects in Asia as the 
different disciplines are not siloed but brought together under a single 
comprehensive study using a political ecology approach. There is an extremely 
important practical purpose for this, as siloed studies and reports can give rise to 
conflicting policies, or policies that sideline some disciplines. A political ecology 
approach examines the past of the projects, understands its history, why and how 
the results appear as they do now, and is able to point out and identify complex 
issues that arise due to the interplay between various disciplines. This becomes 
much clearer in the later chapters which examines livelihoods and environmental 
effects of livelihood reconstruction (Chapters 5 and 6), as well as in the examination 
of role of both domestic and international politics in the history of the dam and the 
effects of resettlement. 
2) The understanding of the natural environment, the species surviving and the quality 
of the freshwater habitat and forests after inundation is vital to for the future 
economic and environmental policy planning for most efficient use of the environs 
of Bakun Lake. For example, there may be a potential for eco-tourism in the area, 
but how the place could be marketed depends on the types of species available to 
nature lovers. Primate-spotting and bird-watching are extremely popular and 
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potentially lucrative eco-tourism activities, but for this to proceed there needs to be 
an understanding of the ecology of the post-inundation Bakun.  
3) It allows a more complete inventorisation of the current stock of medium to large 
species (which tend to be important to indigenous communities) because of the use 
of camera trapping.  
4) This study continues work done by various anthropologists by continuing to 
document the post-resettlement progress of the resettled communities such as the 
Kayan. Work in the Kayan community is important as, culturally, this is often 
considered the most influential group among the Orang Ulu. The trajectory of their 
development is thus likely to be followed by the other communities at the 
Resettlement Scheme. 
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Chapter 2 The Theoretical Context 
 
2.1 Research Field – Political Ecology 
The Bakun Hydroelectric Project is a very good case study for the interdisciplinary 
paradigm of political ecology. Political ecology is a poorly defined field, precisely due to 
its transdisciplinary nature. The most commonly cited definition of modern political 
ecology is that it is a field that ‘combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined 
political economy. Together, this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic 
between … social groups and their physical environment’ (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). 
Political ecology is essentially an interest in how political, economic and ecological 
possibilities and realities interact via social actors with asymmetric political competition. 
Narratives in political ecology are dominated by four main discourses: 1) Degradation 
and marginalisation, 2) environmental conflict, 3) conservation and control, and 4) 
environmental identity and social movement (Robbins, 2004).  The first thesis is 
concerned with environmental change, land degradation and its relationship with 
marginalised communities in a political and economic context. Environmental conflict is 
concerned with environmental access and the struggle for power over this access, which 
may include various components of society, such as gender, class and race.  
Conservation and control look at environment conservation, and its confusion with 
‘preservation’ and the resultant political and economic exclusion. Finally, the last thesis 
is concerned with how social upheaval brought about changes in environmental 
conditions and management policies.  It can be argued that political ecology lies at the 
confluence of the Sciences, the Social Sciences, and Political Economy (Greenberg and 
Park, 1994).  
The Sciences are mainly concerned with ecology, which started as a form of geographic 
study, looking at the role of abiotic factors on biological systems (Worster, 1985). Initially 
however, humans were not a consideration in this field. Ecology has since tried to 
include humans but with great controversy, as human ecology. According to some 
authors, this has plunged the field ‘into a crisis about its validity and methodology, the 
end of which is not yet in sight.’ (Enzensberger, 1982).  
Social scientists used ideas borne out of ‘apolitical’, non-human ecology and cybernetics 
(Odum, 1953; Ellen, 1982) to explore the role of human communities in the 
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environments they live in, giving rise to the fields of cultural ecology and ecological 
anthropology. These researchers (often working with hunter-gatherer or rural peasant 
groups) attempted to explain various cultural practices and institutions as adaptions to 
their environments. Roy Rappaport’s (1968) classic work with the Tsembaga in New 
Guinea is an example. He looked at this group’s ritual cycles that coordinate swidden 
fallow cycles and reared pig population regulations. For example, when the womenfolk 
start noticing that the pig populations have become too big to control, rituals are carried 
out to offer the pigs to the spirits, thereby reducing pig populations to manageable levels. 
Applying the ecological concept of calorific flow through this particular ecosystem, he 
argues that cultures are able to interact with the ecosystems in a homeostatic fashion – 
essentially the cybernetic theory of ultrastability (Ellen, 1982: 225) – and uses a 
thermostat as an analogy. However, contemporary ecological science now disputes the 
assumption that ecosystems are homeostatic, but are instead rather more chaotic in 
nature (Bjørnstad, 2015; Proulx, 2014; Escobar, 1999).  
The final major part that ties the field of political ecology together is an older 
interdisciplinary field - political economy. Political economy is a field that counts Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx as its early pioneers. It is concerned with the interactions between 
politics (power and interests), society (actors with interests and values) and economics. 
The most fundamental basis of political economy is that politics and economics are 
essentially inseparable, and that interests do not just compete, but also that this 
competition should be encouraged (Atkinson, 1991:3). It is ‘political’ because it 
recognises that the individual has self-interests, and that between people with 
coincidental interests there lies a potential to promote, on a national scale, such an 
interest. The same explanation also extends to the international stage. In some sense, 
political economy may be seen as the polar opposite of traditional ecology. The former 
is only interested in human social constructs while the latter found its theoretical 
success where humans are not part of the picture. Political ecology can, therefore, be 
considered a transgressionary field as it brings two such fields together, and its 
practitioners aim to understand the processes and dynamics within such ‘politicised 
environments’ (Bryant, 1999). 
Blaikie (1995) represented the human-environment dynamics of specific environmental 
issues with a model called ‘a chain of explanation’. He used the example of land 
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degradation in a Himalayan community (Error! Reference source not found.). Economic 
problems (Box B) are linked to a physical environmental cause (Box A). These are caused 
by land-use practices (Box C), and individual (Box D) and societal decisions on land use 
(Box E). Such decisions are in turn often a result of conditions placed upon societies, 
hence individuals by wider national (Box F) and international situations (Box G). As a 
logical extension, to thoroughly consider environmental or ecological issues or even if 
locals consider these issues as problematic are really a reflection of the order of priority 
that societies place on said issues and the normal political and economic processes in 
such societies (Hoben, 1995; Harvey, 1993: 25). 
The visualisation of the Blaikie chain of explanation concept was further improved by 
Bryant and Bailey (1997) when they tabulated Blaikie’s figure (Error! Reference source 
not found.) and broke down politicised environments into three ‘dimensions’: everyday, 
episodic and systemic. These dimensions, while essentially temporal, also decrease 
inequality of exposure to the results of environmental damage from ‘everyday’ to 
‘systemic’. The ‘everyday’ dimension involves being participant to daily activities that 
can degrade the environment. The ‘episodic’ dimension involves occasional, sudden 
catastrophic environmental changes that impact different levels of society unequally. 
Some such events, such as flooding, may often be erroneously described as ‘natural’ 
disasters (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 28). The ‘systematic’ dimension involves 
environmental changes as a result of industrial activity that may mostly be equal in their 
impact on all levels of society. 
Table 2.1: Dimensions of politicised environments. Source: Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 30. 
Dimensions Physical 
Changes 
Nature of Human 
Impact 
Political Response Key Concept 
Everyday Soil erosion, 
deforestation, 
salinisation 
Cumulative, 
usually highly 
unequal; the poor 
are the main 
losers 
Livelihood 
protests/resistance 
Marginality 
Episodic Flooding, high 
winds/storms, 
drought 
May have general 
impact but 
unequal exposure 
means that the 
poor are the main 
losers 
‘Disaster’ relief Vulnerability 
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Systemic Nuclear fallout, 
pesticide 
concentration, 
biologically 
modified 
species 
Tends to have 
general impact 
Popular distrust of 
‘experts’ 
Risk 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Blaikie's chain of explanation of land degradation. Source: Bryant, 1998: 83. 
Following on from the work of Adams and Hulme (2001), Berkes (2004) and Humphries 
(2012), the theoretical approach is socio-politically centred (Bryant, 1998) and attempts 
to give a deeper understanding of the complexities of diverse and contested areas such 
as the Bakun Hydroelectric Project and the Asap-Koyan resettlement scheme. Cognisant 
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of the complex environment, this approach also does not attempt to prescribe binary 
verdicts as to whether the HEP and resettlement schemes work or not. In contrast to 
environmental politics, which primarily is concerned with the role of the state in 
managing the environment and environmental impacts of development (Forsyth, 2003: 
4), political ecology focuses on the interactions between the state, non-state actors, and 
the physical environment (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 190).  
Since the work Blaikie and Brookfield, one of the most significant contributions of 
political ecology has been to question and disprove existing developing doctrines. 
Various studies in different locations around the world have shown that persistent 
poverty and environmental deterioration have come as a result of state-led 
developmental programs that were meant to solve these problems (Little and 
Horowitz 1987; Stonich 1989; Peet and Watts, 1993; Painter and Durham 1995; 
Andersson et al., 2011; Peres and Schneider, 2012). They have also demonstrated 
some commonalities that perpetuate and worsen existing suboptimal developmental 
and environmental conditions (Stonich, 1998), and these are often in agreement with 
Blaikie’s chains of explanation concept. The foremost observation is that 
impoverishment and practices deleterious to the environment and its economic 
potential are often a result of reduced access to land and required agricultural 
resources, which is in itself often related to social and political status. Asymmetric 
power relations may also play out as violence due to opposition to land grabbers and 
speculators, and the inability to deflect the often inordinate amount of blame for 
environmental destruction shifted on to smallholder agricultural communities (Stonich, 
1993; Stonich 1998; Peres and Schneider, 2012). The work by political ecologists on the 
links between power relations, social injustices and environmental degradation has 
also shown that a far greater extent of destruction has been caused by powerful 
agencies and actors and that a great deal of land and other natural resources have 
been degraded by the activities of more powerful private, public, and corporate 
interests (Stonich 1989, 1993; 1995; Duraiappah, 1998; Jorgenson, 2006). Large-scale 
destruction is often observed on concession land granted by the state. As the costs 
associated with resource extraction are relatively low and the practice is often 
lucrative, corporate concession holders in poorly enforced states often exhaust the 
resources on their concessions and move to other lands rather than conserve the 
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resources present in their concession. In an increasingly global economy, developed 
nations are also beginning to externalise their environmental consumption to 
developing nations, such that the destructive effects of first world consumption are 
experienced in poorer nations. These cases, such as when developed nation interests 
clear forests that developing nation communities depend on for subsistence, has been 
termed ‘unequal ecological exchange’ (Jorgenson, 2006). Unequal ecological 
exchanges and the feedback loop that perpetuates poverty and environmental 
destruction are made possible by the interests that institutionalise the ease with which 
land is assigned to concessions, effectively locking in the unequal access to resources 
(Stonich, 1998). 
2.1.1 Actors, Power and Scale 
Simply put, actors are individuals or groups of people that have vested interests in the 
said physical environment. Interests are almost always varied and multidimensional, and 
their interactions with the environment reflect this (Lewis 2003: 50). Such variations 
mean that power is exercised by the propagation of specific meanings or ideas in 
different situations, to the effect of marginalising less powerful actors (Robbins, 2004; 
Escobar, 1996; Peet and Watts, 1996).  
Actors are extremely important in political ecology. As mentioned earlier, political 
ecology is a study of the socio-political processes behind environmental issues, or even 
whether particular environmental situations are perceived to be issues in the first place. 
In other words, environmental disturbances or disruptions are such only if the different 
actors within this society perceive there to be problems or opportunities that will arise. 
Blakie and Brookfield’s work with Himalayan societies showed that environmental 
changes (soil erosion, in this case), may actually go unnoticed by actors, and therefore 
will not figure in any way in any socio-political dimension. Importantly, the interaction 
between actors and their natural environment are defined by their respective power 
and scale. 
While Bryant and Bailey characterised these themes separately, in practice these two 
themes are very closely linked as the latter is a product of efforts to exercise the former 
more effectively (Zulu, 2009; Lebel et al., 2008). Power is defined by Max Weber as the 
ability of a person or group of persons to “realise their own will in a communal action 
even against the resistance of others” (Weber, 1946: 180). Scale is a geographical 
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concept (Brown and Purcell, 2005). Deforestation may be seen as issues on a local scale 
(Bassett and Zueli, 2000), while the South-east Asian transboundary haze as a result of 
peat fires may be seen as a regional issue (Jones, 2006; Koh and Robinson, 2002). 
Environmental changes may sometimes be perceived as ‘belonging’ to a particular scale, 
and thus should be solved by specific actors (such as transboundary haze should be 
solved by regional governments). The danger of such thinking has been called the ‘scalar 
trap’ and was shown in an analysis of the literature of Amazonian deforestation, where 
researchers tended to assume that the best solution to democratising and sustainably 
utilising natural environments is to devolve power to local scale actors (see Brown and 
Purcell, 2005).   
Early in human geography, scale was seen as ontological, meaning that it had a tangible 
and fixed concept (Herod and Wright, 2002: 5). It was argued that Henri Lefebvre’s (1974) 
suggestion that capitalism both derives from and is driven by ‘social superstructures’ 
raises the point of ‘scales’ by social separation (Brenner, 2001). More recently debate 
has shifted to a constructionist framework, and if scale should really be epistemological 
and a more fluid concept of interactions between people and societies - what is 
sometimes called ‘tangled hierarchies’ (Bulkeley, 2005; Herod and Wright, 2002; Mains, 
2002; Jones, 1998; Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  Therefore, global, regional, national and 
local scales are not isolated from each other and are in constant interaction (see Error! 
Reference source not found.). While scales are ‘a way of framing conceptions of reality’, 
scalar frames on their own are by no means accepted by all (Marston, 2000: 221). This, 
in turn, means that scales are spaces of power conflicts (Brenner, 2001).  
Despite the slipperiness of the politics and concept of scale, it is nonetheless essential 
in political ecology. The most parsimonious way of first looking at environmental change 
is through scale. For example, for the issue of transboundary haze, the weaker and 
poorer local scale actors are those that bear the brunt for any peat fires. They are 
nearest to the fires and are most affected by the direct costs of all physical effects (fires, 
smoke) and political reactions (boycotts of their products) compared to their wealthier 
and more powerful regional scale counterparts (government institutions, multinational 
corporations).  
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Ichikawa’s work (2003) provides an example to illustrate how scale is discussed within 
political ecology research. The study looks at local-scale changes in land-use practice and 
deforestation activities, centred around Rumah Nakat, an Iban longhouse in Sarawak, 
and how these changes are a result of politico-economic influences on the national and 
regional scale (South-east Asia). Like most longhouses in Sarawak, early economic 
activities were for meeting local scale demand via the extraction and trade of non-forest 
timber products. The longhouse eventually becomes exposed to extra-community 
economic influences such as the encouragement to compete in national and regional 
markets, causing the shift in economic activity from forest product trade to rice 
cultivation. In order to survive the competitive regional rice market, the longhouse finds 
itself in need of increasing areas of land to raise production levels to ensure economic 
viability. As rice cultivation requires large areas of both wet- and dryland, this has 
resulted in the large-scale clear-cutting of the land around the longhouse for this 
purpose.  
The ‘denaturalisation’ of the land around Rumah Nakat, as a result of the political and 
economic forces acting on the longhouse community, can also be seen as a consequence 
of negotiated power relations and can be explained by Blaikie and Brookfield’s (1987) 
concept of marginalisation. They argue that economic and socio-political 
marginalisation leads to ecological marginalisation, such as when power-poor peasants 
can only have access to infertile lands for cultivation. This then starts a vicious cycle 
where their farming efforts further degrade the land and the economic efficiency of such 
an activity, leading to further poverty, which in turn brings about further political 
exclusion. 
2.1.2 Where is the Ecology? 
The title of this sub-section comes from the title of an article written by Peter Walker 
(2005), which tries to address concerns that political ecology is increasingly becoming 
‘politics without ecology’ (Bassett and Zimmerer, 2004; 03; Vayda and Walters, 1999). 
One contention is that the assumption that politics must inherently be the foremost 
factor is petitio principii, an informal logical fallacy that results in circular reasoning. It is 
caused by assuming the truth of a statement, and neglecting other factors. Vayda and 
Walters (1999) contend that the overwhelming focus to depoliticise ecology of the 
1960s caused a massive overcompensation that now becomes ‘politics without ecology’ 
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in which the field of political ecology becomes overwhelmingly about the politics and 
political relations and negotiations about natural resources and their management (i.e. 
natural resource politics), rather than actually studying any ecology at all. 
The lack of ecological studies and data in ‘political ecology’ studies was highlighted in a 
critical working paper on the Centre for International Forestry Research’s (CIFOR’s) 
research in Kayan Mentarang, Kalimantan (Vayda, 1997). In two major, but overlapping 
projects, CIFOR attempted to study how a Kenyah community managed forests by 
converging on income-generating forest exploitation and tried to make a case for more 
devolved powers to communities for the management of forest resources. These 
projects were very heavily skewed towards the social sciences due to the focus on 
income-generation. Various other aspects of the community and the species of 
exploited resource in question, gaharu, were not taken into account or studied 
concurrently. The resulting reports that emerged from this project were poor duplicates 
of long-term on-going anthropological projects. The lack of ecological work meant that 
the community’s zealous exclusionary tactics to protect access to gaharu trees were 
seen as ‘local responses to over-exploitation’ that were ‘compatible with conservation’. 
In reality, gaharu trees at the time of the reports were not over-exploited nor 
threatened with extinction. Rather, the strict controls to access imposed (to the point of 
physically confiscating equipment) were a way of ensuring the community gains 
exclusive access to the harvesting of the fragrant heartwood to maximise profits to pay 
off debts for items such as boats and engines, while their agricultural activities ensure 
that they are not spending for subsistence. 
Many examples of more recent, eminent work in ‘political ecology’ also do not directly 
engage in research in ecology, although these often the application of research 
techniques from anthropology, sociology and political science and economy (See Walker, 
2005 for a list of such examples). In such cases, the aim of the work, like the above 
example, seeks to understand and advise developmental projects and policies. 
Environmental problems or conditions were always taken from historical contexts. 
There were thus notable gaps in such work with regards to how biophysical ecology 
might cause existing conflicts or struggles, how changing biophysical parameters affect 
the future, and, most importantly, how existing struggles may affect or cause further 
environmental changes. 
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There are a few examples of successful biophysically-grounded political ecology 
research. Matthew Turner’s long-term fieldwork in Sahelian West Africa critically 
examines the existing assumptions that livestock population sizes are affected purely by 
bioclimatic factors. He uses his own existing empirical ecological data (Turner, 1993) of 
the effects of livestock grazing on nutrient composition and soil chemistry and grassland 
productivity (Turner, 1998a; Turner, 1998b) as a starting point. The study expanded to 
include studies of how 1) community-based resource (livestock) management (Turner, 
1999a); 2) labour and power relations of livestock herding and mobility (Turner, 1999b); 
and 3) the changing gender-power relations between livestock owners (Turner, 1999c) 
are reflected in the ecological data that he collected. Karl Zimmerer is another political 
ecologist with a deep understanding of ecology who has succeeded at fusing biophysical 
ecology with sociology. His work in peasant communities in the Andes firstly showed 
how peasant agricultural persistence was made possible by existing biogeophysical 
conditions (Zimmerer, 1991), and then later how these agricultural practices and the 
environment were undermined by external perceptions of soil erosion, and the 
imposition of unsuitable, oversimplified conservation practices (Zimmerer, 1993a; 
1993b). 
Walker (2005) suggested that the trend towards a lack of biophysical ecology in political 
ecology could be due the lack of understanding of the more complicated, unintuitive 
ecological theories such as non-equilibrium ecology. Where biologists use both 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium ecology to understand the environment, some political 
ecologists, such as Tim Forsyth (2003: 63), seem to perceive non-equilibrium theory as 
an alternative that supplants equilibrium theory. 
2.1.3 Synthesis 
Political ecology acknowledges the significant role of politics in environmental and 
resource management through power relations between the environment and the 
different scales of human organisation. The ‘political ecology approach’ employed by 
various researchers uses power as a focal point, as most of the work is centred on 
political questions with little ecological input. A study of political ecology in and around 
the Bakun Hydroelectric Scheme and the Bakun Resettlement scheme needs to focus on 
not just the politics of access to resources and their management, but also on the 
existing environment that has led to various decisions in environmental and subsistence 
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management. Indeed, when first coining the very term ‘political ecology’ in his critique 
of ecological anthropology and cultural ecology, Eric Wolf emphasised the need to 
weave local ecological contexts with insights to political economy (Wolf, 1972). Thus, 
while there is a wealth of political ecology literature focussing on power relations and 
scalar politics, this thesis seeks to help redress an imbalance within political ecology by 
the integration of a stronger ecological grounding than other more recent work. 
The following chapters shall examine these socio-political realities at the Bakun HEP and 
the resettlement scheme from a shared ecology and political base. Chapter 3 situates 
the thesis and introduces Sarawak, the communities at the field site, and the ecology of 
the flooded areas. The further details of the dam would also be introduced at the end 
of the chapter. Chapter 4 covers the methodologies and how these changed from 
project proposal to actual field execution. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 5) looks 
at the economic anthropology of the displaced communities, what Piers Blaikie called 
‘economic symptoms’ (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). This chapter is also informed by 
historical information on incomes, livelihoods and migration from the case studies in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 6 covers the ‘environmental symptoms’, through an ecological study 
of ungulates and links these back to the economic symptoms and livelihood 
reconstruction. It would also include previous work, and a further elaboration on the 
zoological background in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 looks at how in a globalised world, 
domestic politics from different parts of the world (Australia and China), such as that 
mentioned in Chapter 1, and the tensions from these can affect regional aid politics and 
in particular, seemingly unrelated locations (Sarawak) and the livelihood decisions (and 
by extension environmental effects) in these locations. In the final chapter, I summarise 
the other empirical chapters and try to synthesise a unifying overview of the political 
ecology of the Bakun HEP, with policy discussions and recommendations for future dam-
induced displacement projects. 
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Chapter 3 Sarawak 
 
Sarawak is an extremely complex place, both in terms of its human as well as its natural 
history. This chapter lays down more foundation for the thesis, providing the 
background information to the two strands of knowledge required to understand the 
study, its people, and their relationships with their living environment. Section 3.1 looks 
at the socio-cultural dimension, firstly to get to know the communities, and secondly to 
point out their main livelihood practices and financial knowledge. Section 3.2 looks at 
the natural history of Sarawak and the study site, the possible species that may exist 
(which also helps in the inventorising of the mammals in the area) and the existing 
theories behind how inundation can lead to changes in species assemblages. 
3.1 Socio-cultural Anthropology – The Communities around Bakun 
The communities that live along the Batang Balui are indigenous groups including the 
Ukit, Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan and Penan. In all, fifteen longhouse communities were 
selected to move in 1987 (Alexander, 2008a; Rousseau, 1994). Figure 3.1 shows the 
locations of the various communities near the Bakun HEP and the respective indigenous 
groups they belong to. 
The population of Borneo can be roughly divided into two major groups, Malay (or 
Melayu) and Dayak (King, 1993), the condition for the socio-cultural division between 
them being religious, rather than by lineage. Therefore the group ‘Malay’ is itself a rather 
heterogeneous one as religious conversion reclassifies a Dayak as Malay. The Malays 
have a term for this process, ‘masuk Melayu’, meaning ‘enter Malaydom’ (Sellato, 1992). 
For example, Kendayan, Bidayuh and Maloh Dayaks that have embraced Islam are now 
identified as Kapuas Malays. There are some Islamised Dayaks, such as the Melanaus, 
that reject this notion (Sellato and Sercombe, 2007). The Malays appear to have the 
highest position on the ‘ethnic ladder’, and some Dayaks masuk Melayu in order to gain 
a competitive advantage in Malaysian society (Chua, 2007). This entails that the Dayak 
loses his/her previous ethnic identity because a Malay person must be Muslim 
(Benjamin, 2003; Shamsul, 1997) while haram pork and alcohol consumption is an 
important part of the Dayak culture, amongst other characteristics (Chua, 2007). 
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Figure 3.1: Map of the Belaga district and locations of the various indigenous communities prior to impoundment 
of the Bakun Dam (Alexander, 2008a). 
The Dayaks themselves can be split into two groups according to ecological criteria: 
either Punan-Penan hunter-gathers (sometimes called forest nomads) or settled 
agriculturalists (sometimes called swiddeners). The agriculturalists themselves can then 
be divided according to their social structure. Some indigenous groups, such as the 
Kayan, Kenyah and Kajang groups, are described as having two or more social classes 
and hereditary leadership (stratified agriculturalists), while others, like the Iban, are 
believed have egalitarian social systems (King, 1993; Nicolaisen, 1986; King, 1978; 
Freeman, 1981; Leach, 1950). To more contemporary researchers, this essentialism can 
appear forced, and examples of flexibility in the stratification and leadership criteria 
challenge the established nomenclature of the ‘stratified’ indigenous groups (Alexander, 
1992; Armstrong, 1992; Alexander, 1990b; Nicolaisen, 1986), and at least one researcher 
has questioned the validity of ‘egalitarianism’ in the Iban, arguing that they were 
effectively split into three hereditary levels (Rousseau, 1980). Some researchers have 
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tried grouping the Dayaks by language and various cultural traits but that has proven to 
be difficult, as groups with the same name may not speak the same language while 
groups with distinct ethnic names may otherwise seem to be identical (Rousseau, 1990).  
In modern Sarawak, the Dayaks are administratively classified as Iban, Bidayuh or Orang 
Ulu, which latter consists of the Penan and the various members of the Kayan-Kenyah-
Kajang complex (Alexander and Alexander, 1999). 
3.1.1 Place, Group and Subgroup Names of the Indigenous Communities 
Three terms are commonly used when referring to communities here: uma, long, and 
lepo. The terms are explained in Whittier (1974). Long is common to the Kenyah and 
Kayan languages and refers to the confluence of two rivers, and the term is combined 
with the name of the smaller river. Therefore, Long Nawang is the confluence of the 
smaller Nawang with the larger Kayan River. Kenyah villages are often named for river 
confluences as their way of livelihood and travel relies heavily on the rivers and as a 
result, villages are situated at these points. These are therefore place names first, not 
names of groups/sub-groups of communities.  
Subgroup names are indicated by the use of lepo and uma. Lepo means ‘place’ or 
‘village’. The word that comes after ‘lepo’ refers to a description of the particular 
location for which the village is originally named. Therefore, Lepo Tau refers to the 
village which, when started, had tau trees near their longhouses.  The other term uma 
means ‘longhouse’. Within each village, each longhouse is named after a characteristic 
of its structure or a something in its environs. Hence, Uma Long means the longhouse at 
the long, and Uma Bio means ‘the big longhouse’. The use of the term uma can be quite 
confusing to non-natives as there is another term uma, which means ‘swidden field’. 
While uma refers to a smaller entity, it is possible also that, over time, uma may change 
to lepo if a longhouse prospers. 
There is a certain degree of ambiguity when applying the terms lepo or uma to particular 
community subgroups, although the Kenyah appear to agree on the terms without being 
actually able to explain. Some single longhouse communities are called lepo such as Lepo 
Tau, while some are called Uma, such as Uma Djalan. Whittier (1974) hypothesised that 
such groups referred to as lepo may have once been one among many longhouses of a 
particular village. Migration away from this lepo then results in discrete uma 
communities appearing some distance away. The final remaining uma is now known by 
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the lepo name reflecting the history of the place and village, while the longhouses which 
have migrated maintain their longhouse name and identity. Evidence supporting this 
hypothesis comes from the analysis of linguistics of various uma and lepo. For the Kayan, 
‘lepo’ is applied to farmhouses which are built to allow a family to stay at their farmland, 
negating the need for a long trek back to the longhouse.  
The names of settlements are a combination of the above, giving two reference 
locations (Alexander and Alexander, 2008a; Alexander and Alexander, 1999), for 
example, Uma Bawang at Long Murum. The first half of the name refers to a place of 
historical significance and may reflect its founding location while the second half refers 
to the present location. The use of geographical locations to name the settlement is 
believed to reflect the strong ties between a community and its lands and in the case of 
the communities within the Kayan-Kenyah-Kajang complex reflect their dependence on 
the rivers. 
3.1.2 The Punan-Penan Groups 
Hunter-gatherer communities are commonly and collectively referred to as ‘Punan’ in 
literature. ‘Punan’ is speculated to be a native term meaning “to roam or wander in the 
forest” (Sellato, 1989).  Communities named as such are not considered to be culturally 
or socially unified. Such communities may have linguistic characteristics that can be 
similar to the Kayan and Kenyah groups due to migration or nomadic activity in close 
proximity to these groups. Other groups of nomads have names that derive from the 
Malay ‘bukit’, meaning ‘hill’, as these groups often live in the hills and headstream 
regions of Borneo. An example from the Bakun area will be the group that is called Ukit, 
a small group now numbering about 120 people (King, 1997). Living in the hills mean 
that forest nomads were unaccustomed to large streams and rivers and were not able 
to swim and did not have the skills to make dugout canoes (Sellato and Sercombe, 2007). 
The Penan have steadily abandoned nomadism to practise agriculture in settlements in 
Sarawak (Needham, 1972) and, today, Penan groups commonly practise a mixed 
subsistence system, combining some swidden farming with hunting and gathering 
(Sellato and Sercombe, 2007). 
There has been much confusion over groups that have been called ‘Punan’. In Sarawak, 
hunter-gatherer communities are called ‘Penan’, and communities that are called 
‘Punan’ are settled, agricultural communities, in contrast with communities called 
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“Punan” in Kalimantan. For example, the Punan Bah are considered part of the Kajang 
group rather than hunter-gatherer ‘Punan’, and the Ukit (or Buket) are sometimes called 
‘Punan Bukat’.  
3.1.2.1 Penan Economy 
Penan groups that follow the hunter-gatherer lifestyle depend on wild sago for as their 
staple food. Arboreal animals such as gibbons, macaques, birds and squirrels are 
commonly hunted and the Penan are known for their skills with the blowpipe, but 
bearded pigs are highly prized sources of protein (Needham, 1972; Sloan, 1975; Sellato 
and Sercombe, 2007). Omen species such as deer, snakes and some birds are not hunted 
(Needham, 1972; Sellato and Secombe, 2007). Gathering is done by the women, and up 
to 200 types of plants and fungi and their parts (Puri, 2001) are recognised as edible, 
depending on the group and the region the groups inhabit. Their skills as collectors of 
various valuable forest products for the coastal communities mean that they are 
economically valuable societies. Longhouse societies became the patrons and 
protectors of Penan groups and blood-pacts were made to protect the economic rights 
of these patron groups (Pauwels, 1935).  Trade has pushed some Penan groups to 
abandon sago collection and to start rice cultivation, accelerating the process of 
“settlement” of the Penan (Sellato and Sercombe, 2007).  
Some researchers attribute the higher levels of poverty among the Penan groups to poor 
economic planning. The more economically adept middleman longhouse societies 
began a system of debt creation in Penan groups by creating new needs, which they 
perpetuate, causing these nomadic groups to become trapped in a debt cycle and 
become enslaved to their farming patrons. Coastal societies have since found a way to 
trade directly with nomadic groups, bypassing the longhouse societies. They are thought 
to be easily enticed by short-term, impractical attractions. For example, merchants buy 
forest products off the nomads at relatively low prices, and in return sell them expensive 
impracticalities, such as stereo sound systems (Sellato and Sercombe, 2007).  However, 
there are contrasting examples that show that the Penan can be adept traders as well 
(Alexander 2008b). 
3.1.3 The Settled, Agricultural Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang Groups 
The Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang cultural complex includes the large and prominent Kenyah 
and Kajang groups as well as a significant number of Sarawakian riverine ethnicities. All 
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groups under this complex are longhouse groups (Leach, 1950). Kayan and Kenyah 
groups are well-represented along the Balui, with several communities found on along 
its banks upstream of the Bakun HEP. One Kajang community, the Long Pangai Lahanan, 
is also found there (Alexander 2008). The other main groups of Kajang are the Kejaman 
and Sekapan, and the other smaller groups form their own identity associations with 
one of these three groups (Luhat, 1989). Most of the groups classified under this 
complex trace their roots to the mountainous Apo Kayan region in central Borneo 
(Nicolaisen, 1986; Strickland, 1986; Leach, 1950). While these groups are called ‘settled’ 
here, they are by no means permanent and move after a number of years once the land 
begins to lose its fertility. As such some authors describe agricultural groups as ‘shifting’ 
(Hong, 1987) 
As with many agricultural societies, member groups of the Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang groups 
have also developed social stratification (Alexander, 1992; Armstrong, 1992; King 1993; 
Hong 1987, p.12, Rousseau, 1979; Rousseau 1978, p.86). These societies are very 
roughly divisible into three levels. The highest level of society is the aristocratic ipun uma, 
literally translated as ‘ancestors of the house’. The middle class, panyin, is made up of 
commoners such as artisans and farmers. The lowest class of society are called lupau, 
which is made up of slaves who have been descended from other slaves and prisoners 
of war (Lebar, 1972, Leach, 1950). Different groups also further divide these three 
groups. For example, in the Kenyah-Badeng, the aristocratic class is divided into ‘big’ 
(deta’u bio) and ‘small’ (deta’u dumit) aristocrats and commoners are split into ‘good’ 
(pinyin tiga) and ‘bad’ (pinyin ja’at) (Welyne 2008, p.60). The Kayan have four social 
classes which are, in decreasing status order, the maren, hipuy, pinyin and dipen 
(Rousseau, 1979). The first two classes are the ‘upper classes’. The maren are the 
incumbent ruling class while the hipuy are former maren who are demoted. Dipen 
corresponds to the slave lupau class (Rousseau 1978, p.87). Historically, power is 
maintained and elevated social status is enforced by the aristocrats by strictly marrying 
within their class and forming marriage alliances with surrounding groups. They 
maintain a higher level of material wealth by generating agricultural surpluses through 
the manpower available to them by the dipen, and by controlling access to caves 
containing the nests of edible swiftlets (Lebar, 1972). In exchange for their monopoly on 
labour and prize resources, members of the ipun uma or maren are expected to provide 
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aid in times of food crises (Hong, 1987, p.12). Kayan maren who take lower class spouses 
eventually lose their corvées and are demoted to hipuy status. In order to stress the 
class differences between the aristocrats and the commoners, hipuy are never demoted 
to become panyin (Rousseau 1978, p.87). As the groups become exposed to urban 
cultures, such social stratification is losing its place in many societies. Indeed, the 
leadership of some communities are subjected to some form of electoral process (albeit 
still confined to the aristocratic class), rather than strict inheritance (Jehom 2008; 
Rousseau 1994). The social structure of these communities is centred on the longhouse, 
which represents the village community. The longhouse is made up of a number of 
‘houses’ or ‘rooms’ or ‘doors’. Each family occupies one such ‘door’ and farms its own 
plot of land (Hong, 1987, p.3).  
Central to the agricultural society is the adat (customary law), an unwritten body of rules 
and principles that guide the behaviour of its members and encompasses both secular 
and spiritual aspects of life (Hong, 1987). The adat is administered and maintained by a 
council of mainly aristocratic elders who are well versed in the relevant rituals. Such 
elders are inducted based on various demonstrated virtues, such as bravery, wisdom or 
oration and they are also expected to mediate in disputes (Hong, 1987, p.13). 
3.1.3.1 The Kajang and Kenyah 
3.1.3.1.1 The Kajang 
The Kajang, although made up of a rather numerous collection of different ethnicities, 
have only one representative group upstream of the Balui – the Lahanan. Together with 
the Kejaman and Sekapan, they are believed to be the original settlers in the Belaga 
district. While there is a number of small groups that consider themselves Kajang and 
that may affiliate themselves with one of the three core Kajang groups, they may be 
culturally quite distinct and it has been suggested that these affiliations may be the 
result of a political decision made at some point in their history (Alexander, 1989; 
Nicolaisen, 1977-1978; Rousseau, 1975). 
The Lahanan are one of the smallest ethnic groups of Sarawak, numbering about 1,000, 
and belong to the Kajang Group of ethnic communities. The entire population is 
associated and split into two longhouse communities. The larger, associated with Long 
Pangai, was moved from the Upper Balui to Sungai Asap as part of the Bakun 
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Resettlement Scheme, while the smaller group live in a longhouse at the lower Balui at 
Long Semuang. The two communities were once a single community but split up due to 
leadership disagreements. The Lahanan Long Pangai have also had much cultural 
influence from the Kayan communities surrounding it, to the extent that they can be 
described as ‘Kayanized’.  The Long Semuang community are living in close proximity 
with other Kajang communities and therefore they have retained their cultural 
distinctions (Alexander, 2008a; Guerreiro, 1998). 
The relationships between the Lahanan and their more populous and militant Kenyah 
and Kayan neighbours have not always been friendly.  Armed conflicts between the 
Lahanan (and the other Kajang groups) and the Kenyah or Kayan have occurred, and 
Kayan were responsible for driving all the Kajang groups (apart from the Lahanan) to the 
lower Balui. Kayan supremacism was enforced by having Kajang chiefs taking Kayan 
wives (Alexander and Alexander, 1999; Alexander, 1993). A halt in hostilities occurred 
when the Brooke regime subdued the Kayan and Kenyah tribes (Lebar, 1972). The 
Lahanan again took up arms in the early 1900s, this time allied with their former 
adversaries against a common foe, the headhunting Ibans. Peace finally prevailed in 
1924, with a peace-making ceremony in Kapit (Alexander, 1993; Runciman, 1960). 
3.1.3.1.2 The Kenyah 
After the Kayan, the Kenyah are the next most prominent group. In comparison to the 
Kayan, some Kenyah societies are more diverse, and sometimes less markedly stratified. 
The name ‘Kenyah’ appears to be one given by the Kayans. Kayan longhouses that are 
able to trace their history, such as Uma Juman, called various non-Kayan warring groups 
that attacked them frequently ‘Li’Kelay’, which later evolved into Ken’yah or Kenyah in 
their oral records. Kenyah communities are found in close proximity with Kayan ones 
and friendly interactions, such as intermarriage, can be common (King, 1993). Like the 
Kayan, the Kenyah were also once head-hunting groups and were also subjected to the 
same pressure by the Brooke administration to cease such activities (Lebar, 1972) 
The Kenyah engaged in smaller scale conflicts than the Kayan. In contrast to the 
conquering style of the Kayan, Kenyah military operations often were headhunting raids, 
conducted by small parties of 10-20 men, utilising stealth and the element of surprise 
this brings. While the Kayan expeditions were motivated by resource (slave) 
requirements, the Kenyah raids appear to be more culturally motivated. Kenyah 
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headhunting expeditions were conducted, in order to procure heads for mamat, or head 
feasts, which accompany cultural rites of passage such as funerals or warrior initiation 
(Lebar, 1972). Successful headhunters were awarded identity privileges, such as wearing 
a panther’s (more likely a clouded leopard) tooth in the ear, a hornbill feather headdress 
and special tattoo (Kennedy, 1935). The cultural, especially linguistic, diversity of Kenyah 
communities has been noted by earlier researchers (Whittier, 1978; Lebar, 1972; 
Kennedy, 1935), in contrast to the homogeneity of their Kayan counterparts. It is likely 
that this diversity can be explained by the assimilation of various small previously non-
Kenyah communities (King, 1993). Today, the Kenyah communities appear to be 
somewhat polarised, with some valued by the regional government for their diligence 
and commitment towards economic development, and others totally opposed to the 
dam and environmental disturbance caused by the project and logging (Alexander and 
Alexander, 2002). 
3.1.3.2 The Kayan 
The Kayan have been described as among the most politically and demographically 
important groups of Central Borneo and the Upper Balui (Alexander and Alexander, 
1999; Alexander, 1992; Rousseau, 1990; Rousseau, 1978), to the extent that Kayan is the 
lingua franca (King, 1993), and that Kayans are often the negotiators with State 
authorities with regard to the resettlement necessitated by the Bakun Dam (Alexander 
and Alexander, 2002). The Kayans appeared to have been a mobile, militarily powerful 
people that plundered from the other ethnic communities in the upper Rejang and 
Baram regions, reaching as far as Limbang, adjacent to Brunei, gradually displacing and 
enslaving other defeated peoples, such as the Murut. Headhunting ceased under the 
repressive Brooke regime by the early 1900s (Lebar, 1972).  
Warfare and military structure were related to the political organisation of Kayan 
communities. Each Kayan village (uma) is made up of a cluster of their famously sturdy 
ironwood longhouses, arranged into their own family apartments (amin) (Figure 3.2). 
Longhouses each have their own chief of the aristocratic class, and one of these chiefs 
is then selected as the village headman (Lebar, 1972). Military expeditions had the aim 
of conquest, to capture slaves, or for revenge. These incursions included a thousand or 
more men drawn from a number of villages (Hose and McDougall, 1912). The chief of 
every participating village led his own men, but a paramount chief is also selected to 
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head the operation (Okushima; 2006; Lebar, 1972), in a command structure roughly 
similar to that of a modern infantry unit.  
 
Figure 3.2: Aerial photograph of Uma Juman, a Kayan Longhouse, along the banks of the Balui prior to inundation. 
The influence of Christianity over Kayan society began in earnest after World War II, and 
in many places Kayans are Christians. In many other locations in Sarawak, a religion 
known as adat Bungan (named after the goddess Bungan) is practised (Rousseau, 1998; 
Prattis, 1963). This religion has continually undergone reform and simplification, under 
the influence of Christianity and Islam, as well as to adapt the religion to changing times 
(Winzeler, 2001). 
Kayan communities tend to be more stable compared to other groups like the Iban as 
members cannot leave the community without the permission of their chief and if they 
cannot find a suitable member of the maren (aristocracy) to lead the breakaway faction. 
The main reason for factions within a Kayan community to consider independence is 
conflict, which may stem from disagreements on direction or timing of migration or if 
two rival maren are vying to be chief.  Such events, however, appear to be very rare. 
Kayans value larger longhouse communities as they traditionally afforded greater 
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protection from raids, and small communities make finding mates difficult (while 
endogamy is preferred, rules prohibit marriage between individuals who share common 
great-grandparents) and suitable successors to chiefs more difficult (Rousseau 1978, 
p.80, 82, 84). 
It is easy, from the use of the collective ‘Orang Ulu’, to assume that, apart from sporadic 
trade meetings, the Kayan (or indeed any other Orang Ulu) have little contact with other 
forms of civilisation, or are insulated from the effects of global or regional events. In 
contrast, Okushima (2006; 2008) provided through oral sources a history of the Kayan 
that included numerous examples of interaction, including marriages, with communities 
outside the Orang Ulu group. Although ‘originating’ from southern Baram, the Balui 
Kayan later moved to the headwaters of the Kayan and the Balui. The Kayan became 
widespread throughout Borneo, having migrated to and become established in areas 
such as Bulungan and Mahakam (which is itself a Kayan name for ‘a broad water surface’) 
(Okushima, 2006), near the Makassar Straits in what is now East Kalimantan, by the 
seventeenth century. The sultanate of Bulungan itself was formed by Uma Apan (now 
on the Belaga river) migrating from the Apo Kayan along the Kayan River to the coast. 
The now-coastal Kayan was encountered by (allegedly) a Bruneian nobleman (c.1650) 
who married a Kayan princess and started an Indianised kingdom, later converted to 
Islam through the influence of Sulu, centred around the present-day Tanjung Selor 
(Okushima, 2008; Sellato, 2001). This sultanate bordered the territories of another 
Kayan group, Uma Laran, and a Kenyah group, Uma Alim which preferred to remain 
autonomous. The two tribal groups rebelled when the sultanate tried to impose trade 
restrictions and direct their trade towards itself.  
Okushima (2006), through the study of the dialects of various groups, believed that 
while origins of the Kayan groups were from Baram, they migrated in waves to the Kayan 
basin, with some also heading for the Balui. A second wave of migration to the Balui 
occurred with two push factors: the Kayan basin became overpopulated, and intra- and 
interethnic conflict began to increase with Malay and colonial occupation over northeast 
Borneo. The influence of the migrating Kayan is reflected in various place names through 
Borneo, and in the vocabulary of other groups like the Murut throughout Sarawak 
(Okushima, 2006).  
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The fate of Kayan societies has historically been intertwined with that of regional shifts 
in geopolitics. By the 16th century, the Portuguese had established the world’s first truly 
global empire (Feldman-Bianco, 2001), and had captured Melaka (anglicised as Malacca) 
in 1511. The last sultan of Melaka, Sultan Mahmud Shah, retreated to Muar (in the 
present day state of Johor), where he built the Kubu Bentayan fort to resist further 
Portuguese incursion. The fort fell and the sultan retreated further to Pagoh (near Muar 
in present day Johor) and Bintan. The Portuguese eventually razed Bintan and the sultan 
finally retreated to Kampar in Sumatra, where he ruled Malacca in pretence until his 
death in 1528. One of his sons went on to found the sultanate of Johor. One of the results 
of the political upheaval and the destructive Portuguese pursuit of Sultan Mahmud Shah 
through Johor to Bintan was the migration of Malay nobility, and of Arab and Bugis 
traders, from the Johor-Singapore-Riau region to Borneo and Sulu (Okushima, 2008). If 
the legends are to be believed, then a daughter from the marriage between the 
Bruneian prince Datu Mancang (or Lancang, depending on which community related the 
story) and his Kayan bride was to marry a Sulu chief, who was himself the offspring of 
an Arab trader forced to flee Johor during the Portuguese invasion. With the fall of 
Malacca and the large-scale migration of prominent Muslim leaders and traders 
eastwards to Borneo and the southern Philippine islands, it was inevitable that the 
dominant Muslim kingdom of the time, Brunei, became a stronger regional power. 
Indeed, Borneo and Brunei were used interchangeably (Cleary and Eaton, 1992, p.34). 
At the height of its power, Bruneian territory stretched from west Borneo through to 
Manila, until the arrival of the Spanish (Cleary and Eaton, 1992, p.37). The Kayan-
originated Bulungan royalty also hired Arab advisors, married Arabs (Okushima, 2006) 
and allied with the Muslim sea-faring ethnicities to compensate for their lack of 
maritime technology while continuing to emphasise their Kayan heritage in order to 
harness the land-fighting ability of nearby Kayan allies, and protect access to valuable 
inland forest products for trade (Okushima, 2008). 
Further Kayan migration from inland Borneo in the 17th century was resisted by the 
Bulungans and their allies and the later arrivals spread southwards to the west Mahakam. 
In time, however, even these areas became overpopulated and inter-community 
tensions resulted in some migrating back to the Balui. The most prominent communities 
that have traced their ancestry that far back is Uma Juman, one of the resettled Kayan 
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communities of the Bakun Resettlement Scheme (Okushima, 2006; 2008). The Balui 
Kayan appeared to have then established themselves and formed a trade link between 
the east coast of Borneo (Bulungan) and the west (Bintulu) (Burns, 1849, 140-44).  
3.1.3.3 Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang Economy 
The communities within this complex traditionally practice swidden agriculture, their 
staple crop being hill rice. Interplanted amongst the rice is a variety of other subsistence 
crops such as maize, yams, beans, chillies, gourds, tobacco and pumpkins, as well as fruit 
crops such as papaya, banana and pineapple (Alexander, 1993; Alexander, 2008a). 
Sugarcane may also be grown. Sago was a traditional staple but is now considered 
famine food (Alexander, 2008a; Lebar, 1972). The purpose of cultivation was for 
subsistence but, in recent decades, cash-cropping is also practised. Pepper, coffee, 
rubber and cocoa are examples of such crops (Alexander and Alexander, 1995; 
Alexander, 1993; King, 1993). 
Land-intensive swidden, rather than labour-intensive estate cultivation, was a necessity 
to the indigenous communities. Soils in South-east Asian tropical rainforests are 
characterised by an extremely thin A-horizon, the nutrient-rich layer of soil. Soil studies 
from rainforests in Borneo show that this layer is no more than 5cm deep (Imai et al., 
2010). The efficient nutrient cycling as a result of conducive humidity and temperature 
means that nutrient uptake by existing plants and fungi is rapid. In some areas, the lack 
of phosphorus left in the soil negatively affects the growth of seedlings (Burslem et al., 
1994). This problem is being overcome partially by clearing, then burning the plot of land 
selected for cultivation, which returns the ‘locked-up’ nutrients to the soil, thereby 
fertilising it and reducing its prohibitive acidity (de Neergaard et al. 2008; Bruun et al. 
2006). The cleared land is exposed to the elements and, as such, these activities are 
confined to the dry season so that the newly enriched soil does not have its nutrients 
leached away by rain (runoff) and leave the communities with even poorer soil.  Various 
tree crops are also interplanted with the short, less leafy rice crops to reduce soil erosion 
and surface runoff. Swidden agriculture is considered land-intensive, because large 
areas of previously farmed land are left fallow for long periods of time between 
cultivation cycles, from the modern chemical assisted 6-year fallows of the Lahanan, to 
as long as 25 years elsewhere (King 1993; Hong 1987). 
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Clearly, land is the most important resource to the Kenyah-Kayan-Kajang economy. It is 
therefore not surprising the adat law governs land tenure and rights. Under the adat, a 
right to a piece of land is entitled to anyone who (or whose family) originally felled, 
cultivated and is still extracting utility from the land. As long as signs of utility remain, 
for example, the presence of a fruit tree, members of a ‘door’ can maintain rights to that 
particular piece of land (Hong, 1987). Constant, active cultivation is thus not needed. 
However, in the absence or improbability of productive activity, such as the moving 
away of a particular ‘door’ from the community or inactivity beyond the normal fallow 
period, the community takes over the land and someone else can claim rights to 
cultivate. Therefore the community can be said to have exclusive control over arable 
land (Rousseau 1978, p.83). This also prevents an individual from claiming more land 
than he can cultivate (Hong 1987: p39). Land rights are also hereditary, as long as the 
beneficiary continues cultivation (Hong 1987: p.14). Owners of rights to cultivated land 
are also eligible to claim rights to the forest immediately adjacent to the land. The 
community as a whole has rights to utilise the forest and water resource within half a 
day’s journey (including boat journeys) from the longhouse. Beyond this distance, 
individuals can claim ownership of wild food trees for their ‘door’ if they are the first to 
discover and mark them (Richards 1961). This claim does not extend to the fruit that 
falls from such trees. Kayan men hold annual meetings to decide which amin farms 
which particular zone of the community farming area (Rousseau 1987, p.83).  
Due to the lack of labour-intensity of their agricultural work, members of the community 
are able to engage in various other economic activities. These activities involve hunting 
or harvesting various materials and resources from the forest and rivers. The men hunt 
and fish, while the women and children gather (Hong 1987: p.30; Hong 1977: p.104). 
Hunting may occur for wild pigs with the help of dogs. The blowpipe may be used as a 
hunting weapon (Lebar 1972). Fishing is also an economic activity frequently undertaken, 
chiefly by mass poisoning using the toxins from the root of the tuba Derris elliptica, 
which is also the source of poison used in blowpipes (Hose 1894). In the Baram Kenyah, 
fish and hunted meat can account for more than half of food intake (Chin 1984: p.195). 
Gathering can be conducted both in the fallow fields as well as in the forest, and includes 
both food and non-food products. Food items that are gathered include tubers, shoots, 
mushrooms and various fruit and vegetables. For the Baram Kenyah, gathered plant 
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food items can account for 10 to 25% of food intake (Chin 1984). Non-food items are 
those that have commercial value, or for use to create useful items or products for sale 
in markets. Commercially important forest produce includes various agarwood (Malay: 
garu or gaharu; Scientific: Aquilaria spp., Enkleia malaccensis Griff., Gonstylus spp., 
Wikstroemia spp.), illipe nut (fruit of the Light Red Meranti, Shorea macrophylla (Malay: 
Engkebang, a’bang), damar or resin from Dipterocarpaceae trees and rotan  or rattan 
(Lim and Awang Anak 2010; Chin 1984; Schlegel 1978: p. 99-101). Kayan communities 
were known to trade various forest products in return for firearms, salt and various 
heirloom items such as beads and brass gongs even before the Brooke rule (Rousseau 
1978, p.79). 
3.1.3.3.1 Case Study (1): Uma Belor economics in 1985 (Guerreiro, 1988) 
Uma Belor in 1985 was a longhouse community on the Balui made up of 27 households 
and 191 people in total. The gender balance was tilted heavily towards the males 
(56%:64%) due to (speculatively) many girls becoming married outside of the longhouse 
and not returning. The distribution among the age groups is shown in Table 3.1. The 
number of people between the ages of 30-44 is especially small due to a combination of 
the high mortality and high rates of migration as they are at working age. The exchange 
rate as of May 1985 was approximately 1MYR:0.404USD 
Table 3.1: Table showing the age-group distribution of the inhabitants of Uma Belor in 1985. 
Age 0-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+ Total 
Number of 
People 
67 55 17 33 19 191 
3.1.3.3.1.1 Stock and Flow: Assets, Income and Expenditure 
One of the two economic stocks measured by in the study was the value of each 
‘household’ in the longhouse. This was dependent on the size of the apartment (the 
headman had the biggest apartment), as well as the type of timber or other materials 
used in the construction of those apartments and their associated gallery sections. Other 
assets were noted, such as “claimed forest land and gardens and heirlooms such as pots, 
gongs, jars, swords, beads and brass objects” but these are difficult to value and thus 
were not quantified. Overall, the valuation for the apartments of Uma Belor ranged from 
15,000 to 25,000 MYR.  
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Five households (out of 27) provided information on expenditure, savings (the second 
economic stock) and rough income breakdown. The average cash income for these 
families was estimated to be about 1200USD. 25% (~ 300USD) was from the sale of 
paddy rice, 41% (~ 492USD) from the sale of meat and fish, and the rest (~ 708USD) 
from a variety of sources such as gifts and allotments. Expenditure of these five families 
covered necessities such as fuel, food, clothes, medicine and toiletries as well as other 
things, such as books. Total expenditures for these families are more or less equal to 
income. 
In total, the 27 households of Uma Belor had a combined income of 65,700USD per 
month, which was significantly higher than the 43,000USD income of their Lahanan 
counterparts (32 households of Lahanan Long Pangai). This difference was attributed to 
the Kayans’ high average education level, although there was no evidence shown in the 
study. Expenditure on basic necessities, in general, took up 80% of income, and some 
households have the added expense of investment in agricultural supplies such as 
fertiliser and pesticides. The poverty line then was $412 per month ($4944 per year), 
which meant that even though Uma Belor was considerably wealthier than Uma 
Lahanan Long Pangai, the overwhelming majority of households were living ‘in poverty’. 
Table 3.2: Table showing a breakdown of households by total income in 1985. 
Cash Income 
(USD) 
301-
500 
501-
1500 
1500-
3000 
3001-
5000 
5001-
8000 
>8000 Total 
No. of 
Households 
1 6 14 4 1 1 27 
 
3.1.3.3.2 Case Study (2): Impact of Introduced Monetary Economy on a Kayan 
Community (Lee and Bahrin, 1993; Lee and Bahrin, 1998) 
A study was conducted in the 1990s in the Baram interior where a number of Kayan 
villages were located. These locations were considered to be “examples of peripheral 
backwaters that resisted the influence of development and modernisation so much that 
the traditional villages remained intact”.  It must also be noted however that these 
communities are not completely isolated. Using the Baram River and navigating up the 
Sungai Tutuh and Sungai Apoh tributaries, Chinese merchants have traditionally 
conducted trade with the Kayan communities, buying their padi and rubber in exchange 
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for other daily needs. Christian missionaries have also been to these communities to 
evangelise and succeeded in converting them to Christianity. The arrival of the 
missionaries was also at about the same time as the introduction of formal education, 
and a small number of Kayans did well enough at primary school level to head to the 
lowlands to continue their education. 
Logging concessions in 1982 saw the timber industry reach further into the Baram than 
before, and a number of logging roads appeared. This had the effect of encouraging 
mobility of the Kayans, who also recognised the inefficiency of river transportation 
compared to terrestrial transportation. Timber companies also paid out compensation 
and employed Kayans to work for them with attractive wages. Important services that 
enable modern conveniences, such as electricity, were also provided. The net result of 
the encroachment of the Kayan territory by the timber companies was that these 
communities were suddenly aware of the attractions and the possibilities available to 
them in the lowlands. 
The rate of migration was three persons per migrant origin household on average. 
People moved to further their education, to seek employment and to follow their 
spouses. Predictably, most of the migrants are the able-bodied labour of 16 to 35 years 
old, which represented about 70% of total migrant numbers. This severely impacted the 
population and life in the Kayan villages. The authors described a particular longhouse 
where 58 units were left vacant, and a village of 1000 was reduced to 200, mostly elderly 
and young children. It was clear that the migration would not be circular, as activities 
such as logging reduced the ability of Kayan communities to continue to be self-sufficient. 
This was accomplished by firstly removing their sources of sufficiency, such as by 
polluting rivers so that fisheries collapse, or by disturbance and destruction of forests, 
so that food animals disappear. Secondly, the wages paid by industry opened Kayan eyes 
to comparatively lucrative work. The education of communities also exacerbated this 
effect as young Kayans see the economic benefits of education. Therefore the best and 
the brightest move away and do not return, and this depresses the rural economy of 
their origin. 
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3.2 The Ecology 
3.2.1 Geography and Natural History 
Sarawak is the largest Malaysian state and is located on the island of Borneo (Figure 1.1). 
It covers a total land area of 124,450 square kilometres. It is a part of the Sundaland 
biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al., 2000), which covers 1.5million square kilometres and 
stretches from the Kangar-Pattani line near the Thai-Malaysian border to, at its eastern-
most, the islands of Borneo and Bali. The Sundaland biodiversity hotspot is estimated to 
contain 25,000 vascular plant species (of which 60% is endemic to the hotspot), 380 
mammal species (45.3% endemicity), 769 bird species (18.5% endemicity), 452 reptile 
species (53.8% endemicity), 244 amphibian species (80.3% endemicity) and 950 
freshwater fish species (36.8% endemicity) (WWF, 2009). While all its lands make less 
up than 4% of the world’s total land area, Sundaland’s forests, when considered as a 
single block, form the third largest rainforest area in the world. Remarkably, while 
Sundaland is now a collection of archipelagos and a peninsula separated by vast areas 
of sea, the structure of rainforests throughout all the discrete blocks of land is rather 
uniform and characterised by dipterocarp trees. 
The natural environment of Sarawak is characterised by the ancient, dipterocarp-
dominated rainforests. Other terrestrial habitats include significant areas of peat swamp 
and kerangas and small areas of mangrove, coastal, montane and limestone forests. The 
forests of Sarawak have extremely high levels of diversity. Lambir Hills and the lowland 
forests of Gunung Mulu, for example, have been recorded to contain up to 290 and 223 
tree species per hectare (Lee et al., 2002; Proctor et al., 1983). These habitats also 
harbour three species of Rafflesia, R.pricei, R.arnoldi and R.tuan-mudae, of which 
R.arnoldi is known to produce the largest individual flowers in the world, measuring up 
to 1 m in diameter (Meijer, 1997). Soil types in the terrestrial habitat are largely either 
humult ultisols or udult iltisols. Humult ultisols are generally nutrient poor and have a 
layer of raw humus on the surface. Udult humus is the exact opposite – generally fertile, 
without the raw humus layer (Corlett, 2009). In Sarawak, it has been noticed that where 
these two soil types are adjacent, their botanical associations differ markedly (Baillie et 
al., 2006; Potts et al., 2002).  
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Figure 3.3: Map of Malaysia showing the location of Sarawak. 
Some of the world’s most extensive cave networks are also found in Sarawak. The 
Clearwater Cave system beneath Gunung Mulu stretches some 189km. In this area alone, 
over 100 caves are known, with a combined map length of 330km. The ‘Sarawak 
Chamber’ is the world’s largest cave chamber, measuring 600m long by 415mwide and 
80m high. It has a total floor area of 162700 square metres and a volume of 12 million 
cubic metres (Gillieson and Clark, 2010). Sarawak is also known for the Niah Caves, near 
Miri, where the earliest modern human remains and evidence of human habitation in 
the region exist (Barker et al., 2007; Hunt et al., 2007). 
Besides the richness of the terrestrial habitat, the landscape of Sarawak is also 
remarkable for its extensive riverine network. The entire network in Sarawak is made up 
of 55 rivers, with a combined length of about 5,000 kilometres, of which 3,300 
kilometres are considered navigable (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011b). Sarawak has very high 
and consistent levels of rainfall (ranging from 3300mm to 4600mm depending on locality) 
and high levels of humidity. Topographically, Sarawak can be divided into three regions. 
The border shared with Indonesian Kalimantan is characterised by mountain ranges and 
is the source of the river systems. The middle is a range of undulating hills up to 300m 
in altitude. The third region is the coastal lowland, which also contains peatlands and 
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well as the deltaic and alluvial plains and other wetlands which eventually drain out to 
the South China Sea (Sarawak Government, 2010). 
The flooding of the forests of Balui and subsequent formation of land-bridge islands 
from hilltops constitute a form of habitat fragmentation and resembles the process 
(albeit much quicker) of the formation of the islands of Sundaland by flooding following 
the last glacial maximum 30 ka (Pelejaro et al, 1999). A summary of South-east Asian 
geological history is the subject of Hall (1998). Sundaland is defined by deep waters - the 
Indian Ocean to the south and west, and the channels on the east and north that divide 
it from Wallacea and the Philippines (Bird et al., 2005). The South-east Asian continental 
landmass, stretching from Indo-China to Burma to the present-day Malay Peninsula, is 
believed to have been present since the Early Eocene (c. 50 Mya), and in this time also 
consisted of the South-Western majority of Borneo and parts of the major Indonesian 
islands of Java and Sumatra.  Borneo was situated much closer to the Malay Peninsula 
and was oriented clockwise to its current position (Hall, 1998). This continental shelf is 
identifiable at a bathymetric depth of 120m (Bird et al, 2005). As it was a large 
continental land mass, the Gulf of Siam did not exist. During the mid-Eocene (c. 42 Mya), 
a block fault created the Makassar Strait, through which Wallace’s Line runs, separating 
Borneo from Sulawesi (Moss and Wilson, 1998). Inundation first occurred during the 
early Miocene period (c. 20 Mya), when parts of Sumatra and Java were covered by a 
shallow sea. Isolation of these two volcanic islands by water was complete by mid-
Miocene (c.15 Mya), forming the early incarnation of the Straits of Malacca. By the late 
Miocene (c. 10 Mya), Borneo had moved further from the Malay Peninsula and assumed 
its current position and orientation, but these areas were still connected by a savannah. 
The expansion of the South China Sea began in the early Pliocene (c. 5 Mya) and 
progressively reduced the land connection between the Malay Peninsula and Borneo 
(Hall, 1998). The connection between Borneo and the Malay Peninsula would be able to 
exist as long as the sea level was -40m (Bird et al, 2005). 
At a bathymetric depth of -20m to -30m, there is a vast surface that seemingly connects 
Borneo to Sumatra and Java via the Karimata Islands and Banka and stretches towards 
the Malay Peninsula (Bird et al, 2005). This suggests that between 110 kya and 
approximately 20 kya, Sarawak and Borneo were connected to the Malay Peninsula, 
with periods of severance (Bird et al, 2005; Lambeck and Chappell, 2001). In summary, 
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the plausible periods of landbridge connections between Borneo and the Malay 
Peninsula were from 1) the period from the Eocene to late Oligocene (c. 25 Mya); 2) 
sometime at the end of the Miocene (c. 10 Mya) and 3) the last periods of any 
connectivity were in the late Pleistocene (c. 20 kya). 
The geology of Borneo is complex and not fully understood, and is subject of intense 
research by people interested in South-east Asian paleogeography.  It is believed that 
the island Borneo was formed by the process of accretion of ophiolites, island arc crusts 
and continental fragments (Parenti and Lim, 2005; Hutchison, 1996). Most of what is 
north-west Borneo today was still oceanic crust at the end of the Cretaceous (Wilson 
and Moss, 1999). The uplifting of central Borneo forming the highlands we see today 
started around the end of the Oligocene (c. 25 Mya), which allowed for the formation of 
the modern Rajang River. Large amounts of sediment were eroded from the volcanic 
middle of the island and deposited on the coastal edges, forming deltas like the Baram 
(Parenti and Lim, 2005). The ruggedness of the lifted interior has resulted in the dendritic 
shape of the lake post-inundation, and as later chapters will show, plays a significant 
role in impacting the livelihoods of the displaced communities. 
3.2.2 Botany and Land use 
Little research or comprehensive inventorisation has been done in the area of the Balui 
in historical records.  Most of the useful knowledge is recorded in the Ekran Berhad 
(1994) EIA which is not easily accessible and kept in the Sarawak Forestry Department. 
However, some researchers have managed to access it, and have published some 
knowledge of the 287 species of medicinal plants that were in the area, presumably from 
indigenous knowledge (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: List of medicinal plants and their potential, or claimed uses. Modified from Choy (2005). 
Plant Family Family 
Common 
Name 
Number 
of Species 
Medicinal Properties 
Acanthaceae Acanthus  10 Fever, hypertension, 
inflammation, diabetes, stomach 
pains, sprains, headaches 
Annonaceae Custard Apple 22 Diarrhoea and stomach pains, 
fever, asthma, insect repellent,  
skin disease, eye infections,  
Apocynaceae Dogbane 8 Hypertension, diabetes, fever, 
yellow fever, swollen joints 
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Araceae Arum 5 Cough, insect bites, skin disease, 
fever 
Compositae (now 
Asteraceae) 
Sunflower / 
Daisy 
15 Headaches, fever, rheumatism, 
anti-malaria, gastric ulcers, boils, 
swelling, chest pains, mumps 
Convolvulaceae Morning Glory 5 Cuts, wounds, diarrhoea, 
poisonous animal bites, headache 
Cyperaceae Sedge 4 Diarrhoea, fever, antidote, tonic 
Dilleniaceae Dillenia 4 Diarrhoea, bleeding, cough 
Euphorbiaceae Spurge 23 Toothache, sore eyes, dysentery, 
ulcers, muscular pains fever 
Gramineae (now 
Poaceae) 
True Grasses 6 Asthma, cough, fever 
Labiatae (now 
Lamiaceae) 
Mint 9 Fever, skin disease, 
dysmenorrhea, amenorrhea, 
hypertension 
Lauraceae Laurel 5 Rheumatism, lumbago, tonic 
Leguminosae Legume / Pea 19 Gonorrhoea, cough, ringworm, 
asthma, chicken pox, nosebleeds, 
inflammation, burns 
Melastomataceae Melastome 9 Headache, fever, dysentery, 
diarrhoea, rheumatism 
Menispermaceae Moonseed 6 Anti-venom, conjunctivitis, gastric 
ulcers, hypertension, diabetes 
Moraceae Breadfruit 5 Diarrhoea, boils, abscesses 
Myrsinaceae Myrsine 4 Fever, tonic, chicken pox, skin 
disease 
Myrtaceae Myrtle 5 Post-parturition aid, diarrhoea, 
hypertension, yellow fever 
Piperaceae Pepper 4 Rheumatism, heart (chest?) pains, 
sprains 
Rubiaceae Coffee / 
Bedstraw 
13 Fever, vomiting, chills, eye 
infections, dysentery 
Schizaeaceae Comb ferns 4 Eye infections, animal bites, fever, 
rheumatism 
Solanaceae Potato / 
Nightshade 
4 Skin disease, hypertension, sore 
throat, cough, fever  
Verbenaceae Verbena / 
Vervain 
7 Diarrhoea, fever, headache, 
inflammation, post-parturition aid 
Zingiberaceae Ginger 10 Tonic, skin disease, fractures, 
fever, cough, swelling 
Others  81 Chest-pain, antimalarial, 
dysmenorrhea, poisonous insect 
bites, fever, cough, cholera, 
burns, abortifacient, tuberculosis, 
scabies, ringworm, sore throat 
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At the time of the commencement of the construction of the BHD, the 14,750km2 
catchment area of the dam was mostly covered in Mixed Dipterocarp Forest (MDF), 
some of the richest habitats in the world. Varying accounts of the land use has been 
given, with selectively logged forest proportions ranging from 21%-37% (Kadikon, 2006; 
Samad and Abdul Patah, 1997). These logged forests have by 1994 contributed some 2 
million m3 of timber to the Malaysian economy (Ekran Berhad, 1994). Some stands of 
virgin forest remain, typically confined to steep slopes and/or very isolated locations. 
These forests, as their name suggest, are dominated by the giant, emergent dipterocarp 
trees that are characteristic of the Sundaland tropical rainforests, which can reach some 
50m in height. While it is not recorded, there is no reason to believe that the spectacular 
mast fruiting seasons do not happen here as well. Recorded highly commercially 
valuable dipterocarp species include Shorea macroptera (meranti melantai), S. 
argentifolia (meranti binatoh), S. parvifolia (meranti sarang punai), and S. amplexicaulis 
(engkabang pinang), and the ‘totally protected’ species Dipterocarpus oblongifolius. 
Some protected species found in the area include ecologically important fig species such 
as Ficus microcarpa, F. aurata and F. lamponga (Kadikon, 2006; Choy, 2005). In 
recognition of their important role in the ecology of a tropical rainforest, all Ficus species 
are considered protected species (Sarawak Government, 1998). Other land areas not 
covered by forest include shifting cultivation lands as well as grassland habitats (Samad 
and Abdul Patah, 1997). In all, 1683 species of plants are estimated to be within the BHD 
region (Choy, 2005). 
Due to the logging activities since 1980, there is a network of poorly maintained logging 
trails in the area, with erosion from these tracks causing siltation of numerous small 
streams (Douglas, 2003). In preparation for the flooding, a decision was undertaken to 
remove biomass in the inundation zone of the reservoir. It was estimated prior to 
flooding that some 50 million m3 of biomass was in the area, and biomass removal began 
in January 2009, with complete removal within certain selected areas (Sarawak Hidro, 
2012). It is not clear how much biomass was left behind overall, as pictures of the initial 
stages of impoundment show that much of the greenery was left untouched (Figure 3.4). 
According to Ekran Berhad’s environmental impact assessment report, a partial removal 
targeting only commercial sawlogs would remove 20% of the biomass in the inundated 
area, equivalent to 10 million m3. It warns that inundating the remaining 80% of biomass 
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would result in the development of anoxic conditions and the generation of various 
gases as a result of underwater decomposition. Doubling biomass removal to 40%, by 
harvesting trees that may be processed to form chip wood, was recommended as a 
measure to strike a balance between reducing water quality issues and the economic 
cost of harvesting trees on the steep slopes of the Balui. The areas that were earmarked 
in this report for clearing are land between 180m a.s.l. and 228m a.s.l. 
 
Figure 3.4: Aerial photograph of the formation of the islands early during the impoundment process. It is likely 
that by now, the lower lying islands here would have been submerged. (Source: http://www.sarawak-rainforest-
deforestation.com/images/inundation.jpg) 
3.2.3 Zoology  
As is with the botany, little is known about the species composition and diversity of the 
Balui region. It is, however, known that the waters of the Balui contain productive 
fisheries (Ekran Berhad, 1994). Six endangered or rare migrating species of fish used the 
Batang Balui, and these included the two most the most commercially important species, 
known as the Tapah (Wallago leeri) and Labang (Pangasius spp.) (Choy, 2005). It was not 
until 2005 that the first ever checklist and report of the fish of the Batang Balui was 
published (as part of a Rajang River basin checklist; Parenti and Lim; 2005). Due to the 
difference in water quality and depth of the Balui and the Rajang, the report found that 
at least 15 species of fish were found only in the former. The endemism of these species 
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was believed to be related to their specialised habitat requirements of clear, cool water 
and low sediment tolerance (Scott and Helfman, 2002). Therefore, it is now likely that 
these species of fish will be facing extinction due to the heavy sediment load of the 
reservoir and the temperature fluctuations brought about by the wider exposed top 
surface of the water. The damming has probably resulted in water conditions resembling 
more the lowland Rajang River. 
In Sarawak, all species of Ardeidae (Herons, egrets, bitterns), Bucerotidae (Hornbills), 
Falconidae (Falcons, falconets and caracaras), Phasianidae (Pheasants and partridges), 
Charadriiformes (Waders), Alcedinidae (Kingfishers) and Picidae (Woodpeckers) are 
listed in the protected or totally protected species list (Sarawak Government, 1998). 
Thirty-two members of these families of birds were listed to be present during the EIA 
conducted by Ekran Berhad (1994).  As many species of birds are migratory, however, 
there may be greater numbers affected by the loss of the stream habitats caused by the 
construction of the dam. Six totally protected and protected mammals were also 
recorded in the BHD area (Ekran Berhad, 1994). Among these are the totally protected 
primate species such as Hose’s langur (Presbytis hosei), silvered langur (T.cristatus) and 
Müller's Bornean gibbon (Hylobates mulleri). The protected rodent, Thomas’ Flying 
Squirrel (Aeromys thomasi), is found in the Balui region. In this study, the taxa of interest 
will be the primates and ground rodents. 
3.2.4 Fragmentation and Island Biogeography 
3.2.4.1 Landbridge islands and the Theory of Island Biogeography  
It has been pointed out that ancient habitat fragmentation by post-ice age flooding is 
responsible for much of the world we see today, as the rising sea isolated fringes of 
continental shelves, giving rise to places such as the British Isles, Japan and the South-
east Asian archipelago (Diamond, 2001; Hall, 1998). There is much similarity between 
the formation of these islands and the formation of man-made landbridge islands in 
lakes caused by damming – faunal relaxation occurs. 
While much is made of the destructive effects of large-scale damming projects, the 
experimental and scientific value of these projects have not escaped scientists (Wu et al, 
2003; da Fonseca et al, 2002; Terbough et al, 2001; Diamond, 2001; Terbough et al, 
1997). Landbridge islands are ideal experimental situations because terrestrial species 
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are generally unable to cross, and certainly unable to inhabit, the inundated areas, 
thereby controlling for at least one factor in the study of the impacts of fragmentation 
on biodiversity and inference for pre-historic processes that shaped modern species 
assemblages. Wholly terrestrial habitat fragments are difficult to study in this regard 
because the zones between forest fragments may constitute a different type of habitat 
that, while suboptimal, may still be inhabitable (Yong et al., 2012).  
MacArthur and Wilson’s theory of island biogeography later spawned a number of 
theories and applications in conservation biology, such as the ‘single large or several 
small’ (SLOSS) reserves debate (Quammen, 1996; Wilcox and Murphy, 1985; Simberloff 
and Abele, 1982; Simberloff and Abele, 1976; Diamond, 1975). It was noted by some 
conservationists that habitat fragments tended toward a new, lower equilibrium 
compared to large, intact habitats. This, combined with the realisation that habitat 
diversity was as important as habitat size, and that total accessible habitat area can be 
increased by linkage, has led to the development of habitat corridors (Triantis and 
Bhagwat, 2011; Noss, 1987; Gilbert et al, 1998). At the very heart of the theory of island, 
biogeography is the simple assertion that the bigger the area of accessible habitat, the 
better for species diversity (Burkey, 1995; Shaffer, 1981; Diamond and May 1976; 
Terbough, 1974). The simplistic elegance of this theory is its major strength. 
Habitat fragmentation is the disruption of the integrity of a particular habitat, and the 
subsequent isolation or insularisation of these fragments from each other (Wilcox and 
Murphy, 1985). The disruption and isolation can also be perceived as habitat loss, as any 
particular individual restricted to any one of these fragments now only has the space 
and resources from the smaller area, rather than the combined richness afforded by a 
contiguous environment. As the theory of island biogeography postulates, this exposes 
species to various risk factors that can lead to extinction. The issue of habitat 
fragmentation is central to much of modern conservation biology and long-term studies 
have been carried out to determine its effects on species survival (Douglas Robinson, 
1999; Lovejoy et al, 1983; Jones and Diamond, 1976). 
Habitat fragmentation can occur on a geologic time-scale, or in relatively quick, 
sometimes catastrophic, events such as through anthropogenic deforestation and the 
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associated logging tracks. Increasing habitat fragmentation results in four observable 
phenomena: 
1. Reduction in the total area covered by the habitat in question; 
2. The reduction of per habitat fragment area, which leads to: 
3. Increased edge length to area ratio, which increases the edge effects; 
4. Increased isolation and insularity of habitat fragments from one another, thus 
reducing the likelihood of successful rescue effect. 
Population extinction in nature occurs for four reasons: demographic stochasticity, 
environmental stochasticity, genetic stochasticity and catastrophes (Shaffer, 1981; May 
1973). Habitat fragmentation increases the exposure of species to these factors, due to 
their now reduced population per fragment, and the insularisation associated with this 
preventing rescue effects from taking place. Demographic stochasticity refers to a 
random change in population size due to variations in individual survival and 
reproductive success, especially sex ratio of breeding populations (Harmon and Braude, 
2010). Environmental stochasticity refers to small to moderate fluctuations in 
environmental conditions that impact on the survivability of species (Allen, 2003). 
Genetic stochasticity is also known as genetic drift. It refers to the changes in the 
frequency of alleles based on random causes unrelated to selection, or migration. 
Genetic stochasticity in small populations tends to reduce genetic variability of these 
populations and increases homozygosity, which can severely impair a species’ ability to 
respond to environmental challenges, as well as uncovering the effects of deleterious 
recessive alleles previously masked by high levels of heterozygosity (Harmon and Braude, 
2010). Natural disasters or catastrophes refer to serious perturbations in the 
environment, essentially very extreme forms of environmental stochasticity (Allen, 
2003). Demographic stochasticity affects populations with very small population sizes 
severely (Shaffer, 1987; Wilcox and Murphy, 1985). On the other hand, the other factors 
also impact larger populations. The minimum number of individuals that a population 
must have in order for it to escape extinction from the above factors is termed the 
‘Minimum Viable Population’ (MVP; Shaffer, 1981). The extinction of the last population 
of the heath hen (Tympanuchus cupido cupido) is an extreme example where all four 
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factors came into play within a short span of time to exterminate the species (van Dyke, 
2002). The 1916 lightning fire (catastrophe) was followed by severe winters 
(environmental stochasticity), and subsequent inbreeding of the further reduced 
population (genetic stochasticity) led to a population size of ten individuals left, all of 
them males (demographic stochasticity).   
3.2.4.2 Metapopulation Theory and Source-Sink Dynamics 
The MacArthur and Wilson Theory of Island Biogeography suffers from a number of 
drawbacks because of its focus on a particular habitat island, and because it assumes 
that all species and all types of surrounding isolation matrix are equivalently 
uninhabitable,  it ignores interspecific and biophysical interactions like edge effects 
(Laurance, 2010; Hanski, 2010). The metapopulation theory addresses some of these 
drawbacks. At a local scale, individuals (on a habitat island for example) tend to belong 
to a specific population. At a larger scale (metapopulation scale) however, it often is the 
case that a particular species is extant in more than one location, in different populations. 
These populations may be isolated to a degree, but they may still be linked to the 
dispersal ability of the species. This collection of populations, for example, mainland-
island or source-sink populations, is termed a ‘metapopulation’. Populations spread over 
a large geographical scale, beyond the dispersal capabilities of individuals, cannot be 
considered metapopulations (Hanski and Simberloff, 1997; Hanski and Gilpin, 1991). The 
metapopulation theory is in a sense related to the theory of island biogeography in that 
they are both concerned with the same processes: immigration (or colonisation) and 
extinction. Where they differ is that the theory of island biogeography assumes that the 
mainland population is the source of colonists and immune to extinction, while in Levin’s 
metapopulation theory, any extant population can be a source of migrants and all 
populations show some degree of turnover and face some risk of extinction (Hanski and 
Gilpin, 1991). The scale of metapopulation studies is defined as that “at which 
individuals infrequently move from one place (population) to another, typically across 
habitat types which are not suitable for their feeding and breeding activities, and often 
with substantial risk of failing to locate another suitable patch in which to settle” (Hanski 
and Gilpin, 1991). 
Metapopulations are difficult to study because of the assumption of dispersal events 
which cannot be observed directly in the field. Therefore the most practical way to study 
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them is by modelling and genetics. Short-lived taxa, like insects or rodents, are certainly 
easier to study because their short generation time accelerates the effects of 
metapopulation dynamics compared to longer-lived species. For the latter type of 
species, there are a number of ways that can be used to infer the effects of 
metapopulation dynamics (Karieva, 1990): 
1. Genetics: Within a metapopulation, patterns based on habitat patches may 
appear. Genetic methods in metapopulation approaches are related to those of 
population genetics (Giles and Goudet, 1997).  
2. Occupancy models: These can include percentage occupancy or occupancy 
turnover in relation to mainland-island or other inter-island distances. 
3. Spatial autocorrelation models: These models are also called ‘stepping stone 
models’. These models can be used to contrast the consequences of long-range 
and short-range dispersal. Environmental variability is also factored into the 
spatial model. 
3.3 The Bakun Hydroelectric Dam and the Sarawak Corridor of 
Renewable Energy (SCORE) 
The Bakun Hydroelectric Dam (BHD; coordinates 02°45′23″N 114°03′47″E) is a 204m 
high concrete-face rock-fill dam (CFRD) in Sarawak (Sibon, 2011a; Sovacool and Bulan, 
2011a). At full operational capacity, Bakun is expected to be able to generate 2400MW 
of electricity, utilising eight 300 MW capacity Francis turbines. The lifespan of the dam 
is expected to be between 30 and 50 years (Keong, 2005). The nearest town is Belaga, 
which is 37km downstream of the dam (Ekran Berhad, 1994). Technical and engineering 
information about the BHD is shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Engineering and technical information of the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011a; 
Ekran Berhad, 1994) 
Parameter Details 
Length 750m 
Height 205m 
Width of base 573m 
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Width of crest 12m 
Volume of fill material used in 
construction 
16.71 million cubic metres 
Spillway discharge capacity 15,000 cubic metres per second 
Reservoir storage volume 43.8 billion cubic metres 
Reservoir storage capacity 6 months 
Reservoir surface area 720 square kilometres 
Original waterbody surface area ~67 square kilometres 
Catchment area 14,750 square kilometres 
Installed capacity 
8 x300 MW Francis turbines (2400 MW 
total) 
Estimated average annual output 16,784 GWh 
Construction cost RM 5,596 million – RM 25,054 million 
(USD 1,763 million – USD 7,894 million) 
(AUD 1,769 million – AUD 7,920 million) 
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Figure 3.5: The Bakun Hydroelectric Dam. (Source: Sarawak Online) 
The BHD, as described earlier, is sited on the Balui River, which feeds into the Rajang 
River and is part of the Rajang River system, the largest in Malaysia. This river system 
originates from the Nieuwenhuis Mountain Range and the Upper Kapuas Mountains 
(Long, 2010), drains about 44,200km2 of central Sarawak, and its rivers total 580km 
(Sovacool and Bulan, 2011a). Some 51% of the area covered by the reservoir is Native 
Customary Land (meaning land that is legally owned by indigenous communities) and as 
a result of the impoundment, close to 10,000 indigenous people from the the Kayan, 
Kenyah, Kajang, Ukit and Penan ethnic groups had to be relocated (Sovacool and Bulan, 
2011a). 
The economy of Sarawak is dominated by the exploitation of its substantial natural 
resource base. Key industries include logging, monoculture plantations of oil palm, 
rubber and pepper, and liquefied natural gas production. As such, the rate of growth of 
the economy in Sarawak is not consistent and fluctuates year-by-year depending on the 
prices of the commodities that it exports (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). Electricity 
generation is currently dominated by fossil fuels, with coal, natural gas and diesel 
providing 907MW out of 1315MW available in 2010 (Sovacool and Bulan 2012). With 
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the first turbine of Bakun come online in August 2011, and hydroelectricity was boosted 
further when the Murum Dam came online in 2016 with an installed capacity of 944 MW 
(Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Table showing current and planned power stations of Sarawak. (PS = Power Station; HEP = 
Hydroelectric Power).  (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012; RECODA, 2007) 
Name Installed Capacity 
(MW) 
Fuel Type Operational  
Status 
Biawak PS 114 Diesel and Natural 
Gas 
Operational 
Batang Ai HEP 
Station 
108 Hydroelectric Operational 
Bintulu 510 Natural Gas Operational 
Distributed 
Generation (various 
locations) 
4 Diesel and Oil Operational 
Miri PS 99 Natural Gas Operational 
Mukah Coal PS 270 Coal Operational 
Sejingkat Coal PS 210 Coal Operational 
Bakun 2400 Hydroelectric Operational, but 
only one turbine 
used, producing 
300MW 
Murum 944 Hydroelectric Operational 
Belaga 230 Hydroelectric Planning 
Pelagus 411 Hydroelectric Planning 
Baram 1212 Hydroelectric Suspended 
Limbang 1 45 Hydroelectric Planning 
Limbang 2 200 Hydroelectric Planning 
Baleh 1400 Hydroelectric Planning 
Punan Bah 130 Hydroelectric Planning 
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Lawas 105 Hydroelectric Planning 
Limbang 3 50 Hydroelectric Planning 
Linau 290 Hydroelectric Planning 
Tutoh 160 Hydroelectric Planning 
Belapeh 140 Hydroelectric Planning 
Ulu Ai 54 Hydroelectric Planning 
Merit-Pila 1200 Coal Planning 
Balingian 900 Coal Planning 
Total  10586   
 
The BHD is one of at least a dozen hydroelectric dams planned for the Sarawak Corridor 
of Renewable Energy (SCORE) to commence by 2030, with an initial combined installed 
capacity of 7,800 MW (Table 3.5). If the all tabled plans are realised, SCORE would be 
the most expensive, most ambitious energy project in South-east Asia, requiring some 
RM334 billion (USD 105 billion; close to AUD 105 billion) in investment by 2030 
(Sovacool and Bulan, 2011b). To put this in some perspective, the amount allocated to 
“support the needs of infrastructure, industry and agriculture as well as rural 
development” in Malaysia’s federal budget for 2012 is RM29.8 billion, and total foreign 
direct investment into Malaysia was RM29 billion in 2010 and RM32.9 billion for 2012 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2011). This projected cost is also by no means concrete, 
considering that the cost of the Bakun Dam inflated six-fold from RM2.5 billion to some 
RM15 billion due a variety of factors (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011b), which may threaten 
the affordability of the electricity supply. If all of the plans for SCORE are fulfilled, 51 
dam sites would be developed, stretching some 320km, covering an area of 70,709km2, 
and would be able to generate 20,000 MW of hydroelectricity (Sovacool and Bulan, 
2012). It has also been pointed out that, due to the geography, hydrology and 
abundance of rainfall of Sarawak, up to 155 potential dam sites have been identified, 
with the potential of providing 80,000MW of hydroelectric capacity, producing 340,000 
GWh of electricity per year (Suhakam, 2009; Sovacool and Bulan, 2011b), which is nearly 
four times Malaysia’s 94,748GWh electricity demand in 2009 (Suruhanjaya Tenaga, 
2012).  
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Figure 3.6: Map of hydroelectric dams that have been built and are being built, and those undergoing feasibility 
studies. Of these, Baram Dam has been suspended. (Source: 
http://www.siwrs.com.my/modules/iwrm/components/0_webpages/image_show.php?id=98) 
SCORE can be considered the jewel of Malaysia’s development planning. It has been part 
of both the Ninth (2006-2010) as well as the Tenth (2011-2015) Malaysia Plans, and the 
Third Industrial Master Plan (Sarawak Government, 2007). All these plans have the 
explicit purpose of propelling Malaysia’s economy from middle-income to industrialised 
high-income by 2020, a goal often referred to as Vision 2020 (EPU, 2001). To do this, 
planners will have to lift Malaysia’s GDP through rapid, sustained acceleration of 
economic growth in Malaysia’s poorest states by the attraction of substantial amounts 
of foreign investments, an activity in which Malaysia has been lacklustre (Economic 
Transformation Programme, 2010). In doing so, they aim to narrow the income and 
developmental gap between rich states like Selangor and Melaka, and poorer states 
such as Sarawak. The over-arching strategy appears to be to proceed with the SCORE 
project and intentionally create a surplus of electricity, which in theory would drive 
electricity prices down. This, it is hoped, would accomplish three aims: 1) to provide 
cheap electricity for the masses and more; 2) to incorporate indigenous societies into 
‘mainstream’ Malaysian society through resettlement and provision of education and 
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healthcare; and 3) to attract energy-intensive, value-added industries by offering low 
electricity prices from a method of electricity generation that is not ‘carbon-polluting’. 
Ten industries have been identified: 
1) Aluminium smelting to produce up to 25 million tonnes of aluminium for export 
to Asian markets. 
2) Steel mills 
3) Glass-making 
4) Palm Oil production and processing 
5) Timber processing 
6) Livestock and meat industry processing 
7) Aquaculture 
8) Marine Engineering (including ship building and repairs and rig building) 
9) Petroleum refining and products 
10) Tourism, including upgrading of existing infrastructure and implementation of 
new attractions, with particular interest in promoting eco-tourism) 
A further excess of electricity produced, as more dams and turbines come online, would 
be sold to Indonesia, Brunei and Peninsular Malaysia. With the rise of industries and the 
inflow of expatriate expertise, the government hopes to double the population and 
increase the number of jobs in the state by 2.5 times by 2030 (Sarawak Government, 
2007), and to increase the development of their own workforce. The government 
projects that, by 2030, SCORE would have resulted in RM334 billion (USD 105 billion) in 
investments (80% of this investment going into industries and power and 20% into 
physical and institutional infrastructure and developing Sarawak’s human capital). It is 
also projected that 836,000 jobs will be created by 2030 as a result of SCORE, 663,000 
of which will be filled by locals. 
Low energy prices, especially for heavy industries such as aluminium smelting, is an 
attractive factor in terms of deciding where to locate their factories. By the end of 2011, 
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major players in the resource industry have decided to locate smelters in Sarawak, to 
capitalise on the projected lowering of electricity prices as Bakun and Murum come 
online (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). A US$1.6 billion, 370,000 tonne/facility operated by 
Chinese government-linked companies that will consume 600MW of electricity was 
being negotiated as of March 2012, and a 240,000-tonne smelter owned by Malaysian 
company Press Metal Bhd is due to start operations in June, consuming 480MW of 
electricity. Australian mining company Rio Tinto Alcan was in a joint venture negotiation 
with a Malaysian company to build a US$2 billion, 550,000 tonne/year facility that 
requires 1200MW of power, but negotiations have failed due to the disagreement of 
the electricity tariff to be paid by the smelter operator (Borneo Post, 2012). 
The construction history of the Bakun Hydroelectric dam is a tumultuous one, involving 
ecological, sociological and economic controversy. The fifteen affected indigenous 
communities, known as the Orang Ulu, are now resettled at the Sungai Asap 
Resettlement Area, about 40mins drive from the dam (Alexander, 2008). Old hilltops 
have become landbridge islands. The lifespan of the dam, as mentioned above, is 
expected to be between 30 and 50 years. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
One striking characteristic of political ecology as a research field is the apparent lack of 
a defining, unifying theory or methodology (Khan, 2013). The political ecology approach 
can instead be seen as a framework in order to understand how political and 
environmental factors interact with each other to cause actors on various scales to 
effect social and environmental changes. Briefly, the political ecology approach can 
consist of three components (Kalipeni and Oppong, 1998). These components are by no 
means equally weighted, nor indeed compulsory at all, such is the methodological 
fluidity of this field. These components are: context and scale, historical depth and 
structural relationship.  
‘Context and scale’ looks at interactions between actors and their environment through 
the various scales (Atkinson, 1991; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). The researcher looks at 
how their relative power and associated political and economic differences affect the 
management and access to resources and the implementation of policies that favour 
certain groups over others (Mayer, 1996; Peet and Watts, 1993; Stonich, 1993).  
Historical depth examines the interactions between actors and their environment by 
considering local histories and ecology. This diachronic component often reveals the 
rationales behind various persistent practices that may intuitively seem detrimental to 
the environment (Kalipeni and Oppong, 1998; Atkinson, 1991; Peluso, 1993). Structural 
relationship looks at social and state structures which ‘channel’ actors to perform 
actions that they would normally not consider rational choices which may or may not 
occur via direct restriction of choices (Giddens, 1984). Such structures can include 
organisations at the local, or state level up to supranational ones such as the World Bank 
and even foreign governments.  Because of the substantial focus given to international 
and state level forces affecting the local ecology via human agency, this component 
overlaps greatly with political economy.  
The advantage of a political ecology approach is that provides an avenue to conceptually 
integrate several areas of research. There is little research done on hydroelectric dams 
explicitly using the political ecology approach, but much more research has separately 
been done on the anthropological and sociological (Aiken and Leigh, 2015; Alexander, 
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2014; Tilt et al., 2009; Choy, 2004; WCD, 2000; Fearnside; 1999; Jing, 1999; Loney, 1995) 
and ecological impacts (Benchimol and Peres, 2015; Fearnside, 2014; 2001; Harnish et 
al., 2014; Palmeirim et al., 2014; Finer and Jenkins 2012; Zhong and Power, 1996). Some 
authors such as Philip Fearnside publish research from the same field site, from both 
sides of the ‘divide’, but have not written integrative work in the political ecology 
tradition (see Fearnside, 1999; 2001; 2006; 2014). In general, these studies demonstrate 
the often adverse social and environmental impacts of hydropower, but not much work 
is done with regard to linking the two sides to give a clear overview of how observations 
made at local scale society and ecology is driven by the greater political economy. 
This chapter outlines the methods employed during research. The methods eventually 
employed had changed somewhat from earlier, planned methods due to various 
limitations and issues encountered in the field. These will be explained in at the end of 
the chapter. The essence of the methods has not changed, as qualitative methods for 
social research builds on the quantitative base of the ecological research. 
4.1 Reconnaissance 
Prior to formally starting field research, a ten-day reconnaissance trip was made in 
December 2012. This helped to inform and optimise the research in a number of ways. 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, it allowed me to begin building networks and links 
to the communities that I would work with, as well as with future field assistants. 
Secondly, it helped me to identify where I would be able to lodge for the longer term as 
well as to ensure long-term transport availability. Thirdly, I would be able to visit the 
lake, to understand the logistics required for the ecological research, as well as the 
terrain of the land. Fourth, it would allow me to meet people within the Sarawak 
Forestry bureaucracy and University Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS), the state university, 
in order to gain access to maps, materials and (it was hoped), some expert local advice 
in the field. 
4.2 Ecology 
The ecological part of the research is targeted at mammal diversity, specifically, the 
changes in recorded mammal biodiversity after the inundation of the former Batang 
Balui. Mammals are an important part of tropical Asian biodiversity, filling several niches 
and providing many important ecological services. Various mammalian species are also 
63 
 
important sources of protein and income and have cultural symbolism to indigenous 
tribes.  
Baseline data have been recorded by two Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). The 
assessments were done twice (1994 and 2009) due to the shelving of the project during 
the 1998 Asian financial crisis. The first EIA was done by a team from University Malaysia 
Sarawak (Ekran Berhad, 1994), while the second was done by Sarawak Forestry 
Corporation (SFC, 2013). 
For ecological research, three methods were tried: transect surveys, small mammal 
trapping and camera trapping.  The descriptions for the ecological methods in this 
chapter are general, and more specific descriptions will be written in the empirical 
chapter. 
 
Figure 4.1: Bakun Rapids before impoundment. Source: Rodney Christopher. 
64 
 
4.2.1 The Study Site 
Geologically, the Balui lies in an area called the Sibu zone of the Rajang Group, 
characterised by ‘highly deformed steeply dipping low-grade metamorphic flysch’. The 
immediate area is called the Pelagus Member of the Rajang Group, made up 
predominantly of argillite, with extremely strong greywacke beds 15 to 90m thick. The 
Pelagus member is intensively folded and tectonic disruption is evident (Osman, 2008; 
Hutchison, 2005). The Bakun dam is named after the Bakun rapids, over which the dam 
was built.  
The entire area that is left after inundation consists mostly of steep, rugged, and slippery 
slopes. The seasons vary the heights of the dam as well. These factors affect the 
availability and access to locations for trapping and transect sites. There is actually little 
primary forest around the Balui area, due to the long history of various human activities, 
from shifting cultivation to logging. Much of the area is fragmented to some degree 
which can be caused by a combination of inundation, rivers and streams, walking trails, 
logging tracks and camps. Although the earlier EIA (Ekran Berhad, 1994) described there 
to be virgin mixed dipterocarp forest above 200m, large-scale logging activities had 
entered these higher altitudes since the construction of the dam. It is not uncommon to 
see log barges plying the lake. The second EIA recognised that the various plant species 
play important roles culturally and ecologically, and rescued 34,000 tree (mostly 
dipterocarp) seeds and 1188 saplings of non-tree species for cultivation at a nursery and 
replanting. However, due to the rescue team miscalculating the final inundation height, 
82% of all the seedlings were planted too low and were lost to the rising water level (SFC, 
2013).  
4.2.1.1 Hydrology and Climatology 
The Batang Balui is a tributary of the Batang Rajang. The Batang Rajang is Sarawak’s 
longest river, the associated watershed, the state’s largest, covering an estimated 1.5 
million hectares. The Balui itself has three major tributaries: the Murum, which was also 
being dammed and slated to go online in 2013 with a 944MW capacity, the Linau, which 
may have a 290 MW dam planned, and the Bahau (Kadikon, 2006; Ekran Berhad, 1994). 
More than 1,500 permanent streams also feed into the Balui. The topography of the 
land immediately surrounding the Balui River is steep, and as such the Bakun Lake, 
although covering more than 700km2, does not spread out radially. Instead, a 160 km 
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long lake with a 2000km perimeter that follows the valleys is formed, averaging 2km 
across (Ekran Berhad, 1994). Within the area of the lake, hilltops have become islands. 
Some islands would be transient. In December 2011, when the height of the reservoir 
level was at 219m above sea level (a.s.l.), there were more than 20 major islands in the 
lake. When the water level finally reaches the target elevation of 228m a.s.l., which is 
also the maximum operating level of the dam, it is expected that more than 10 major 
islands would still be left (Sibon, 2011b; Figure 4.2). It is possible that the state 
authorities may try to develop these islands into ecotourism destinations. The land 
surrounding the lake is rugged with steep slopes, with much of the land above 500m 
a.s.l. and the highest peak rising to 2040m (Samad and Abdul Patah, 1997; Figure 4.3).  
The region around Balui and Sarawak, in general, is remarkable for its abundance of 
rainfall, even by tropical standards. More than 4000mm of rain falls annually on average 
around the Balui from as many as four rainy seasons (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011a; 
Kadikon, 2006; Samad and Abdul Patah, 1997; Ekran Berhad, 1994), which is high in 
comparison to other nearby areas. For example, annual rainfall in Singapore averages 
about 2,360mm, while the Danum Valley Field Centre in Sabah receives about 2822mm 
(Hu et al, 2003; Marsh and Greer, 1992). The heaviest rains come during the Landas 
season, which occurs under the influence of the northeast monsoon from October till 
February, and there is no distinct dry season (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012; Kadikon, 2006; 
Morrison, 1993). Of the rainfall in the Bakun catchment area (located between latitudes 
1.5°N and 3.0°N and longitudes 113.5°E and 115.3°E), about 70% - 75% becomes run-off 
(Kadikon, 2006; Samad and Abdul Patah, 1997; Ekran Berhad, 1994). Mean annual 
evapotranspiration is also high at 1300mm (Samad and Abdul Patah, 1997). Depending 
on land use, microclimatic variables, such as temperature and humidity, fluctuate. 
Overall, temperatures range from 220C - 360C, while humidity ranges from 35%-88% 
(Kadikon, 2006). It is likely, however, that with the rest of Southeast Asia and Sarawak, 
Balui is experiencing, or will experience, rising temperatures as vegetation is lost from 
logging. 
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Figure 4.2: Map showing inundated areas forming Bakun Lake and the islands in it. 
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Figure 4.3: Terrain map of the region around the Bakun rapids preinundation, which is indicated by the placemark ‘A’. The terrain is generally steep and rugged. The flat plains opening to 
the coast can be seen on the top left. (Source: Google Maps, 2012. Images ©MapIT, ©Tele Atlas. 
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Figure 4.4: Landsat 8 image mosaic of the Bakun Dam from 16th June 2016. The small water body on the right is the reservoir of the newer Murum Dam (Source: Landsat 8, United States 
Geological Service Products).
69 
 
4.2.1.2 Camera Traps 
Camera traps were deployed in six different locations at various times over 18 months. The 
traps were checked every three months where it is possible. The models used were Bushnell 
Trophy Cam, Bushnell Trophy Cam HD and Bushnell Aggressor. Locations were marked with 
a Garmin GPSmap 62s set. 
Between three to five camera traps were used on each trap line, at heights of 0.5 m above 
the ground in small openings or wildlife trails. The traps all faced in the same direction, and 
the distance between each trap was 25m, creating surveillance belts of 50m (three traps) to 
100m long (5 traps). The traps were not baited and continuously set for at least three 
months until it was time to check the traps and remove the memory cards. As there could 
be an issue with the same animal returning to particular cameras or walking along the trap 
line, it was taken that unless the individuals were clearly identifiable, the species will not be 
counted if it reappears in the same trap or adjacent traps within two hours. Camera traps 
might also sometimes produce unclear images, due to fog or long shutter speeds under poor 
light conditions. When this happened, the images were discarded. 
4.2.2 Small Mammal Traps 
The initial idea was to buy Sherman traps for the small mammal survey. Due to cost 
reasons, this was then changed to using traps that were made by hand out of thick 
steel wires and mesh. This trapping mechanism is similar to that of a conventional cage 
mouse trap that is popular throughout Southeast-Asia. A piece of thick steel wire was 
fashioned into a hook at one end for the bait and another at the other end to hold the 
sprung trapdoor open. The springs were derived from those used by sprung baby 
hammocks. The traps were then sprayed black then dried in the sun, before soaking in 
water to remove aromatic signatures of the paint. 
While the initial idea was to set the trap in random locations, the terrain made it 
difficult to set secure trap lines in accordance with animal ethics requirements as most 
places were steep and the traps were prone to roll, even with the help of stakes in the 
corners to support them. Therefore, it was inevitable that a bias was introduced, in 
that the traps needed to be placed in locations where they could be secured. Once set, 
the traps were covered by some leaf litter to camouflage and provide reasonable 
shelter for the trapped animals. Traps were set for seven days straight each time and 
were checked twice a day: at 7 am and 7 pm. A number of baits were tested, including 
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banana, jackfruit (both flesh on and off, and chunks with shell on), desiccated coconut 
and banana with peanut butter. Trapping locations were marked with a GPSmap62s 
set.  
 
Figure 4.5: Hand-built small mammal traps baited with jackfruit 
4.2.3 Transect Surveys 
Transects were used to survey for arboreal or volant mammals.  The transects used 
essentially were the paths taken where the camera and small mammal traps were laid. 
Surveys started two weeks after each trapping period when the traps had been removed. 
Both day and night surveys were done as far as possible, although, for safety reasons, 
not every transect was walked at night. Night surveys were also highly discouraged by 
the locals as hunters and hunting dogs sometimes hunt at night (especially for pangolins), 
and there are risks of being mistakenly shot. The transects mainly consisted of old 
secondary forests at different growth stages. 
The transects were walked in teams of two or three people at a normal pace in the day 
but at approximately 500m an hour at night. The night pace was a consequence of the 
need for safety and it is also a method employed for night surveys for species such as 
the slow loris. During the night surveys, a scanning method was used to survey the forest 
from canopy to ground. Red filters were attached to head torches, to reduce the 
disturbance to any mammal species that may be present on the transect. If there was a 
sighting, the GPS location, height, date and time, and weather were recorded 
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(Sutherland, 2008).  Day surveys started at 7 am and night surveys at 7 pm, and were 
walked until the end of the transects were reached. 
4.3 Social Research 
The losses incurred as a result of the displacements are often beyond physical, tangible 
assets but also include grief, loss of cultural identity and social structures (ADB, 1998).  
Much research has been done to describe the adverse effects of forced displacement in 
various locations, including at the Bakun Resettlement Scheme (BRS) (Perera, 2009; 
Jehom, 2008). On the other hand, in resettlement areas as diverse as the BRS, there is 
also diversity in the way the various longhouses respond to the change, and these can 
include flourishing, instead of collapse. The social research thus collects qualitative 
information on some longhouses and look at how their responses have differed post-
resettlement.  
4.3.1 Resettlement and the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model 
Forced displacements of people often occur due to infrastructural projects, such as road 
or dam building. It is argued that forced relocation raises ethical questions of social 
justice and equity, as the state uses its power to move communities to make way for 
these projects, but the relocated communities are often found to be in poorer 
conditions than before. While the benefits of the relocation and the infrastructural 
development may be felt elsewhere (such hydropower dams providing cheap and 
reliable electricity to industries), the displaced communities receive almost no share of 
the gains.  
Displacement represents an anomaly in development. International agencies such as the 
United Nations define development using a basket of parameters, such as life 
expectancy, literacy, and average income (UNDP, 2015).  The most common indicator of 
development is the measurement of a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Yet, GDP 
growth does not necessarily translate to greater development in a nation (Soubbotina 
and Sheram, 2000). There is an increasing recognition that GDP growth is a means to 
development, rather than it being the goal of development (UNDP, 1996: 1).  Amartya 
Sen expanded the definition of development further by arguing that the aim of 
development and development projects should be to increase freedoms of individuals 
in societies (Sen, 1999; 1997). It is understood that poverty is linked to social 
exclusionary forces that then exclude displaced peoples physically from an area (Phillips 
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et al., 2013). Since displacement is a result of exclusion, which curtails the freedom of 
choice of the affected communities, Sen (1997) then argued that the act of displacement 
runs counter to the nature of development. 
Michael Cernea (2000) accepted that the process of development inevitably requires 
that areas be redesignated for different purposes. On the other hand, he recognised 
that the costs and benefits of development and associated resettlement need to be 
more equitably distributed. Indeed, he pointed out that resettlement does not end with 
the migration of people from one place to another: there is also a reestablishment 
component, as communities try to make sense of their new surroundings and try to 
create new links. His earlier work with conceptualising resettlement and rehabilitation 
of affected communities (Cernea, 1996; 1995; 1990) culminated in what was called the 
‘Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model’ (IRR) (Cernea, 1998), a tool which he 
believed would be useful for making resettlement plans. Impoverishment risks are 
factors that can sink a resettled community (further) into poverty. The IRR identifies 
eight such risks. Conversely, resettlement policies that provide security against these 
risks make up the reconstruction model, which stops these risks from being realised 
(Table 4.1). The risks are not independent, and can, therefore, interact and influence 
each other.  
Table 4.1: The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model (IRR) formulated by Cernea. (Cernea, 1998) 
Impoverishment Risks Reconstruction Model 
Landlessness Land-based resettlement 
Joblessness Re-employment 
Food insecurity Safe nutrition 
Homelessness House reconstruction 
Increased mortality and morbidity Better health 
Marginalisation, deprivation of common 
assets and community disarticulation 
Community reconstruction and social 
inclusion 
 
Here, the risk model is useful as a scaffold to help explain and assess the socioeconomic 
condition of longhouses at the BRS. An approach based on some of the risks was used 
at the BRS at Uma Badeng to understand their experiences of displacement from Long 
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Gang and their attempts to get their livelihoods started despite community 
disarticulation, marginalisation and deprivation of access to common property (Jehom, 
2008). 
4.3.2 The Study Area 
The Bakun Resettlement Scheme (BRS) lies along Sungai Asap and Sungai Koyan, which 
are smaller tributaries of the Belaga River. The large, 19,000km2 Belaga District stretches 
from the upper region of the Rejang River to the Indonesian border.  Belaga, like most 
of Sarawak, is generally sparsely populated. However, the relatively small population of 
30,000 is a diverse one. The largest groups are the Kayan and the Kenyah. Other 
indigenous groups were the Kajang, Ukit, Iban and Penan. Chinese and Malay 
settlements are also present. The BRS is virtually a microcosm of Belaga, with nearly 
every ethnic group represented, except for Ibans and Malays. The move from the Balui 
to the BRS was called ‘Operation Exodus’, and this was accomplished over three phases. 
This was also Sarawak’s first dam-induced displacement, as the Batang Ai HEP displaced 
3,600 Ibans from 26 longhouses (Perera, 2009).  
Fifteen longhouses were required to move, affecting 1,640 families and about 10,000 
residents (WCD, 1999). Prior to the move, the government made more than one 
valuation of the assets of the communities, including the longhouses and the trees 
planted as cash crops, and promised to pay a final amount, minus the cost of their new 
home. However, after much public pressure, the government announced in 2012 that 
the Bakun residents would not need to pay for their new longhouses. The land that was 
taken for the BRS and its associated transport infrastructure actually lies in the native 
customary land of a few other longhouses: the Kenyah Uma Sambop Long Semutut, Uma 
Pawa Long Urun, Uma Badeng Long Dungan and Uma Bakong Sungai Asap, as well as 
the Seping (Alexander, 2014; Tan, 1994).  For most of the work in this fieldwork period, 
most of the information is obtained from a focal longhouse, Uma Belor (Figure 4.6). 
Some information is also gathered from the other longhouses. 
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Figure 4.6: Newspaper clipping showing an aerial view of Uma Belor. 
The BRS can be divided into two halves. Some longhouses are arranged along Sungai 
Asap, the others along Sungai Koyan (Figure 4.2). Each side is meant to have its own local 
‘centre’, consisting of shops and health clinics, with Sungai Asap centre being local 
centre 1, and the Koyan centre being local centre 2. However, in reality, the town centre 
is located in the Sungai Asap side of the resettlement scheme, as it has a police post, 
eateries, fresh food market, a number of Chinese-owned provision shops, a small library 
and a large, fully staffed clinic. Local centre two consists of a single shop, a futsal court 
and a small clinic. There are also two primary schools in each half of the BRS, which were 
moved from the old upriver areas and retain their old names. SK Long Gang was the 
primary school closest to Uma Badeng and is still located next to Uma Badeng at the BRS. 
The second primary school is SK Batu Keling, which is located in local centre one, next to 
the clinic. A new secondary school was inaugurated for the area which offers boarding 
facilities, SMK Bakun. The local administrative office is not within either of the centres 
but is located near SMK Bakun, which is near the access road to Uma Nyaving. The 
administration office building also houses a multi-purpose hall and an internet room. 
Water is drawn from Sungai Koyan and treated at a small, water treatment facility at the 
northernmost end of the Koyan access road. The treated water is then pumped to 
reservoir tanks near local centre 2. Using gravity, water is piped from the reservoir tanks 
to families. Electricity comes from a set of large diesel generators located just outside 
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the BRS, not from the Bakun hydroelectric plant. Families are metered for the electricity 
use and pay for consumption if their monthly bill exceeds RM20. They are, however, not 
billed for water consumption. 
 
76 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Map of the Bakun Resettlement Scheme, also showing the local centres and the water treatment 
facilities. 
4.3.3 Employed Methods 
The methods initially planned were a combination of semi-structured interviews and 
survey questionnaires, as well as participant observation. However, as noted in Jehom 
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(2008), the communities at the BRS have been surveyed by different groups to the point 
of survey fatigue. Even while I was there doing fieldwork, there had been at least five 
other research groups entering and exiting the BRS for research related to the 
resettlement, using survey and focus group interviews. After arriving at the field site and 
making acquaintances with friends and family of the host, and seeing the weariness in 
their responses to ‘research’, ‘survey’ and ‘interview’, and more than a few “last time 
also there were researchers from government and universities here to survey and 
interview, but in the end everything is still the same”, it was decided that this 
component of research would have to proceed with just participant observation. 
Participant observation is defined as a process by which a researcher first establishes 
rapport within a community and blends with the community to reduce the reservations 
of community members to the researcher, and then later distances from the community 
with the data to objectively interpret the information collected (Bernard, 1994). In the 
early stages, I travelled to all the longhouses and introduced myself as a PhD candidate 
from Australia and explained what I had intended to accomplish in Sarawak. I attended 
several functions and met with and talked to various political figures on an informal basis. 
Through participant observation, I collected information on power relations, 
information on the livelihoods of various people in the different longhouses (including 
their access and use of land and resources around the BRS and the upper Balui) and 
social norms as well as inter-longhouse relations and interactions. Collected information 
was recorded in digital form in a tablet whenever possible, and information was clarified 
with various members of the community, without revealing the original sources of the 
comments in question. Although following hunts might have yielded even more data, 
this was not a part of the research as foreigners are not allowed to follow hunts, and 
safety protocols were non-existent. It is not unheard of for hunters to accidentally take 
aim at their hunting partners. 
4.4 Challenges and Limitations 
The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men / Gang aft agley – Robert Burns 
4.4.1 Seasonalities 
Seasonality became a problem with ecological fieldwork, as the sheer volume loss at the 
reservoir in the dry season is magnified greatly, the drop in water level from the 
maximum reaching as much as 20m. This unanticipated fluctuation had great 
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consequences. At low water levels, the naturally steep banks become very high, and 
streams with small rapids become large waterfalls. This posed a serious safety risk as, in 
order to access the survey sites, we had to grab hold of dried out, exposed tree roots. 
Exiting survey sites was as hard due to the unstable slopes. In some areas, where the 
field site was accessed by streams, the boats had to stop at the base of the waterfall and 
we would have to rock-climb up the banks. Another problem posed by the dry season 
was that driftwood would tend to collect and block access up some tributaries. Many 
surveys had to be cancelled when the interlocked pieces of timber became immovable. 
On the other hand, the nearly daily occurrences of rain the wet seasons tended to bring 
heavy, lashing storms, where visibility reduced to less than 5m. Accidents have been 
known to occur when fishermen tried to race home in the rain with their catch and 
collided with tree stumps, rocks, or other boats. My host also, just before I arrived, got 
lost on the way back from the lake himself in the rain. Once the rain subsided, he realised 
that he had been repeatedly circling one of the small islands. 
Besides safety issues, the extreme seasonality brings about operational issues, such as 
identifying islands to place traps, and needing to know that these islands are permanent, 
and not submerged during the wet season. For this, we needed to consult the other men 
and hunters for their own knowledge as these areas are in the land owned customarily 
by other longhouses. 
4.4.2 Access 
Besides seasonality, access to survey sites is also challenging due to the shape of the 
lake. The area of the lake surface is generally accepted to be 700km2, and often quoted 
to be ‘the size of Singapore’, but, as noted earlier, the shape of the lake is very different 
to the diamond-shaped island republic. Due to the inundation area being within 
mountain ranges, Bakun lake has turned out to be an extremely long, dendritic lake. This 
means that to access survey sites, or visit people who decided to live on the lake, can 
take a long time and get extremely expensive. For example, to reach Uma Kulit, a Kenyah 
longhouse which has significant numbers of people living in floating houses on the lake, 
takes about sixteen hours to and from the jetty and two barrels, or 416 litres, of petrol.  
79 
 
4.4.3 Positionality 
On arrival at the fieldsite and in the process of acquainting myself to the place and 
people, I was aware and constantly reminded by the locals, of my own collection of 
identity markers that made me out to be “different”, and a “privileged outsider”. I am a 
male foreign national, from a rich home country (Singapore), and am a tertiary candidate 
at the highest level (PhD) from an institution in a country that is somewhat associated 
with power. A surprising number of people knew that the president of Parti Rakyat 
Sarawak (PRS) was also an anthropology graduate of the Australian National University 
(ANU), that many other political leaders were trained in Australia, and that Australian 
corporate entities had a big role to play in the Bakun Dam; and many were also aware 
of the Australian missionaries who set up the BEM and brought young Orang Ulu 
children to Australia to be educated. A few mentioned an Australian anthropologist 
(who is actually my advisor) who works at Uma Lahanan. They considered her to be more 
“insider” than I was, as I was new, had no familial relations in the area, and could not 
speak or understand Kayan, Kenyah or any of the Orang Ulu languages.  
I had to keep all the identity markers in mind as I talked to people.  I had to remember 
also that the information that was told to me by the people was a combination of their 
perception of my identity markers (which then affected their understanding of my 
conversational intentions), social norms, their own intentions and expectations, and 
perceived power relations (Briggs, 1986). As they talked to me and assessed my identity, 
their own experiences and values would prioritise some markers over others, and they 
would assign a position within the BRS to me (John, 1990). These would place constraints 
on who I could talk to and what about, or expectations of what I could do for the 
community. For example, my association with the PRS president made some wary to 
talk to me about political issues, while others expected various problems to reach the 
highest levels of government through me. Nevertheless, as argued by Takacs (2003) and 
Robson and Willis (1994), positionalities can often be turned into advantages. Demands 
for issues to be brought to political leaders give me direct access to the problems of 
resettlement, and my foreign nationality as a Singaporean, a country that was formed 
by separation from the Malaysian Federation which Sarawak is still a part of, enabled 
discussions at various scales.  
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I would also be associated with my host family, which would later adopt me. This 
potentially would affect my position within the community, and who I could talk to. The 
elderly patriarch of the family is one of the last dayongs, while his daughter, whom I 
lived with is a senior education officer and is called cikgu (or teacher) even when she is 
referred to in absence, reflecting the relatively high levels of respect accorded to them. 
Her husband is also popular among the communities in general. The combination of 
these factors meant that I was afforded very good access to data, from men, women 
and the elderly to culture to education.  
4.4.4 Ethics 
4.4.4.1 Animal Ethics 
Although the ecological research had been approved by the Animal Ethics panel at the 
ANU, I realised that there was one aspect that was not covered. My research included 
the use of camera traps. After the traps were collected, the field assistants were often 
very excited to see what was captured and I would show them the captured images on 
my laptop. Soon after, hunters began asking where I placed my traps and what I saw, 
and I realised that they were hoping to gather data to boost their chances of successful 
hunts. After this, I made sure that the locations of the cameras were unknown as far as 
possible (except for location), and that hunters did not get access to the list of species 
that were sited at particular locations.  Some other hunters became interested in my 
work and when asked about the presence of certain species, said that they were happy 
to shoot the animal in question to show me. I politely declined these offers and 
explained that if the animal was shot it would not count as it was dead and no longer 
present. 
4.4.4.2 Human Ethics 
Researchers have been accused of exploiting the communities they studied (Smith, 
2006). Indeed, one of the things said when I first arrived was that I would just be here 
to get my data and leave. Clearly, the community has been very heavily studied and had 
entrusted the researchers to have been able to help improve their lot with the 
information provided to them. Thus, I tried whenever I could to reciprocate. In addition 
to paying rent to my host family, I taught them some skills, such as basic book-keeping, 
as they were trying to keep their small businesses in good shape to attract federal grants. 
As the project progressed and the results of the political ecology approach became 
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clearer, I started to help resolve livelihood issues on a larger scale (further elaboration 
in Chapter 8). I helped look into the water and electricity issues in the village and helped 
expedite the sending of messages to higher authorities. I paid my field assistants fair 
wages for ecological work, and always paid for the coffee or tea whenever discussions 
were held in coffee shops, and my informants took the time to travel to the town centre. 
Finally, in this thesis, I have tried to maintain anonymity except where the informants 
are happy to have their names used. In some cases, informants insist that their names 
are used. I have applied some discretion to these cases, as discussions sometimes 
covered politically sensitive topics. For example, if someone in leadership has expressed 
certain views that are already in the public domain then they may not be anonymous 
here. 
4.4.5 Administrative Restrictions and Timelines 
Two full years’ fieldwork was planned for in 2012, and ethics approval arrived from the 
university in March 2013.  The fieldwork proposal and approvals were submitted as 
supporting documents to the Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia and the State Planning 
Unit of Sarawak for permission to begin field work. Three to six months was advised as 
processing time, and it was anticipated that fieldwork could start just after the middle 
of the year. However, the approval for fieldwork only arrived in December 2013, before 
Christmas, with the research permission to expire by 30 Nov 2015.  While two years 
were actually granted it was impossible to stay in the field for two full years as my 
candidature was to end in early March 2016, and much time would need to be spent on 
writing the dissertation. 
Research time became further compressed and fragmented when the administrators of 
the scholarship changed the rules of the award, such that a significant amount of time 
still needed to be spent within Australia or I would lose my stipend. As such, I had to 
constantly fly in and out of Sarawak over the field work period. On average, after three 
months of fieldwork, I returned to Australia for over a month. Thus, all in all, the amount 
of time spent physically in the field was just over a year. 
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Chapter 5 Economic Symptoms of a Politicised 
Environment 
 
In Blaikie’s ‘Chain of Explanation’ (Chapter 2), economic problems are inextricably linked 
to environmental problems. It is arguable as to which arises first, and there often is no 
clear-cut answer. Here, the thesis begins first with economic symptoms, as it the most 
obvious issue at the field site upon arrival.   
In areas such as the Upper Balui and the Bakun Resettlement Scheme (BRS), indigenous 
communities are inextricably linked to their land. Invariably, their traditional economic 
means are derived from the exploitation of ‘their’ land. It is not always easy for outside 
observers to understand if their means of production is sustainable or not. However, 
displacement creates a discord between communities and their traditional land, and 
places them in ‘new’ land - this land could belong to another group of people and 
previously exploited, but for the transplanted community, the location for settling down 
is novel. 
Very often, communities struggle to make sense of their new surrounds, and this can 
affect their ability to recreate or replace their previous form of economic production. It 
is commonly a working assumption that communities are treated as a whole, 
homogenous entity, which results in suboptimal post-displacement planning. In Sarawak, 
this can be seen from the relocation of the all the communities from the Balui and Linau 
rivers into a centralised location, without the consideration of their ethnic and inter-
longhouse political history, as well as the repeated attempts to introduce cash crops as 
blanket initiatives. A multi-variate analysis done on displaced communities in the 
Mekong river projects show that each family within the displaced community can 
behave and make economic decisions based on their own experience and their post-
resettlement circumstances. (Kura et al., 2017) Given the myriad of skills and capital 
levels. one-size-fits-all solutions may further entrench existing inequalities and 
disadvantages, and make it even more difficult for some families to achieve self-
sufficiency. This chapter looks at the economic situation throughout various 
communities at the BRS post-displacement. The information that is gathered for this 
chapter starts with the early conversations that began with my arrival at the field site 
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for the reconnaissance trip and is supplemented by further data that were obtained 
throughout the bulk of the main fieldwork period. This chapter forms the start of the 
chain of explanation that will be used and explained in the synthesis in Chapter 8, in an 
integrative way with the environmental symptoms that will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Cash and Property 
The earlier work of other anthropologists at the Bakun Resettlement Scheme noted high 
levels of grief and economic struggle throughout large sections of the communities 
studied, the Lahanan and Kenyah Badeng. For the majority of families, compensation 
was paid after displacement. While in the early stages, the price of the new door in the 
new longhouse was charged at RM52,000 to the families and deducted off their 
compensation packages, the Land Development Minister, Dr. James Jemut Masing, 
announced in 2012 that the cost of the longhouse would not be in fact, deducted from 
the compensation amounts. 
The compensation amount itself however was and is a point of contention among some 
of the members of the community, with a number of residents even bringing the State 
to court over this matter. Some others, while they acquiesced to their offered amounts, 
revealed their unhappiness regarding the way the compensation amount was reached, 
especially regarding the valuation of one of their main means of production – cash 
cropping. Two years prior to Operation Exodus, a valuation was done of all the assets of 
the communities to be displaced, and each household was told of the valuation of their 
own assets. As the community members knew that they were about to be displaced, 
they reduced the maintenance of their gardens. Species of cash crops that were more 
susceptible to diseases such as cacao did not maintain their health very well under such 
circumstances. Closer to Operation Exodus, a new valuation was done, and the 
depreciation of these trees were accounted for. As a result, these households received 
a final valuation that was about half of what was originally offered. A few other 
informants, on the other hand, claimed that their lands were never surveyed. There are 
yet others who had been surveyed, and often because of longhouse hierarchy, have 
amassed large areas of cultivated land and viable cash crops. These families obtained 
large compensation pay-outs. 
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Each community is often called a longhouse, even though they can in actuality exist as 
different, separate blocks. Each apartment within the longhouse is called a ‘room’ or 
‘door’ or amin. In theory, each nuclear family lives in its own amin. However, along with 
the Balui, extended families often live in the same amin. As told by informants and noted 
previously by Welyne (2008) and Tan (1995), a rapid expansion of longhouses occurred 
after news arrived that they may be displaced. This was because it was believed that 
compensation would be paid to each amin, therefore extended families would be at a 
severe economic disadvantage. Uma Belor expanded from 13 rooms to form a long block 
along the river’s edge and a new block that housed the family of the then maren uma 
(headman) Saging Bit and his extended family. There is some inconsistency of how the 
compensation was paid in the end. In the case of Uma Belor, a new longhouse was built 
containing six blocks of 15 doors and one of eleven, a total of 101 doors. However, the 
compensation cash was still paid through the original ‘core’ 13 doors. In other 
longhouses such as Uma Badeng, it did not appear so and each door during valuation 
received a compensation sum. 
Included in the compensation package was also the promise of cultivable land. This was 
also noted by earlier workers. Prior to the move, Sungai Penyuan was the designated 
land for resettlement, with 10 acres of land promised to each door for cultivation. This 
area was then reduced to three acres at Sungai Asap. The Penyuan site was turned over 
to local timber conglomerate Shin Yang, which turned the area into a plantation for fast 
growing, introduced timber species such as Paraserianthes falcataria (endemic to New 
Guinea) and Acacia mangium (endemic to New Guinea and Northern Australia) (Shin 
Yang, 2016). Clearly, this area could support the growth of large amounts of biomass. 
Also, this area covers over 22,000 hectares, as opposed to the 4,000 hectares of the 
eventual Bakun Resettlement Scheme. The problems the resettlers faced were 
compounded when they arrived to see that their assigned farming lots were either 
inaccessible or uncultivable (rocky land, for example). This sparked further unhappiness 
with the government, as well as some resentment towards their headmen as they were 
supposed to have been part of the process to decide where their longhouses would be 
located. One informant, whose mother was assigned one such inaccessible lot, 
exclaimed in a mixture of Malay and English, “Macam these people take map and draw 
like this. Nah macam ‘ni! You go here, you go here. Mana ada survey!” This translates 
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to, “It’s as if these people grabbed the map and drew a circle in a random area of land 
and assigned it to people without first surveying.” 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of the timber plantation concession area that was initially meant for the resettlement of the 
Bakun communities. 
Most longhouses dealt with their compensations by dividing them up among individual 
families or persons and left each entity to do whatever they wished with the 
compensation money. Three Kayan longhouses stand in stark contrast to the rest – Uma 
Belor, Uma Balui Liko and Uma Juman. Uma Juman is considered a prestige longhouse. 
Their recorded history is long and they have various locally powerful members of local 
politics within their ranks, as well as some astute and savvy businessmen, including the 
youngest headman from the Balui. Interviews with various influential longhouse 
members revealed that this longhouse received in total more than RM16 million in 
compensation. Most of the compensation was divided, like the other longhouses, while 
over a million was placed in an account in a bank for emergencies and the occasional 
dividend pay-out. Uma Belor is a much smaller longhouse but still collected a sizeable 
amount of compensation in total. This longhouse invested a much larger proportion of 
their compensation and this investment is in unit trusts. Every year in the week leading 
up to Christmas, the longhouse gathers for hari keluarga (family day), and the headman 
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announces the dividends from investment to be distributed to each household, which 
usually ranges from one to three thousand ringgit. Uma Balui Liko took a different 
approach, which was to invest in property. Local area 1 town centre (Figure 4.2) is made 
up of two rows of shops. One row is only open to resettlers to own, and the back row 
was for open tender. Uma Balui Liko used their compensation collectively to buy one of 
the shop lots in the market centre, which they then rented out. The shop has been 
housing coffeeshops since the beginning. The second level was renovated in 2015 and 
is now rented out as office space. 
Some other longhouses did not have the same foresight. One commonly told story 
describes how one particular headman spent all his compensation money on cars, and 
lavish spending in the city. However, not all were spendthrifts, as there are also frequent 
recounts of some who spent on capital-intensive businesses (such as starting a fleet of 
transport buses) that eventually closed down due to insufficient demand or financial 
mismanagement. What is clear is that for the overall longhouse financial health, the 
headmen play extremely critical roles. The more successful longhouses post-
displacement were the same ones that were doing better than average even before 
relocation (such as Uma Belor; Chapter 3), in both finance and education (further 
discussed below). Displacement had the knock-on effect of providing well-run 
longhouses even more capital with invest and grow with, further widening the inequality 
between these longhouses and the others.  
5.2 Livelihoods 
Three of the five major impoverishment risks in Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks and 
Reconstruction (IRR) model related to livelihoods are landlessness, joblessness and food 
insecurity. In mostly small-scale agricultural societies such as the longhouses in the BRS, 
these three are very closely tied to each other (Alexander and Alexander, 1995). 
Landlessness leads to joblessness and food insecurity. In the BRS, the situation is 
complicated by the wide range of compensation received, and how, if received, how 
people dealt with the sudden influx of relatively large amounts of cash. Some resettlers 
had land on paper but had no land in practice because of inaccessibility or simply 
uncultivable land. Very often a lot of these individuals were old folks. Without land, 
farmers were jobless. Researchers who arrived that the BRS before this project often 
noted that resettlers blamed the government for not teaching them how to use the 
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compensation efficiently and prudently. Very often, and this included some headmen, 
resettlers squandered their compensation. For example, they would buy four-wheel 
drives, spend large amounts in town drinking or buy expensive household entertainment 
systems which they had no need for, nor knew how to operate. Effectively, for some 
sections of these communities, having large sums of cash eliminated the urgency of 
having to deal with the lack of accessibility to land and the fact that their virtual 
landlessness meant that they were in reality, jobless. Only when the cash ran out and 
they had to start selling off their new assets did the gravity of the land situation become 
much more apparent. It should be noted that this is not an entirely new phenomenon, 
and have been observed in Dayaks societies, including the Penan as well (Chapter 3).  
Some longhouses at various points in time after resettlement received assistance with 
cash cropping. Uma Belor received assistance for pepper farming from the Sarawak 
pepper board, which included seeds and an all-expenses paid trip to Johor to see how a 
large commercial pepper farm is run. Uma Badeng received assistance for women to 
cultivate vegetables for the Chinese consumer market in Bintulu. These efforts often 
came to nought for a lack of follow-up from the agricultural office and forward planning. 
The pepper farming scheme was poorly supported financially and farmers found it 
expensive to maintain a network of timed, generator-powered sprinklers and set up 
large areas of sunlight filters. The vegetable harvesting scheme was abandoned due to 
their inability to break into the tightly-knit Foochow Chinese-controlled market. 
Many younger members of the community very quickly abandoned the idea of tilling 
their own land for their livelihoods, instead preferring to join exploitative resource 
industries such as logging or large oil palm plantations or find jobs in the cities such as 
Miri, Kuching and Bintulu. Outside of the large public holidays of Gawai or Christmas, 
Uma Belor retains about 20% of its full strength. Apart from the elderly, a small number 
of people who chose to maintain subsistence farming and one transport driver, those 
who remain at the longhouse are either unemployed youth, the family of the Penghulu 
Saging Bit and headman Ding Ajang (who have construction contracts in the area), or 
work at the local schools and clinics, or run the budding tourism business. Further 
income was made by renting out spare bedrooms to government workers such as 
teachers or healthcare workers. 
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5.3 Economic Reconstruction 
There is a tendency to frame the displacement as the communities being thrust into a 
whole new economy, resulting in a danger that researchers over-victimize the 
communities. In reality, these longhouse communities, though previously remote, have 
had some experiences with the monetary economy especially since the logging 
companies arrived in the Balui in the 1950s (Alexander, 2008a). The logging companies 
recompense the native communities both in cash, in kind, and in employment. An 
amount is negotiated with the longhouse with regard to the native customary land that 
is meant to be logged over, and the amount will only be paid after felling. The company 
will also start building a network of access roads, and various other land traffic 
infrastructure as needed. Manpower requirements are also met by longhouse labour. In 
theory, this arrangement appears fair to all parties involved. In practice and under the 
surface, the different power relations cause realities to be very different.  
Negotiations over the taking over of native land by logging companies are often not 
straightforward, especially from the perspective of the longhouse communities. 
Negotiations within and between longhouses communities are consensus-based and 
consultative (Bulan, 2008), and power differentials are not significant. On the other hand, 
negotiations with logging corporations were difficult for them. Logging companies arrive 
on the land with legal concessionary permission, placing the community leaders in a 
disadvantageous position. There are also unverifiable but oft-repeated claims that one 
particular Sarawak Chinese-owned logging group negotiates in a mobile office with a 
pistol on the table, although nobody has heard of the weapon actually being discharged. 
Jobs offered are also often menial labour, such as debarking logs. The most coveted job 
is that of a truck driver, who would ferry the processed logs between log ponds and mills, 
seen as a better job for less strenuous work and higher wages. These occupations pay 
by the number of trips (even in the early years post-resettlement), and one driver from 
Uma Belor (who now works as an ambulance driver in the resettlement scheme) claimed 
that he could make several thousand ringgit every month. He gave that job up when his 
daughter was born so he could be home with his family. The expected traffic 
infrastructure were disappointing as roads usually appeared to be dug out, rather than 
built, and were extremely dangerous in the rain. Turnover rates for jobs were also very 
high, and there are disagreements about why this is so. Some locals blame the 
companies for ad-hoc hiring and firing while some others blame their compatriots for 
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poor working attitudes. To the longhouse communities, they are being penalised for 
being indigenous, where there are two sets of land laws running parallel, but at different 
levels. Their leaders are unable to assert their claims and rights to the land through their 
adat to deny the loggers, and because of that, they have had to accept inequitable 
means of compensation. The entry of the logging camps and the payments of cash for 
jobs for a relatively large number of people also meant that a lot more needs began to 
be met with cash. For example, instead of planting hill rice, families instead began to 
buy wet padi rice brought in from other parts of Malaysia. Cash-rich truck drivers 
became unwitting walking advertisements for a different, consumerist lifestyle, through 
their stories of wild days off in the city, and purchases of electrical appliances or 
entertainment sets, which in turn further necessitated the purchase, maintenance and 
fueling of diesel generators (called gensets). 
In some ways, the move to the Bakun Resettlement Scheme was a repeat of the entry 
of the logging corporations. The move was something decided somewhere else high up 
in the Federal government which trickled through the layers of state and local politics 
and bureaucracy to reach the communities along the upper Balui. Their local leaders 
were not able to assert their traditional claims to their ancestral lands, and there was an 
overwhelming opinion among the longhouse folk that they were being cheated of their 
rightful compensation due to the repeated devaluation of their crops and land by the 
Balui, the need to deduct the cost of the new longhouse from their compensation, the 
meagre, infertile or inaccessible three-acre plots, and the supposed reneging on the 
promise of free electricity supplied from Bakun. Yet when pressed further, responses of 
the informants started to diverge. One group claimed that the move to the resettlement 
scheme was worse than with the logging companies, while the other conceded that 
while being displaced was a tough and trying experience, life in the resettlement scheme 
some 16 years after Operation Exodus was less rough than on the Balui. Scratching 
beyond the surface, one finds that there are two layers to the problem that has led to 
such a division in opinion.    
5.3.1 Education and Mobility 
Education provides freedom of economic mobility. The more educated informants, 
those with tertiary education, readily found employment in the cities, such as Kuching, 
Miri or Kuala Lumpur, with the government or with multinational companies in 
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industries ranging from automotive to energy to dentistry to diplomatic missions. The 
few who are working in Belaga, within easy access of the resettlement scheme, are those 
employed at the Bakun Hydroelectric plant or those who have joined the teaching 
service and are working at the four main schools between the BRS and the HEP, SK Batu 
Keling, SK Long Gang, SK Sambop and SMK Bakun. Throughout the fieldwork period, this 
group of people were seen and interacted with only during the Christmas or Gawai 
holidays. Many of the tertiary educated individuals are in their late twenties to forties 
and have started families with people from outside of Belaga. While they had 
experienced the trauma of the move from the upper Balui to the BRS, and while many 
still harbour bitterness from the forced displacement, many accept that moving to the 
cities was an inevitable part of ‘development’, and stated that they were happy with the 
comforts and convenience of the cities. They still have emotional attachments to their 
longhouse, as an important part of their identity, as well as their kinship bonds. When 
asked if they would readily return to work in the BRS area, many were hesitant, because 
apart from the education sector or forestry, they could not really see where their skills 
could be used in rural environments, and there was almost unanimous agreement that 
they would not be interested in farming. There is a clear urbanisation in economic 
thinking among these informants. This group also tends to associate the BRS with 
positive emotions. One Kayan lady from Uma Belor who works in Peninsular Malaysia 
said, “I love coming back because it is always during the holidays, everyone is back, 
having fun, seeing our grandparents. It’s a nice feeling!” 
Kayan longhouses such as Uma Juman and Uma Belor (Kunding, 2007) have been given 
special mentions in state media for their educational achievements. The push for 
education in both longhouses was the result of efforts by two strong headmen – the late 
Temenggong Talek at Uma Juman and Pengulu Saging Bit at Uma Belor. Anecdotally, 
Penghulu Saging is known for once disciplining his own son for escaping from his school’s 
hostel; and sending the homesick boy right back. Uma Belor has set a long-term target 
for every one of its 101 doors to be home to at least one graduate, and a shorter-term 
target of 80 graduates by 2020. The longhouse has displayed a high level of cohesion 
and by and large cooperates with the weekday evening entertainment curfew of 7 pm 
to 9 pm, where television and radios are not turned on to allow school children to 
complete their school assignments.  By 2015, Uma Belor (out of 800 registered residents) 
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has produced 142 tertiary educated members, with slightly under half holding university 
qualifications (including eight postgraduate qualifications), and the rest holding 
diplomas. Every child leaving the longhouse elsewhere for education gets a big send-off 
party, starting with a long prayer session and ending with a large dinner party for the 
whole longhouse. At the first such session I attended to send off Penghulu Saging’s 
daughter to university in Penang, my host (who would become my longhouse father) 
pointed to his temple and said, “It is like how we send off warriors. But now warriors not 
use knife. Now we use ‘up here’.” Later, I asked the Penghulu about his thoughts of 
sending the best and brightest young people away from the longhouse and if he is 
worried that they would not want to return. He replied: 
“Of course, if they can find a good job and have a good life there, we understand if they 
would like to remain there. It is up to them, and their choice to come back. We cannot 
force them! We should not expect them to come back where there is no job suitable for 
their qualifications. We hope they remember where they come from and come back to 
visit, that’s all.” 
 
Figure 5.2: Newspaper clippings celebrating the academic successes of Uma Juman. 
The rapid rise in education standards, accompanied by the resulting employment 
opportunities, has also seen income growth among the community. 65% of the families 
in Uma Belor take home more than RM3,000 monthly, placing them at or above the 
RM3,123 median household incomes for rural families for the state, perpetuating an 
increasing lead over other longhouses since the last study of longhouse incomes 
(Chapter 3, case study 1). On the flip side, as the Penghulu mentioned, many such people 
are overqualified for the few employment opportunities at the BRS. There is sometimes 
a feeling that the city folk ‘living better lives’ should do more the longhouse, as they are 
perceived to have greater amounts of disposable income and might have new ideas they 
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could bring to the longhouse. This dissatisfaction is often directed especially at the 
offspring of political leaders who seldom return to the longhouse or aspiring political 
leaders who only return to the longhouse at election periods. Uma Belor tries to address 
this by having the city diaspora run and organise the annual family day, with the 
longhouse members of Kuching, Bintulu, Miri and Peninsular Malaysia taking turns each 
year. The high levels migration of Kayan households was also noted in the second case 
study covered in Chapter 3. 
For the above group, they are less likely to be affected by the compensation amounts 
and issues with the allocated three-acre plots as they are either financially independent 
through their education and occupation or they were still at school-going age during 
Operation Exodus and so were not involved in any property claims. For the others, which 
generally comprise people who are in the 50s or older and less likely to have received 
education beyond high school, their means of livelihood greatly depends on their access 
to cultivable land. It is also this group that built and owned the longhouses, farmlands 
and fishponds on the upper Balui before the construction of the dam, and who have 
seen the arrival of the logging companies. This was the group that was at the crossroads 
of farming and hunting for food or working for money to purchase food. With the move 
to the BRS, various factors have pushed the scale towards the latter. The inequality of 
education also affects longhouses through their headmen. As mentioned earlier, some 
longhouses were already doing better even more relocation, and these tended to the 
longhouses that emphasised academic achievement. When relocation came, these 
longhouses, and their savvier leaders were the ones that made the financial decisions 
that were most sustainable in the long run. Therefore, it may that to improve the long-
term prospects of longhouses, especially in longhouses that appoint headmen from the 
maren level rather than elect, it would be prudent to at least teach financial education 
to possible candidates. 
Land for farming and the access to these plots are among the main contentions of the 
compensation package. According to informants, they were first promised 15 acres for 
each door, which became reduced over time to three acres. For the old folk, this also 
posed a cultural problem. Traditionally, their lands would be passed on and divided 
among their descendants. Clearly, three acres meant that in many families the amount 
of land each descendant inherits would not amount to much.  Further complications 
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arose when many of the resettlers realised that a lot their land is not cultivable, or even 
accessible. As it soon became evident that the agricultural component of their 
traditional lifestyle is unsustainable, based on their three-acre plots. For Uma Belor the 
problem was solved relatively quickly and easily. Due to the large number of urban 
professionals, they simply passed their allocation to their parents and grandparents to 
till. In a 2008 joint report, the Sarawak Ministry of Land Development and the Sarawak 
Aluminium Company (SALCO) noted the decline of the planting of hill rice by the people 
at BRS due to space constraints, which did not allow for the traditional swidden fallow 
cycle. By 2015, only a dozen households with elderly residents harvested rice at Uma 
Belor, sharply down from the 48% in the SALCO report. My host recalled that, while on 
the Balui, harvest season meant that the entire longhouse structure would vibrate, with 
every door pounding their harvested rice.  
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Figure 5.3: Lady from Uma Belor pounding rice. 
Without the space to plant rice, the locals have proceeded to plant vegetables, fruits, 
tobacco and cash crops. In Uma Belor, the chief cash crop is pepper. Nearly every farmer 
in the longhouse has about a hundred pepper vines. In particular, Penghulu Saging 
seems to be rather successful at it, and often visitors asking to buy pepper from the 
longhouse would be directed to him. He has also taken to investing in a grinding machine 
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to process the pepper seeds into powder. The pepper powder is hand-bottled and sold 
at Belaga Bazaar. Vegetable crops are planted and harvested throughout the year for 
sale at the markets. In previous studies at the BRS, the market at local centre 1 was 
noted for its haphazard operation, with producers finding it difficult to sell their produce 
(Jehom, 2008). However, when I arrived in 2013, there was a system setup, where every 
producer who wanted to sell their produce are given a particular recurring day, as well 
as a fixed location. For example, my longhouse grandmother is at the market every 
Sunday selling her produce (Figure 5.3). On other days, other women are there in her 
‘spot’ until the next Sunday. Produce is not limited to just to vegetables. Various other 
items such as betel nuts and leaves and seasonal fruits are sold at the market by these 
farmers as well. With increasing numbers of non-local visitors such as domestic and 
international tourists, migrant workers and public servants posted into the BRS from 
elsewhere, some women have begun selling handicrafts in a corner at the rear of the 
market. Plant produce is sold by women, while there are two stations right outside the 
market where meat is sold by men. Although the longhouse folk rear some chickens and 
pigs, these are never for sale in the market. Chickens are often reared for (illegal) cock-
fighting, and self-consumption while pigs are reared for adat Bungan rituals. Increasingly, 
the market lots are being tended by older women, a sign that vegetable farming yields 
little in terms of cash. Two factors work against them. Firstly, many of the families that 
remain at the BRS are self-sufficient in terms of vegetable requirements as the majority 
of them are vegetable farmers themselves. This means that there is an oversupply for 
the local market. Secondly, their small three acre plots mean that they cannot reliably 
supply large volumes of vegetables for consumption in the nearby cities. They cannot 
produce enough to meet urban demand. Therefore, vegetable farming in its current 
state is usually not particularly viable. The elderly in the longhouse communities, 
however, continue to plant and sell vegetables at the market as the economics do not 
matter to them and the times spent at the market are much-anticipated socialisation 
times with friends and relatives from the other longhouses. The planting cycle at Uma 
Beloh differs slightly from the one at Uma Badeng. At Uma Belor, each full year consists 
of two half-yearly cycles.  
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Figure 5.4: The neatly arranged stalls at the market in the Bakun Resettlement Scheme. Everyone who wants to 
sell their plant produce is allocated a fixed day every week to do so. 
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Table 5.1: Table of seasonal crops, and a comparison between Uma Belor and Uma Badeng 
MONTH UMA BELOR UMA BADENG (JEHOM, 2008) 
JANUARY Long beans 
Cucumber 
Chillies 
Long beans 
Chives 
Bittergourd 
Indian nightshade 
FEBRUARY Indian nightshade 
Chillies 
Long beans 
Chives 
Bittergourd 
MARCH Long beans 
Pumpkin 
- 
APRIL Bittergourd 
Spinach 
- 
MAY Pumpkin 
Chillies 
- 
JUNE - - 
JULY Long Beans 
Cucumber 
Chillies 
- 
AUGUST Indian nightshade 
Chillies 
Spinach 
SEPTEMBER Long beans 
Pumpkin 
Cucumber Leaves 
Corn 
Chillies 
OCTOBER Bittergourd 
Spinach 
Cucumber 
Cucumber leaves 
Chillies 
NOVEMBER Pumpkin 
Chillies 
Pumpkin 
Winter melon 
Cucumber 
Chillies 
DECEMBER - Long beans 
Chives 
Bittergourd 
Indian Nightshade 
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While the elderly mostly content themselves with vegetable farming, the younger, more 
energetic and more ambitious members of most longhouses have begun to plant oil 
palm on their land. If the trees were planted according to standards set by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), there would be a planted density 
of about 170 trees for 3 acres of land (FAO, 1977). Most farmers, however, admit to 
increasing the density of the cultivation due to their small lots to try to maximise their 
short-term income when the trees reach maturity at 18 months. Most longhouses have 
gone into oil palm cultivation in a big way. The access road to Uma Lahanan is lined with 
oil palms, so too is the main road of the Koyan side of the settlement, from Uma Lesong 
to Uma Ukit, the final longhouse on the road to the waterworks and the settlement’s 
water intake from the Koyan River. Uma Belor is a curiosity among the longhouses as 
they are least interested in oil palm. There is a small attempt at cultivation near the 
recreational fish ponds, but the longhouse has not dived into it like the other longhouses 
have. One of the members of Uma Juman is a manager at Sarawak Oil Palm Berhad, a 
joint venture between the Sarawak Government and a UK Government development 
finance institution (Figure 5.5) Commonwealth Development Corporation, or CDC) that 
is now publicly listed on the Malaysian stock exchange. The CDC’s share has since been 
bought by Shin Yang Plantations Sdn Bhd according to the company website. With his 
experience in large-scale, commercial plantations, he formed a co-operative for 
smallholder oil palm plantations in Belaga.  
Oil palm plantation in the Sungai Asap area has persisted remarkably well as a cash crop 
compared to the other plants in the cash cropping history of the upper Balui longhouse 
communities, despite the returns actually being quite low. When I arrived at the 
longhouse to begin my fieldwork in 2014, fresh fruit bunches were worth around 560 
ringgit per tonne for the lowest grade C quality up to over 630 ringgit per tonne for the 
highest grade A bunches. By the time fieldwork ended in July 2015, prices had fallen to 
428 ringgit per tonne for grade A and 390 ringgit per tonne for grade C. According to 
statistics from the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB), Sarawakian plantations averaged 
about 16 tonnes per hectare per year.  A rough extrapolation to the plantations in Asap 
suggests that on average, the three hectares might yield about 19 tonnes of fresh fruit 
bunches a year, or an average of about 1.5 tonnes a month. As smallholders, with little 
technological help from the bigger plantations, their produce is often grade C, which 
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leaves them with a revenue that had ranged between 840 ringgit and 585 ringgit from 
the high to the low market rates. As fresh fruit bunches are clearly heavy, the farmers 
require transport to send their produce to the Koyan palm oil mill. Some choose to buy 
a four-wheel drive pickup. According to informants, instalments range from 700 to 950 
monthly, depending on the model specifics of the vehicle. Clearly, instead of the vehicle 
helping them make money, they have had to spend a month’s revenue from the 
plantation just to pay off the vehicle. 
 
Figure 5.5: Oil palm manager from Uma Juman teaching his assistant to use a weed controller (Source: Ricky 
Pudang). 
Hunting and fishing are the next main economic activity for the men. Many of the men 
have 12 gauge shotguns, for which ammunition can be bought in Belaga town. These 
weapons are very old and some are even held together by plastic cords. Hunting can 
take place within the BRS or up at Bakun and involve the hunter, his gun, and his hunting 
dogs in a basic sense, this has not changed from what has been recorded in the literature 
(Chapter 3). In the BRS, the hunting dogs are loaded on the back of a pickup or a single 
dog in a basket attached to a motorcycle. The chosen vehicle is then driven slowly either 
along the Koyan access road or through the oil palm plantations or along the Bakun 
highway. When a dog picks up the scent of game, it leaps off the truck and starts tracking 
and flushing. The cornered prey is then killed with the shotgun. Hunters may work 
around the BRS because to hunt or fish up at the Balui is usually a complete expedition. 
They have to drive an hour to the jetty, bring their boat engines, petrol, and outboard 
engine accessories, repair kits and lubricants, hunting dogs, insulator boxes, ice and food 
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and water. Fishing trips often involve the same except that the dogs are left behind, 
although if the fisherman owns a gun it will invariably be brought along. As former 
expatriate District Officer Alastair Morrison noted, the gun is an important article of 
ornamentation for the Dayak man (Morrison, 1993). Hunting around the BRS, however, 
yields little success normally. Also, hunted pigs from oil palm plantations are also not 
popular, as it is believed that their flesh has an unpleasant smell from eating the oil palm 
fruits. If hunters want to hunt for economic reasons they would usually head to the Balui. 
Fishing involves the use of gill nets and baited hook lines. Occasionally, they cast nets to 
catch smaller bait fish but these are more often done to obtain bait and for self-
consumption. 
Within the contemporary upper Balui communities, hunters occupy a position in society 
that cannot be easily be classified among the normal stratified system. This is because 
they serve a vital role in the community as a source of protein, and they are seen to have 
a skill that is more difficult to acquire than laying gill nets across a stream. Socially, they 
can be quite close to the maren, without being maren themselves. On the other hand, 
while they are respected, there is a sense that hunting is not an occupation that one’s 
son should aspire to, as the work is too dangerous and that hunters are often seen to be 
rough, sometimes ‘undesirable’ characters. Within the dynamics of the Bakun 
Resettlement Scheme, hunters, as this chapter and the next show, occupy central roles 
in the reconstruction process, as well as in the environmental effects of post-inundation 
Bakun. 
5.3.2 Economic Struggles 
Among the earliest meaningful interactions were some with my longhouse parents and 
their family. My host was initially a carpenter, who returned after some time working at 
construction sites in Kuching, and his wife was a daughter of the dayong (Bungan priest), 
and is one of the first university graduates of the longhouse. When I arrived, she was 
teaching Bahasa Malaysia and English at the primary school at Uma Sambop, and was 
soon promoted to be vice-principal. Due to her position within the civil service hierarchy, 
she has an above-average salary and is able to support the family while her husband, 
who has high school qualifications, tries to make a career for himself. The carpentry was 
not working out well due to the distance from his family and dangers of the job, and the 
wages did not make up for these. He returned to the Balui and did various jobs, from 
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logging to farming and fishing, and he and his wife are quite well known and respected 
among the longhouse communities. He was a signatory on the committee for 
compensation funds at Uma Juman, and community church leader at Uma Belor. Both 
husband and wife also held executive positions in the Uma Belor leadership committee. 
He also claimed to have been involved in the consultative work to design the new 
longhouses. 
Despite significant success at a community leadership level, my host felt that he needed 
to find work that paid better than what he had up on the Balui – he very quickly realised 
that they were now in a different economy. He took up pepper farming, and got the 
support of the political leaders, and even got himself sent to Johor to observe large 
commercial pepper plantations, and obtained a grant for high-tech watering systems. 
He claims to have been reasonably successful as a pepper farmer until he had another 
idea: tourism. His tourism business was started with help from his wife’s family who live 
in Kapit and Miri. They combined the doors of the city dwellers to form a larger area that 
houses 10 rooms at the longhouse. Using his savings, he also built a relatively 
comfortable floating chalet at Sungai Belanum, an Uma Belor NCR area that still retained 
its old hunters’ trails and, more importantly, has a waterfall. Sarawak tourism ran a 
feature on it on their website as well. It was through this list that I arrived at the BRS 
with accommodation for my reconnaissance trip. After I had settled into my room at the 
homestay, I explained my purpose for future plans at Bakun and the BRS. He then 
proceeded to tell me how much the Kayan people love the bearded pigs as a protein 
source and how, after the Bakun dam was built, it became harder to hunt for them, and 
that the pigs seem to be much thinner than before. He claimed that they used to 
regularly see pigs weighing 120kg, with the fat layer on their backs being as thick as the 
width of his palm, but the pigs that they hunt down now seem to be weighing around 
80kg. 
Over the course of the fieldwork, many hunters also talked about the difficulty of 
hunting after the construction of the Bakun Dam. One man from Uma Bakah who now 
makes a living by fishing recalled that when he was a boy they knew of a particular 
location near Long Bulan where they were sure there would be at least a pig to shoot 
after waiting for a couple of hours. Hunters said that, before the inundation of the Balui, 
they knew where pigs were moving and they knew where the seasonal migration routes 
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were. The headman of Uma Juman said that during migration season, hunters would sit 
on the veranda of the longhouse and simply shoot at the migrating herd. This knowledge 
was made obsolete after the construction of the dam, causing hunters to be 
disempowered. Hunting became more by chance encounters and hoping that dogs pick 
up scent, than by knowledge of the land and migration patterns.  
One Kenyah hunter says that many of them feel desperate for kills, as this has become 
more difficult in the lower reaches of the dam. Hunters used to hunt for subsistence; 
now they have to hunt for money. This particular hunter hunts for high-value species 
such as pangolins (Manis javanicus), which are valued (erroneously) by the Chinese as 
medicines while their meat is considered a delicacy locally as well as overseas. The 
international trading of pangolins is illegal, yet demand is high; as a result, there is a 
large and lucrative black market for these animals. When I spoke to this him, he had just 
returned from selling a pangolin for RM1,200 and was sitting outside a shop with some 
beer. He hunts with a friend, a dog and a chainsaw. When pangolins are threatened, 
they burrow, climb a tree or curl up into a ball. If the animal burrows into the ground, 
they would wait from a safe distance for the animal to re-emerge. If the animal curls up 
into a ball when the dog reaches it, they could simply pick it up. The chainsaw is used if 
the pangolin tries to climb up a tree or is found in one; the tree is cut down and the 
pangolin is picked up. For him, as long as he caught one pangolin in a month he makes 
more than his younger relatives in the city working at fast food outlets for RM800 a 
month. Other hunters, however, noted that this was an extremely unreliable way of 
making an income as the pangolin is expensive because of its rarity. For them, they 
would prefer traditional targets such bearded pigs, deer, mousedeer or monitor lizards. 
Similar stories were shared by fishermen of their issues with finding catch. Their old 
fishing areas and spawning areas have disappeared. As is with hunting pigs, there is a 
yearly bonanza when catfish Wallago leerii, locally known as tapah, head up tributary 
streams and rivers to spawn. Also, like the pigs, fishermen complain that catch sizes are 
smaller, as the fish is a large species and have been known to weigh up to 30kg; but no 
one has seen any individuals landed of that size since the dam was completed. My host 
is also a fisherman, although he does not fish for sale as he believes that the income is 
unreliable and that too much work is involved for a one-man business to be 
economically viable. He does, however, catch fish for the extended family’s 
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consumption, and to bring to friends elsewhere in the country. The most common 
catches are the tevengalan (also called tengalan; Puntioplites bulu) and baong (various 
catfish species).  
Some of the more expensive fish such as tengadak (Barbonymus schwanenfeldii), semah 
(Tor tambra/ Tor duoronensis) and adong (Hampala macrilepidota) can still be found in 
some areas as well. The famous Empurau (Tor tambroides) that can sell for over 
RM1,000 per kilogramme during the Chinese New Year still exists, but only in the very 
far areas of the lake, such as the rivers around the NCR of Uma Kulit. The expensive 
species of fish are priced highly, partly because of their rarity. Most of the fish sold in 
the markets are the various catfish species. Apart from the large Tapah, the other catfish 
are all called Baong and they generally form the bulk of the catch. In the last large 
biological survey of the Rajang River freshwater fish, it was found that species like Semah 
and Empurau were found only above Belaga (Parenti and Lim, 2005). 
In much of the conversations with the longhouse folk, most of the unhappiness with the 
resettlement tended to be economic. Many felt that the government agencies involved 
in the compensation process had been dishonest, that they were given land that was 
deficient in terms of area, access and fertility, that they had to fork out their own funds 
to repair deficiencies in the new longhouses, that they were not taught to handle the 
large compensation amounts that were handed to them, and that they had to pay for 
the electricity that was the reason they were resettled. Many people thought that the 
government had rushed them into moving, and then forgot about them once the 
resettlement process was complete. 
5.3.3 The Elite 
The communities in the Bakun Resettlement Scheme such as the Kayan, Kenyah and 
Lahanan are hierarchical societies. For Kayan longhouses, the upper classes are the 
maren (aristocrat), and the hipuy, followed by the commoner panyin class and finally 
the slave dipen. In the past, the lower classes provided corvée labour to the maren. The 
accumulation of food and the ability to make use of community labour to harvest from 
larger areas of land, and collection of heirloom items, were the hallmarks of the maren. 
The hipuy were just below the maren, but still considered upper class, and they did not 
have the benefit of corvée labour. These days, corvées no longer exist, longhouses do 
not go to war and collect slaves, and some longhouses such as Uma Belor, Uma Kulit and 
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Uma Badeng have attempted to allow their community members to vote for their 
leaders, but the class differences still exist. Headmen are still clearly required to lead the 
longhouses and perform their native court duties according to the adat.  There is, 
however, a difference. The contemporary headman no longer gets to accumulate wealth 
from contributions by his longhouse. In the state government system, the traditional 
longhouse leadership are in a grey zone, as they are not actually considered civil servants, 
but are still paid RM800 a month as an allowance. This amount is a relatively recent 
increase from the previous RM450 a month in from 2013.  
The allowance for the headman is clearly too low to be considered a reasonable living 
wage. A former Penghulu and maren uma who used to work as a customs officer said 
that leading a longhouse in the last two decades has been difficult. He found that issues 
that can be dealt with by the native courts or mediation were much easier to solve, but 
experienced much difficulty with finances. As an ‘ordinary customs officer in Kuching’, 
as he described himself, he did not have a particularly large salary, even when 
complemented by the headman allowance; yet as a headman, he was expected to lead 
the organisation of community bonding events and festivals, and provide funding. He 
points out that now, all the headmen are running some kind of business venture and are 
more deeply involved with politics, and even the few in civil service, such as teachers, 
have left service.  Indeed, of the community leaders at the BRS from maren uma to 
Pemanca, many are oil palm farmers, while some others, such as the maren uma of Uma 
Juman, are businessmen who are contractors for various infrastructure projects both in 
the BRS as well as in the cities. They supply not just materials, but also the labour, usually 
made up Indonesian transient workers.  There are headmen who are not particularly 
prominent in local politics or in business and they tend to be rather side-lined when it 
comes to major events or decision-making involving the entire resettlement scheme. As 
powerful headmen lead powerful longhouses, this can cause educational, 
developmental and financial inequalities to increase. This further emphasises the power 
difference between the longhouses and ethnic groups.  
All the headmen are also shareholders in a consortium called Wargana, which describes 
itself as a local co-operative. It is headed by the former federal member for the area, 
Datuk Billy Abit Joo, who is also a maren from Uma Belor. Penghulu Saging Bit heads the 
tourism division of the consortium, but there seems to be little activity on that front, 
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while he is much more involved in the other sectors of the company, such as 
construction and biomass removal from the Bakun and Murum reservoir areas. 
Therefore, in this sense, the resettlement project reflects resettlement schemes 
elsewhere in South-east Asia, where the elites get a better chance at not just livelihood 
reconstruction, but also a possibility of really thriving and accumulating significant 
wealth (Elmhirst, 2001). Wargana also has logging concessions as well as other smaller 
scale projects, such as the construction of a pavilion, a security post and the modular 
floating jetty at Bakun. The consortium had also tried to start an aquaculture venture 
but ran into difficulties and the project appeared to be abandoned.  
The appointments to the positions of Penghulu and Pemanca in the BRS have a Kayan-
Kenyah balance. There are two Penghulu and two Pemanca leading the resettlement 
communities – Pengulu Saging Bit (Uma Belor) and Pemanca Umek Jeno (Uma Daro) are 
Kayan while Pengulu Katan Lawai (Uma Badeng) and Pemanca Tony Kulleh (Uma Bakah) 
are Kenyah. Of the four, Penghulu Saging Bit and Pemanca Tony Kulleh feature 
prominently in local politics and government media and are the more vocal. Both are 
successful commercial farmers as well, in pepper and oil palm respectively. As noted 
previously, the headmen often reflected the situation in their longhouses. The 
longhouses with headmen deemed to be more successful in commerce and politics 
tended to be better maintained and their longhouse folk themselves tended to adapt to 
new livelihoods better. On the other hand, other longhouses where the headmen 
adjusted poorly tended to reflect the misfortunes of their headmen. In one of the 
smaller longhouses, the headman received a large amount of compensation, which was 
then squandered on cars and nightlife in Bintulu.  
5.4 Conclusion 
What the early conversations with informants have revealed is life in an environment 
that has been highly politicised by the processes of dam construction. The outcomes of 
the early attempts at economic reconstruction have varied widely, and with little self-
initiated support from the government. Success stories by no means rare, but they 
reflect successes ‘despite’, rather than ‘because of’ government interventions. The 
longhouses and families that experience least financial and material deprivation were 
those who quickly realised that their old days of livelihoods by hunting, fishing and 
gardening were over, and these seem to also correlate with their level of education.  
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From the government’s point of view, the Bakun Resettlement scheme may be seen as 
a fairly successful venture. There are issues with compensation and longhouse quality, 
but they have in general provided the longhouse communities with piped water and an 
electrical grid (albeit with a bill for doors that consume over RM20 per billing cycle). 
They have also mostly managed to centralise an otherwise very dispersed group of 
people and this allows the easier provision of government services, such as health clinics 
and schools, as well as a greater integration with the general economy, and raised 
consumption levels as well as aspirations for increased household consumption. The 
integration of the longhouse communities with the capitalist economy can also be seen 
to weaken the positions of the traditional longhouse elites, particularly the maren uma, 
which, in the greater scheme of State leadership, represents a low-level management 
position that is expected to shoulder a high level of responsibility for little material gain. 
Corvée labour no longer exists, and yet there is an expectation of large contributions to 
communal events, despite getting only RM800 a month as an allowance from the 
government, an amount which is now below the state minimum wage (Lo, 2016). Labour 
and manpower are now perceived as a means to cash, rather than a barter exchange for 
food or non-monetary resources. 
The move has primarily marginalised and impoverished members of the longhouse 
communities who are unwilling or unable to move to a different means of economic 
production to hunting and fishing, as the extensive inundation has led to the old 
knowledge of hunting grounds often becoming irrelevant and obsolete. In some cases, 
such as fishing for the valued Empurau, they have become confined to the upper reaches 
of the lake where the effect of the inundation is felt much less.  
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Chapter 6 Environmental Symptoms of a Politicised 
Environment and Socio-environmental 
Perspectives 
 
6.1 The Distribution and Ecology of Mammals in and around the 
Bakun Lake 
Following on from the revelation that hunting and fishing have become more difficult, 
this chapter aims to look at the post-inundation ecology of mammals around Bakun lake, 
especially the economically important medium to large species. Why has it become 
harder for hunters to make their living by hunting - or is it really so? The answer could 
lie in some basic population ecology. What affects animal behaviour and distribution can 
be explained by optimal foraging theory, which sees behaviour and distribution as a 
direct consequence of the trade-off between risk of being preyed upon (or hunted), and 
increased viability by finding and getting to food resources (Charnov, 1976).  
6.1.1 The Human Dimension 
As societies that traditionally have depended heavily on their land to live, Orang Ulu 
societies had developed strong links to various species. Some species are associated 
with power and status, such as the clouded leopard (Neofelis diardi; kulleh in Kayan) and 
rhinoceros hornbill (Buceros rhinoceros; tingang in Kayan), some are associated with 
food and abundance, such as the bearded pig (Sus barbatus; bavui in Kayan) and sambar 
(Cervus unicolor; payau in Kayan), and yet others are associated with cosmological 
omens, such as little, yellow-eared or grey-breasted spiderhunters (Arachnothera 
longirostra, A.chrysogenys, A.modesta; all called isit in Kayan). Apart from the good 
cosmological omens, the others have to be hunted in order to fulfil their designated 
utility. Encounters with bad cosmological omens may necessitate killing the animal in 
order that evil does not spread. 
Hunting and fishing are almost exclusively pursuits for men. Although women may 
accompany on fishing trips, hunting and guns are a part of the masculine Orang Ulu 
identity. Guns are passed down from father to son, and the number of cartridges one 
can buy is controlled by the state. Legally, hunting is also a controlled activity. Natives 
are allowed to hunt, but only for consumption and not for sale. The limit of wild meat 
anyone can stock at any one time is 5kg. Urban dwellers and non-natives are also not 
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allowed to hunt in Native Customary Land. Of course, in reality, these are not enforced, 
and meat is sold freely in the market at Local Area 1 in the resettlement area, as well as 
at the Wednesday and Saturday markets at the jetty. 
For most hunters, the target animal during expeditions is the bearded pig. This 
constitutes the greatest proportion of animal protein that most families consume. By 
some estimates, bearded pigs represent 72% to 90% of the 1000 metric tonnes (1 million 
kilogrammes) of wild meat sold in Sarawak per year (Chin, 2001). Even though some 
Kayan families rear domestic pigs, called uting in Kayan, they are meant only for rituals 
and sacrifices and not for day to day consumption; many of the elderly longhouse folk 
will actually refuse to eat domesticated pigs. Hunted pigs are gutted and large adult 
individuals are chopped up for sale. Although bearded pigs are born black with 
longitudinal yellow bands along the body, their colours fade to brownish or reddish grey, 
even buffy white, in adulthood. Sometimes yellowish pigs are seen but the hunters claim 
that pigs of this colour do not taste as good as the other morphs. In the absence of pigs, 
deer are a distant second option in terms of terrestrial meat, and very often families 
would just turn to fish instead of venison. Other wild meats that are common include 
reticulated python (Python reticulatus; Penganen in Kayan), turtles (various spp., 
collectively called kelavang in Kayan) and mousedeer (Tragulus spp.; Pelanuk in Kayan). 
Hunting in the Bakun Lake increasingly is being undertaken, not just by the natives, but 
also various other outsiders, such as Ibans from other parts of Sarawak who are posted 
to work at the Bakun hydroelectric plant, as well as workers who are employed to work 
at the logging concessions that have begun to open up around various parts of the lake. 
This places increased hunting pressure on game species. In the upper reaches of the lake, 
Indonesian Orang Ulu occasionally also cross the border in search of work, or to move 
in with their Malaysian relatives. Among the Balui Orang Ulu groups, although many men 
go hunting, they do so in conjunction with other activities, such as pepper farming. 
Hunting trips are also taken on with greater frequency at festivals such as the rice 
harvest festival (doh ledoh in Kayan), Christmas and other special occasions like 
weddings and family days. 
Besides hunting, there are also other pressures exerted on local environments by 
humans. Logging has resumed at various locations along the banks of the lake. Felled 
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timber is brought to shore at a separate jetty near the common one that the public uses. 
Boat traffic also causes noise disturbances, especially at night.  
Several longhouse folks have also built floating houses (called jelatong in Kayan). These 
are basically wooden houses floating on top of discarded oil barrels or large logs. There 
are three major uses for these floating houses. Many are used as temporary outposts 
for when hunters require shelter when during hunting or fishing trips. These tend to be 
very basic jelatongs, with no conveniences. The second group are permanent homes, 
for people who have rejected the government’s offer to resettle at the Bakun 
Resettlement areas. These tend to be found further upstream, especially in the 
traditional Kenyah areas, as these traditional lands are much harder to reach due to their 
distance. The third group are floating houses for commercial purposes. Uma Belor has 
two such examples, and Uma Badeng has one, for tourism. Floating houses create 
environmental issues for the lake and surrounding terrestrial habitats for a few reasons. 
First, there is a complete lack of sanitation or rubbish disposal services. Toilets empty 
into the lake water, and rubbish such as food wrappers, corroded barrels, beer cans and 
lubricant bottles are thrown into the lake. Second, electricity for lighting is generated 
using diesel or petrol generators, which produce a lot of noise and exhaust. Thirdly, 
tourist destination longhouses tended to be extremely brightly-lit, extremely boisterous, 
often from dusk to dawn. There is even a karaoke service in one of the houses with a 
powerful sound system. These cause a lot of disturbance to the immediate areas on the 
lake. 
6.1.2 The Nonhuman Dimension 
The environment around Bakun Lake is typical of Borneo. The weather is influenced by 
two monsoons. One brings dry, hot weather in the middle of the year and is intensified 
by El Nino events. One extreme El Nino event in 1997 brought about a drought so severe 
that large numbers of emaciated bearded pigs were seen (Wong et al., 2005). The period 
of field work also coincided with a moderate El Nino event, and the effect of reduced 
rainfall on the lake was quite remarkable (Figure 6.1). The second monsoon event brings 
about extremely wet weather that is intensified by La Nina. The topography of the land 
is steep, and numerous tributary rivers and streams run throughout the catchment area. 
The former Balui river was one that ran through a narrow valley bounded by steep 
ranges. As such, the inundation caused by the damming of the Bakun rapids formed a 
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lake that is dendritic and deep; instead of a wide, shallow lake, a long, deep lake was 
formed that flooded through the valley. In most places, the lake is about 1km wide. 
 
Figure 6.1: The figure on the left is Belanum waterfall at normal lake height. The picture on the right is Belanum 
at its lowest level. The currents are strong due to rain upstream. The circle shows where the rocks of the picture 
on the left are. 
The terrestrial environment of the banks of the old Batang Balui and the surrounding 
mountain ranges are sometimes described in anti-dam discourses as ‘pristine’. This, 
however is not true. The forests of the Bakun area have been settled by longhouse 
communities for a long time and movements throughout these ranges are common. For 
example, Penghulu Saging Bit said to me that Uma Belor had moved six times within his 
lifetime. Every move brings with it the environmental disturbance associated with 
longhouse living such as felling of trees for new longhouse blocks and land being cleared 
and burned for farming. In recent decades, there has also been logging along the Balui, 
both by concession holders as well as longhouse folk illegally felling valuable timber for 
sale. What is left in the forests along the Balui is thus a patchwork mosaic of fallow land, 
abandoned rubber stands, kerangas heath and logged over secondary forests.  
The second environmental impact assessment done for the Bakun catchment area 
(Ekran Berhad, 1994) determined that the lake would have a catchment of over 1.5 
million hectares, made up of kerangas forest, a very small amount of submontane forest, 
shifting cultivation and fallow land, as well as logged-over mixed dipterocarp forests, 
including riverine and riverbank mixed dipterocarp forest. The latter two do not exist 
anymore as riverine and riverbank forests have been flooded, while much of the 
valuable dipterocarp and Aquilaria beccariana (gaharu) timber has been removed 
during the biomass removal period. Indeed, the commissioner of the EIA and leader of 
the Bakun Project in the 1990s, Ekran Berhad, was then owned by then timber tycoon, 
111 
 
Tan Sri Ting Pek Khiing. Ekran also awarded contracts to four other companies, which 
were also owned by Tan Sri Ting (Lopez, 1996).  
The Ekran survey also showed that the forest in the catchment area harboured the 
‘totally protected’ ensurai (Dipterocarpus oblongifolius) as well as 68 other ‘protected 
species’. While the ensurai is not considered to be endangered (its IUCN red list status 
is Least Concern), it is considered an important species as it is a riverbank tree that helps 
anchor the soil of the steep riverbank slopes, as well as providing food to the prized food 
fish empurau and semah, in the form of fallen fruits. A second flora inventory was built 
by the Sarawak Forestry Corp (2013) and included an attempt to rescue the seeds of 
various ‘priority’ tree species, including the ensurai, but the project was plagued by 
various mistakes and problems, one of which was an erroneous estimation of the final 
height of the lake, which resulted in the destruction of the nurseries that were housing 
and germinating the rescued seedlings. 
The old Batang Balui was also characterised by a large number of smaller tributary 
streams and rivers, and rapids. Indeed, the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam is named after the 
Bakun Rapids, upon which the structure is built. The longhouses along the Batang Balui 
were generally located at the confluence of this major river with a smaller tributary river. 
This tributary river’s name is then attached to the longhouse’s name. In Uma Belor’s 
case, the name before relocation was Uma Belor Long Sah A.  
This naming system is useful especially in identifying longhouses that have split. For 
example, the Lahanan longhouse split into two groups. The main one remained at the 
confluence of the Balui and a tributary called Long Pangai and is called Levu Lahanan 
Long Pangai, while the splinter group moved to another river, and is called Levu Lahanan 
Long Semuang. Post-inundation, most of these tributaries have been flooded as well. 
Long Sah and Long Pangai do not exist anymore; the tributaries that remain are the 
upper reaches of the original rivers and streams. Due to the depth of the lake (the 
normal operating height of the lake is 225m), stratification of the lake body occurs; with 
Sarawak being a tropical location, this is especially marked. The convection currents that 
characterise temperate lakes are disrupted in tropical lakes because the top layer of the 
lake is the warmest and thus stays on the top surface. Warm water also holds less 
dissolved oxygen. The lack of a convection current thus leads to severely hypoxic 
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environments in the body of the lake. Aeration of the water occurs where tributaries 
feed into the lake.  For the fishermen of the Balui, their fishing grounds are now confined 
to these areas.  
The frequent rains bring large amounts of water flowing into the lake with great force, 
which also bring a lot of sediment and nutrients. This presumably replenishes the oxygen 
and nutrients depleted by the thermal stratification of the lake. Permission to analyse 
lake water samples was not granted by the authorities and I was unable to pursue this 
further. A controversial study was conducted in 2015 by Elli Luhat, a former forestry 
official and a member of Uma Juman, which claimed that the lake water contained high 
levels of aluminium (Ruekeith, 2015); although the press release claimed that the study 
was done in collaboration with universities in China and the United States, there has 
been no scrutinised, peer-reviewed publication released from the tests, and he may 
have been pushing for water-filtration technology a  company he is affiliated to. 
The environment of the lake can also be greatly affected by the extremes between the 
wet and dry seasons. The dry season of 2014, which was probably intensified by an El 
Nino event, resulted in severely reduced rainfall. Due to the deep but relatively narrow 
shape of the lake, reduced collection from the catchment areas resulted in drastic 
fluctuations in the depth of the lake, and this particular event caused a drop 19m in the 
height of the lake, and unattended floating houses became beached, while areas of 
eroded banks were exposed. Even floating houses that were constantly occupied and 
shifted from the banks were threatened by the crowns of dead underwater trees 
pushing through the floors. Because of the steepness of the banks, the surface area of 
the lake did not change drastically, and islands did not join up as one would normally 
expect for many manmade islands. This also affected the hunters and the field research 
as it became harder to access the forests, the options being to rock climb without ropes 
(if one wanted to follow tributaries that have become waterfalls) or a similarly vertical 
climb along the banks of the lake by grabbing dead tree roots and scrambling for a grip 
on crumbling soil. 
6.1.3 Previous Studies 
The first recorded survey in the area was an ornithological expedition into the Hose 
Mountains, which are located halfway between Bakun and the end of the lake, and near 
the native customary lands of Uma Balui Liko and Uma Bakah (Fogden, 1964), while 
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amphibians were surveyed in the early 1990s (Inger and Voris, 1993), followed by lotic 
invertebrates (Abang, 1995) and fish (Parenti and Lim, 2005). For the purpose of building 
the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam, three environmental impact assessments were done, 
each one corresponding to each attempt to start or restart the process of dam 
construction. The SAMA consortium (1992) report was the earliest and by far the 
scantiest, with the second Ekran Berhad (1994) report going so far as to say that it had 
“no reference to any specific wildlife”. The latter report was done by a collaborative 
effort from academics at the Centre for Technology Transfer and Consultancy at the then 
newly founded Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. 
6.1.3.1 The Ekran Berhad Environmental Impact Assessment (1994) 
The Ekran Berhad report (1994) surveyed for small and large mammals in four plots that 
are now inundated. One plot was used for small mammal trapping, while 3 were used 
for large mammal transects. The small mammal trap location was along the west bank 
of the Balui, “13km above the proposed BHEP dam site between Kuala Long Murum and 
Long Nyah”, which would place their site in the vicinity of Uma Belor’s NCR lands. One 
hundred small mammal traps were placed in a 10x10 grid, with 10m between each trap 
location, in addition to 10 rat traps placed around the base camp and moved randomly 
daily. These traps were set for 10 days, for a total of 1,100 trap nights. It is not known 
what was used to bait the traps.  Ten pitfall traps were also dug at random places around 
the base camp. These trapping methods yielded 5 species of small mammals: Mueller’s 
rat (Rattus muelleri), Brown spiny rat (Rattus rajah), Malayan porcupine (Hystrix 
brachyura), Plantain squirrel (Callosciurus notatus) and common treeshrew (Tupaia glis). 
Of these, only the porcupine and plantain squirrel were recorded outside of the 
inundation area (above the dam’s maximum height of 230m).  
Large mammals were surveyed by walking 4km long, meandering transect lines near 
Long Murum, Long Liko, and Long Linau in both day and night. These locations 
correspond to the NCR lands of Uma Bawang, Uma Balui Liko and Uma Nyaving 
respectively. Survey effort was not disclosed in the reports. As a number of species were 
recorded as ‘carcasses’, particularly the species that are favoured as food sources 
(bearded pig and deer), it is likely that hunters’ kills were recorded as well, even though 
this was not made explicit in the described methodology.  
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Five species of primates were recorded, which were made up of two leaf monkey species 
(Silvered leaf monkey Trachypithecus cristatus and Hose’s langur Presbytis hosei), two 
macaque species (long-tailed macaque Macaca fascicularis and pig-tailed macaque 
Macaca nemestrina), and one ape, the Bornean gibbon (Hylobates muelleri). Of these, 
only the gibbon and long-tailed macaque were found beyond the inundation zone.  
Six species of even-toed ungulates were found, all of which are considered good game 
animals: the bearded pig, sambar, both Bornean yellow and red muntjacs (Muntiacus 
atherodes and Muntiacus muntjak respectively), and both greater and lesser mousedeer 
(Tragulus napu and Tragulus kanchil respectively). Carcasses for all but the sambar and 
red muntjac were recorded. All species were also recorded both within and beyond the 
inundation zone, perhaps indicating that these would be less impacted by the flooding 
of the lowland forest. 
Six species of carnivores were recorded: the Malayan sun bear (Helarctos malayanus) 
and oriental small-clawed otter (Aonyx cinerea), which were found in both within and 
beyond the inundation zone, and four species of viverrids. Of the latter, only the 
common palm civet (Paradoxus hermaphroditus) was recorded on both sides of the 
projected lake highline; two were found only on higher ground (masked palm civet 
Paguma larvata and banded palm civet Hemigalus derbyanus); while the Binturong 
(Arctitis binturong) was found exclusively in the lowland habitats. No felids were 
recorded. 
In all, 27 non-volant mammal species were observed, ten being small mammals (one 
treeshrew, six squirrel, two rat and one porcupine species), five being primates, six 
carnivores and six even-toed ungulates. Of the large ground birds, only the Great Argus 
pheasant (Argusianus argus) was recorded. 
6.1.3.2 Sarawak Hidro Sdn Bhd and Sarawak Forestry Corp (SFC) joint report 
(2013) 
This report was written at the completion of the wildlife monitoring and rescue 
operation conducted around various locations of what was to be Bakun Lake. Most 
importantly, this joint effort between Sarawak Hidro and SFC was meant to compile a 
wildlife inventory, and rescue the seeds of valued flora species and trapped animals as 
inundation happened. Because the inundation would begin to confine animal species to 
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shrinking habitat patches (landbridge islands) on the lake itself, this could result in the 
compilation of a species inventory that is much closer to a complete census than the 
1994 Ekran Berhad EIA. The other consequence is that it is highly probable that a 
significant number of animal species would have drowned anyway, due to the 
impossibility of a complete rescue mission on the large surface area of the lake. This 
project inventoried wildlife in three stages.  
First, a seven day ‘rapid assessment’ was carried out in four locations: Base Camp 
(henceforth referred to as ‘big island’), an unidentified location on Long Linau, Long 
Kayah and Long Besuar. The base camp location corresponded to Uma Bawang’s NCR 
area, while the latter two are NCR lands for Uma Lahanan and Uma Juman respectively. 
In total, four teams of three or four workers walked 24km of transects. All transects 
were within the inundation zone. This survey effort yielded 26 non-volant mammal 
species. Compared to the Ekran Berhad (1994) report, the results here did not include 
the common treeshrew, differed in the types of squirrels seen, and included the 
presence of two felids (leopard cat Prionailurus bengalensis and clouded leopard 
Neofelis diardi), the moonrat (Echinosorex gymnura) and the pangolin (Manis javanica). 
There was also a taxonomic issue with the recorded langur species, which was entered 
as the ‘banded leaf monkey (Presbytis melalophos)’ which does not actually exist in 
Sarawak. In past, the now critically endangered Sarawak surili (Presbytis chrysomelas) 
was thought to be a subspecies of P.melalophos but P.chrysomelas but it is not thought 
to range anywhere near Belaga. A lot of the records were not actually direct sightings, 
but rather indications of presence, such as possible sun bear claw marks on trees, and 
footprints. 
During the impoundment of the dam, a rescue operation began, using a combination of 
active capture, and trapping on temporary islands that would be submerged as the 
impoundment continued. This phase yielded a far more comprehensive inventory than 
other efforts. Rescues were carried out on temporary islands in four zones: the 
confluences of Long Murum, Long Wat and Long Belepeh; the Long Kayah area; the Long 
Belangan area; and the Long Luan and Long Besuar areas. These areas correspond to the 
NCR lands of Uma Bawang, Uma Lahanan, Uma Penan Talun and Uma Juman.  Rescued 
species from Long Kayah to Long Besuar islands which are in the ‘Totally protected’ state 
list were released on the mainland near Long Besuar, which is linked to the proposed 
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Hose Mountains National Park. Similarly, totally protected species rescued from the 
Long Murum and Long Linau area were released into the proposed Batu Laga National 
Park. The other species of lower conservation priority were released onto the adjacent 
mainland. In total, 47 species of mammals were rescued (Table 6.2). 
The third phase of the operation was the monitoring of two large islands (Ngalan Dasan 
and Avang) using camera traps. Three traps were placed on each island, and these were 
left for four months. The exact trap locations are unknown.  In all, 12 mammal species 
and three ground bird species were captured by the camera traps.  Ngalan Dasan traps 
recorded fewer (nine) mammal species than Avang (12). The Malayan sun bear, Malay 
civet and an unidentified species of mongoose were recorded only at Avang. This phase 
also indicates that these two islands were not evacuated like the other islands. 
Four ground birds were identified, three more than in the previous EIA. Apart from the 
Great Argus Pheasant, crested firebacks (Lophura ignita), Crested wood partridges 
(Rollulus rouloul) and Bornean ground cuckoos (Carpococcyx radiceus) were rescued as 
well.
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Table 6.1: Table of species identified in previous surveys and rescue operations. IUCN threat status is also added to the table, along with updates in scientific names according to IUCN listings. 
No. Sarawak 
Protection 
Status 
Common Name Scientific Name IUCN status Reported in Ekran 
(1994) 
Reported in Sarawak 
Forestry (2013) 
1 Totally 
Protected 
Hose’s langur Presbytis hosei Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
2 White-fronted langur Presbytis frontata Vulnerable  ✓ 
3 Silvered langur Trachypithecus 
cristatus 
Near threatened 
✓  
4 Bornean gibbon Hylobates muelleri Endangered ✓ ✓ 
5 Slow loris Nycticebus menagensis Vulnerable  ✓ 
6 Western tarsier Tarsius bancanus Vulnerable  ✓ 
7 Cream-coloured 
giant squirrel 
Ratufa affinis Near-threatened 
✓ ✓ 
8 Tufted ground 
squirrel 
Rheithrosciurus 
macrotis 
Vulnerable 
 ✓ 
9 Clouded leopard Neofelis diardi Vulnerable ✓  
10 Protected Leopard cat Prionailurus 
bengalensis 
Least concern 
 ✓ 
11 Malayan Sun bear Helarctos malayanus Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
12 Binturong Arctictis binturong Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
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13 Long-tailed macaque Macaca fascicularis Least concern ✓ ✓ 
14 Pig-tailed macaque Macaca nemestrina Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
15 Common palm civet Paradoxurus 
hermaphroditus 
Least concern ✓ ✓ 
16 Small-toothed palm 
civet 
Arctogalidia trivirgata Least concern  ✓ 
17 Banded palm civet Hemigalus derbyanus Near threatened  ✓ 
18 Masked palm civet Paguma larvata Least concern  ✓ 
19 Malay civet Viverra tangalunga Least concern  ✓ 
20 Banded linsang Prionodon linsang Least concern  ✓ 
21 Asian small-clawed 
otter 
Aonyx cinerea Vulnerable ✓  
22 Short-tailed 
mongoose 
Herpestes brachyurus Near threatened  ✓ 
23 Sunda pangolin Manis javanica Critically endangered  ✓ 
24 Malayan porcupine Hystrix brachyura Least concern ✓ ✓ 
25 Thick-spined 
porcupine 
Hystrix crassispinis Least concern  ✓ 
26 Long-tailed 
porcupine 
Trichys fasciculata Least concern 
 ✓ 
27 Malayan Colugo Galeopterus variegatus Least concern  ✓ 
28 Black flying squirrel Aeromys tephromelas Data deficient  ✓ 
29 Thomas’ flying 
squirrel 
Aeromys thomasi Data deficient ✓ ✓ 
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30 Whiskered flying 
squirrel 
Petinomys genibarbis Vulnerable  ✓ 
31 Common treeshrew Tupaia glis Least concern ✓ ✓ 
32 Large treeshrew Tupaia tana Least concern  ✓ 
33 Pygmy treeshrew Tupaia minor Least concern  ✓ 
34  
Trade ban, 
restricted 
hunting 
 
 
 
Sambar Rusa unicolor Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
35 Red muntjac Muntiacus muntjak Least concern ✓ ✓ 
36 Bornean yellow 
muntjac 
Muntiacus atherodes Least concern ✓ ✓ 
37 Greater mousedeer Tragulus napu Least concern ✓ ✓ 
38 Lesser mousedeer Tragulus kanchil Least concern ✓ ✓ 
39 Bearded pig Sus barbatus Vulnerable ✓ ✓ 
40 Brooke’s squirrel Sundasciurus brookei Least concern  ✓ 
41 Low’s squirrel Sundasciurus lowii Least concern ✓  
42 Plain pygmy squirrel Exilisciurus exilis Data deficient ✓ ✓ 
43 Black-eared squirrel Nannosciurus melanotis Least concern ✓ ✓ 
44 Horse-tailed squirrel Sundasciurus hippurus Near threatened  ✓ 
45 Plantain squirrel Callosciurus notatus Least concern ✓ ✓ 
46 Prevost’s squirrel Callosciurus prevostii Least concern  ✓ 
47 Dark-tailed tree rat Niviventer 
cremoriventer 
Vulnerable  ✓ 
48 Long-tailed 
mountain rat 
Niviventer rapit Least concern  ✓ 
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49 Long-tailed giant rat Leopoldamys sabanus Least concern  ✓ 
50 Unprotected Rajah spiny rat Maxomys rajah Least concern ✓ ✓ 
51 Mueller’s giant 
Sunda rat 
Sundamys muelleri Least concern ✓ ✓ 
121 
 
6.2 Methods 
The general framework for field ecology methods is in chapter 4.2. From the camera 
traps, a number of abiotic parameters could be collected, such as time and date, 
temperature and moon phase, as well as video recordings after still images were taken. 
Due to the different ages of the models, not all of the cameras came with the same 
functions. The oldest camera was simply a still image camera, with only the date and 
time available (Bushnell Trophy Cam). The Bushnell Trophy Cam HD came in two 
versions. The earlier model came with less sharp video quality and no moon phase, 
temperature or time stamps on the videos, but these were included in the newer Trophy 
Cam HD as well as its successor, the Bushnell Aggressor. Although transect belts were 
meant to be in surveillance mode constantly, in reality, a number of factors disrupted 
their operation and caused gaps or, in one case, a whole transect belt to fail. Information 
from field ethnography will then be incorporated with the ecological results in the 
discussion. Market surveys proved contentious, with hunters often unwilling to share 
information or open up their insulators for fear of raids by Sarawak Forestry officials, 
from the results of the study. During the fieldwork period, there were two spot checks 
conducted at the jetty markets for illegal firearms and bushmeat. 
Small mammal traps were tested at three locations, each for three five-night stretches, 
but these traps did not catch anything. Transect surveys similarly yielded little, apart 
from a single slow loris. 
6.2.1 Study Sites 
The survey and trapping locations are as marked in Figure 6.2. The number trap nights 
varied with the number of cameras and duration on the various locations and ranged 
from 1305 trap nights at Belanum to 321 trap nights at Avang. Besides camera reliability, 
encroachment of logging operations also greatly affected the survey efforts. 
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Figure 6.2: Landsat 8 satellite photo showing locations of the trapping sites. 
The trapping sites also differ in character. Ngalan Dasan is the site closest to the jetty 
and is the first major permanent island. It can be reached within 5 mins by boat. The 
island was once a cemetery, and the base camp of Sarawak Forestry was located on this 
island until a series of ‘ghost hauntings’ moved the camp elsewhere.  
Belanum (named after the tributary that feeds into the lake) is the first mainland site of 
camera trapping, and is on the west bank of the lake, twenty minutes by boat from the 
jetty. Uma Belor once built its longhouse at the end of this river where it met the old 
Batang Balui. This site is very heavily utilised. Prior to inundation, the area was used both 
as fruit tree gardens as well as a logging concession held by a timber conglomerate KTS 
(pers comm). Two floating houses for tourists are based there, as well as two other 
floating houses for the purposes of hunting and fishing. As it is an old hunting ground, 
trails through this area are very clear, and the camera traps have captured hunters 
moving through. This is the site with the highest level of human pressure, as conflicts 
have arisen from Sarawak Forestry workers using the site to hunt and fish in competition 
to the harvesting that is already going on by the people of the Bakun Resettlement 
Scheme.  
Another half hour south, but on the east bank, is Pahak, which is the boundary that 
separated Uma Kelap and Uma Lahanan. This was an old logging site up to the time of 
inundation. Logging started again unexpectedly near the end of field work, and two traps 
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were lost to felled trees (Figure 6.3). Halfway through the trapping period, there was a 
large natural tree fall in the middle of the trapping area.  
 
Figure 6.3: Camera trapping location on Pahak that got bulldozed through by logging companies. 
About 45 mins further south is the location of the second island site, Avang. The Sarawak 
Forestry report calls the place Sungai Luan, which is the stream that originated at lower 
altitudes but has now been inundated. The now inundated area below the island was a 
shifting cultivation and fruit garden area of Uma Juman, but the areas that now exist are 
too steep for planting. A construction project to build a permanent chalet was carried 
out by a member of Uma Juman using Filipino and Indonesian (Kalimantan) migrant 
workers; the business had run for a few months before the owner suddenly passed away 
in October 2015 from melioidosis. The final site, Besuar, is on the west bank, two hours 
by boat from the jetty. It is also the furthest release location of the wildlife rescue 
mission conducted by Sarawak Forestry Corp. The area is connected to the much larger 
Hose Mountains which still contains significant habitat and is a proposed national park.  
6.2.2 Statistical Methods 
Although moon phases were displayed in the images recorded by the camera traps, I 
realised during the analysis that the camera traps’ calculation of moon phases are not 
accurate for South-east Asia, and did not include percentage illumination. Accurate 
moon phases, including percentage illumination, were acquired from the United States 
Naval Observatory website (US Navy, 2016). Descriptive statistics of the number of 
encounters, and the proportion of crepuscular, diurnal or nocturnal activity, were taken 
as well.  
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Camera traps essentially record binary data - presence or absence. In attempting to 
determine if various factors lead to absence/presence likelihoods, such as island vs 
mainland, distance from Bakun jetty, moon phase and season (wet vs dry), we are also 
collecting categorical and nominal variables which we are trying to associate with pre-
determined individual groups (such as species) (Dytham, 2003). However, as there were 
only five sites and the composition of wildlife on each site was affected by several 
(confounding) factors, such as tourism, logging, distance from the jetty and cultural 
avoidances, it was only possible to come up with summary statistics.  
The statistical methods are basic and mainly concerned the absence and presence of 
various species, as well as their frequencies of encounters. Tabulation of frequencies 
was done with Microsoft Excel. 
 
6.3 Results 
In all, 27 species of vertebrates were identified from the camera traps, of which, three 
species were ground birds, and one was a reptile, with the remaining 23 species being 
mammals from six orders. Table 6.3 breaks down the binary presence/absence data by 
location. Nine of the mammal species occur at all the sites, while nine other species 
occur only at one site. Appendix II shows some of the shots taken by the traps. 
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Table 6.2: Table showing the species identified at the different sites from camera traps. 
No. Order Common Name Scientific Name IUCN Status Island Sites Mainland Sites 
Ngalan Dasan Avang Belanum Pahak Besuar 
1 Primates Long-tailed 
macaque 
Macaca fascicularis Least concern 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2 Pig-tailed 
macaque 
Macaca nemestrina Vulnerable 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
3 Carnivora Malayan Sun bear Helarctos malayanus Vulnerable ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
4 Small-toothed 
palm civet 
Arctogalidia 
trivirgata 
Least concern 
✓   ✓  
5 Banded palm civet Hemigalus derbyanus Near 
threatened 
 ✓  ✓  
6 Malay civet Viverra tangalunga Least concern ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
7 Marbled cat Pardofelis 
marmorata 
Vulnerable 
   ✓  
8 Yellow-throated 
marten 
Martes flavigula Least concern 
 ✓    
9 Malayan weasel Mustela nudipes Least concern   ✓   
10 Short-tailed 
mongoose 
Herpestes brachyurus Near 
threatened 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
11 Pholidota Sunda pangolin Manis javanica Critically 
endangered 
  ✓   
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12 Rodentia Malayan 
porcupine 
Hystrix brachyura Least concern 
✓  ✓ ✓  
13 Thick-spined 
porcupine 
Hystrix crassispinis Least concern 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
14 Long-tailed 
porcupine 
Trichys fasciculata Least concern 
 ✓    
15 Horse-tailed 
squirrel 
Sundasciurus 
hippurus 
Near 
threatened 
   ✓  
16 Prevost’s squirrel Callosciurus prevostii Least concern    ✓  
17 Scandentia Large treeshrew Tupaia tana Least concern  ✓    
18 Artiodactyla Sambar Rusa unicolor Vulnerable ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
19 Red muntjac Muntiacus muntjak Least concern ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
20 Bornean yellow 
muntjac 
Muntiacus atherodes Least concern 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
21 Greater 
mousedeer 
Tragulus napu Least concern 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
22 Lesser mousedeer Tragulus kanchil Least concern ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
23 Bearded pig Sus barbatus Vulnerable ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Total number of identifiable species 14 14 16 18 11 
Number of unique species 0 3 2 3  
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As a species group, ungulates are the most represented by far on the mainland sites 
(Table 6.3). On the site furthest away, Besuar, ungulates appear in over 85% of 
encounters. On island sites (Ngalan Dasan and Avang), exhibit a significant level of 
hyperabundance, appearing at least as often as ungulates. Pahak appears to have a high 
level of primate occurrence because there was a large tree fall during the trapping 
period that formed a habitat corridor that primates utilised often.  
Table 6.3: Table showing percentage occurrence of each species group at each camera trap site. Island sites 
indicate hyperabundances of primate populations, also seen in other field sites in South America. On mainland 
sites, ungulates dominate. 
Species Group Ngalan Dasan Belanum Pahak Avang Besuar 
Ground Birds 8.176% 14.124% 0.000% 15.625% 2.581% 
Ungulates 42.767% 47.175% 53.403% 35.625% 85.591% 
Primates 42.767% 12.994% 30.890% 38.750% 7.097% 
Porcupines 3.774% 22.316% 4.712% 4.375% 4.086% 
Total 97.484% 96.610% 89.005% 94.375% 99.355% 
Total 
Encounters 
159 354 191 160 465 
 
Encounter rates also differ by site (Table 6.5). Camera traps at Pahak and Belanum were 
least likely to capture any images on a given trapnight. When the other species are 
removed, ungulates appear most often in Besuar and least often on Pahak. 
Table 6.4: Summary statistics of the percentage mean encounter rates at each site. 
Trap Site Total Trapnights Total 
Encounters 
% Encounters %Ungulate 
Encounters 
Ngalan 
Dasan 
529 159 31.57 11.72 
Belanum 1305 354 27.89 11.11 
Pahak 641 191 26.37 10.30 
Avang 321 160 47.07 13.40 
Besuar 972 465 41.56 33.13 
 
Of the most interest are the ungulates, as they provide a significant source of protein 
for the indigenous communities. The effects of human disturbance on the activity and 
distribution of ungulates are significant. Firstly, bearded pigs (Sus barbatus), which are 
often among the most common ungulate in ecological studies on Bornean habitats 
(including this one), are completely absent in the camera traps on Avang. Secondly, the 
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bearded pigs, which are mostly diurnal in the other field sites, become mostly nocturnal 
on Belanum. Thirdly, mousedeer (Tragulus spp.) exhibited mostly diurnal behaviour on 
Pahak but were mostly nocturnal in other areas. Fourthly, Besuar had a significantly 
higher encounter rate for both bearded pigs and muntjacs. 
Table 6.5: Summary statistics of the number of encounters per 100 nights per location for each ungulate group. 
Location Bearded Pigs Muntjacs Mousedeer Sambar 
Ngalan Dasan 4.91 2.27 3.59 0.95 
Belanum 4.60 1.30 5.13 0.08 
Pahak 1.72 1.40 6.71 0.47 
Avang 0.00 5.92 4.05 3.43 
Besuar 10.29 20.78 1.54 0.51 
 
Table 6.6: Summary statistics for the activities of bearded pigs. Belanum stands out as the ground where bearded 
pigs tend towards nocturnal activity, opposite to the activity of bearded pigs in the other trapping sites. 
Location Nocturnal Diurnal Crepuscular 
NgalanDasan 9 16 1 
Belanum 32 21 6 
Pahak 2 9 0 
Avang 0 0 0 
Besuar 11 87 2 
 
Table 6.7: Summary statistics for the activities of the mousedeer in the trapping sites. Pahak stands out as the 
ground where mousedeer exhibit an unusual level of diurnal activity, opposite to the other sites. 
Location Nocturnal Diurnal Crepuscular 
Ngalan Dasan 11 6 2 
Belanum 50 6 3 
Pahak 12 26 5 
Avang 9 2 1 
Besuar 6 8 0 
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Trapping Results 
Due to the insufficient number of traps, and difficulties in ensuring complete traplines 
for extended periods of time, the study was unable to collate ideal, high-quality levels 
of camera trap data. Therefore, we can only use the data as rough indicators of what is 
going on at in the forests of in and around the Bakun Dam area. Even so, some of the 
data reveal some rather compelling information. This is also the first camera trap study 
in Bakun of such a scale. 
Firstly, the effect of hunting on the populations of ungulates is clear. The most popular 
hunted species, the bearded pigs and the muntjacs, are present in significantly higher 
proportions at Besuar, the furthest and least disturbed areas of the forests included in 
the study area.  At Avang, where a chalet business existed, and where one of the big 
attractions was bearded pigs roasted on a spit Filipino style (Figure 6.4) by the Filipino 
worker based on the island, bearded pigs were not recorded at all. On the other hand, 
the species not of culinary interest for that particular business, especially muntjacs and 
sambar, recorded higher than normal encounter rates than the other sites. 
 
Figure 6.4: Spit-roasted bearded pig at the floating house done 'Filipino style'. 
Secondly, human disturbances appear to play a significant role in the foraging behaviour 
of ungulates. Bearded pigs at heavily hunted Belanum became significantly more 
nocturnal, while mousedeer became significantly more diurnal on heavily logged Pahak. 
As suggested by work done earlier in Sabah (Matsubayashi et al., 2003), mousedeer 
occurrence seems to correlate with habitat disturbances, such as logging, which creates 
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crown-gap areas that may encourage fast fruiting pioneer species. This is reflected in 
the higher mousedeer occurrences that are seen in Belanum and Pahak. 
Thirdly, Pahak may be the point past which diminishing returns for hunting and fishing 
become significant. Although Avang is heavily disturbed as well, its disturbance is 
localised and due much more to the presence of the construction and operation of the 
chalet there, rather than of hunters and loggers moving to and from the jetty. In our 
journeys to the trap sites, a typical trip on an empty 10 seater boat and a 40hp engine 
required 125L to and fro, averaging about RM300 on fuel and lubricant cost alone (the 
lubricant is mixed with the fuel).  Hunting trips also usually involve multiple people, 
typically relatives, and hunting dogs, and therefore there is often a need to expend on 
consumables such as food, water and cooking fuel. These become bigger burdens as 
they are required to stay out for longer periods of time, and the added weight can easily 
double the time and fuel needed to arrive at such a hunting ground. Therefore, far 
greater hunting pressure is seen in locations closer to the jetty. The camera traps at 
Belanum have also captured images of hunters moving through the trapping sites 
(Figure 6.5).  
 
Figure 6.5: Camera trap image of a hunter walking through Belanum. People from Uma Belor who have seen this 
image speculate that he is an Iban from outside the Balui working at Sarawak Hydro. 
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Fourthly, the data also clearly show the same hyperabundance of primate species (long-
tailed macaques and pig-tailed macaques) typically associated with newly formed 
landbridge islands, such as Lago Guri in Venezuela. (Feeley and Terborgh, 2006; 
Terborgh, 1997). Of the ungulates, sambar also seem to appear more frequently on the 
islands than on the mainland sites. The fact that camera trap data can detect 
hyperabundance of these three species also indicates that macaques and sambar are 
not favoured food animals, even though they are hunted from time to time. 
Photographs of hunted Sambar are also posted on a Facebook page of a Kenyah tourist 
initiative called ‘Bakun Paradise’. This group operates on the Linau side of the lake, which 
is not covered in this study. Young macaques are sometimes taken home as pets. Sambar 
is said to have an unpleasantly strong gamey quality, and they are too large to move 
easily through the forest and up and down the steep terrain of the banks of the lake. 
Decorative horned ornaments and trophies hung on walls are also always muntjac, and 
sambar equivalents were never noted throughout the fieldwork period. 
6.4.2 Human Adaptation to Environmental Symptoms 
Ungulates play important roles in the ecology and forest dynamics of Borneo, as well as 
economic and cultural roles. Muntjacs are traditionally an omen animal. The calls of 
muntjacs are an evil omen and marriages had been called off because of muntjac 
vocalisations (Hose and McDougall, 1912). Sambar occur in Kayan folklore, with one 
particular tale telling of how Sarawakian Kayan tribes became separated from their 
brethren in Kalimantan; when their migrating Kayan ancestors were crossing a ravine, a 
scout relayed a message saying there was a sambar (payau in Kayan) ahead. In an 
unfortunate ‘Chinese whispers’ twist, payau became ayau, which meant that their 
warring enemies were ahead. In response to the erroneous message, the rear half of the 
party cut the bridge spanning the ravine, and from then on separated the Kayan into 
two regions. Ecologically, the deer species are important and prolific seed dispersers and 
a study in Thailand found that they disperse far more seeds than gibbons (Brodie, 2007).  
By far the most important species to the indigenous communities displaced by Bakun, 
and to all Dayak communities (apart from the Muslim Melanau), is the bearded pig. The 
bearded pig is the preferred terrestrial game, and hunting for this species is one of the 
most traditionally important economic activities. Conversations with the people reveal 
that longhouses such as Uma Juman and Uma Bakah were built near known migration 
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routes of bearded pigs and it was even possible to shoot migrating pigs from their 
verandas. These does not happen for all longhouses as they need to also full a number 
of other criteria, such as distance from the river, the likelihood of flooding and if the 
ground can be easily built on. These migration routes are now underwater and hunters 
no longer have any knowledge of the new migration routes. Outside of migration 
periods, hunting dogs are trained to track and corner bearded pigs, which are then killed 
by shotgun blasts. In practice, this adds to the fact the hunting can often be relatively 
stationary and therefore hunting pressure was quite diffuse throughout the length of 
the river, with the strongest hunting pressure being at specific points (the longhouse), 
at specific times (migration season). 
Displacement to the Bakun Resettlement Scheme had caused some serious upheaval in 
terms of livelihood occupations. Hunting was a far more common occupation pre-
inundation, but today there are far more gun owners than there are active hunters.  At 
the more affluent Uma Belor, there are at least 25 hunting rifle owners, but only two 
spend significant amounts of time in the Belanum forest. The cause of loss of this avenue 
of livelihood is almost certainly the lack of access. Prior to displacement, the longhouses 
were built on the banks of the Balui or Linau rivers, and backed by forests. Hunting was 
a matter of trekking through these forests with their packs of hunting dogs, to shoot and 
bring back whatever they could carry. Displacement from upstream of Bakun meant that 
two modes of transport are required. A truck is needed to get from the longhouse to the 
lake, and then a boat from the lake to the hunting ground. This meant that people who 
already had large enough boats with big enough engines to carry kills were at a distinct 
advantage. 
Despite the loss of hunting manpower, the demand for bearded pig meat did not 
diminish. Some younger men ride on motorcycles through the palm oil concessions with 
hunting dogs running alongside them in hopes that there is a pig among the palm trees, 
but these are considered poor quality meat.  
The initial displacement of the communities was also associated with a large injection of 
cash from their displacements. This was the equivalent of jumping into the deep end of 
the pool where the introduction to the globalised cash economy was concerned. Much 
has been written in displacement literature regarding the lack of financial control as a 
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result of inadequate financial education of dam-displaced communities. Often these 
cover the unnecessary purchase of luxury items such as four-wheel drive vehicles, which 
get repossessed or sold later on as they could not afford their upkeep, or home 
entertainment systems. Where food is mentioned, the literature often covers 
complaints about the loss of ‘free food and water’ from the forests or the loss of the 
‘jungle supermarket’. Therefore, purchasing decisions made at the individual level are 
divided by researchers into necessary (food) and unnecessary (luxury vehicles). 
Conversations during fieldwork show that the quality of decisions made may not 
necessarily be as distinct. 
When talking about access to animal protein, replies often fall into two kinds, the 
negative disapproval from the inability to master the cash economy, and the positive 
affirmation of the power of cash. The former talks of access and the loss of “free” 
provisions. One lady, who is a Kenyah grandmother married to a Kayan man, said in a 
mixture of Malay and Kayan, “Balui, di Long Bulan, kami boleh cari. Tidak susah. Percuma 
bah. Bavui kah, masik kah. Sekarang semua mesti ada duit.” Translated, it means that 
in the past, on the Balui, it was easy to find free fish and pigs, but money is needed for 
everything now. In other words, they could hunt and did not have to pay. The latter 
speaks of the ability to acquire needs and wants as one can easily use cash to exchange 
for these. My host, who runs the most successful tourism business in the settlement 
scheme and Bakun lake itself, is happy to work for money to acquire food for the family. 
He said, “At the beginning, I was unhappy with the move, but I worked hard on the land 
to grow pepper and then used that money plus my wife’s extra savings to do tourism. 
We are OK. She has a good job as a senior education officer, and the jelatong business 
is not so bad. So we can buy rice, and meat and whatever. We don’t have to go and 
search ourselves.” In other words, they did not have to hunt and they could pay.  
Quite clearly, there are three kinds of actors in this area. There are the hunters, the ones 
who do not hunt but can afford to buy from the hunters, and those who do not hunt but 
find it difficult to afford to buy from the hunters. Economically, the first two have 
advantages, the former tends to have enough initial capital post-displacement to 
overcome the barriers of distance, while the latter tends to have the advantage of 
education or acute entrepreneurial instincts. The final group, which can include former 
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hunters, are those who do not possess any of the three criteria, leaving them in the most 
disadvantaged position. 
6.4.3 The Hunters 
Thus, In the post-displacement economy, hunters play an extremely prominent, if 
curious role. They are not the most educated, nor are they the richest of the longhouse 
folk. They often socialise around headmen of their longhouses but are not of the 
aristocratic maren or hipuy classes. Nonetheless, they are among the most recognisable 
faces in the longhouse communities, and the new social dynamics associated with the 
hunters at the Bakun resettlement scheme have led to the rise of different ways of 
hunting and new economic models and structures based around hunting. 
Before displacement, hunting was a more common and social activity, and the spoils of 
the hunt are usually brought directly to the longhouse and divided among various 
members of the longhouse. This carried on for a short period of time post-displacement, 
but with the emergence of the marketplaces at Bakun jetty and the resettlement 
scheme’s local centre 1, the integration longhouse now lives in the cash economy, and 
the reduction in the number of active hunters signalled the rise of the hunter as a high-
intensity, profit-making profession. This meant that not all the kills were being brought 
home from the hunts, and hunting became an increasingly commercialised activity. The 
Bakun jetty market (Figure 6.6) is now held on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and these 
(especially the Saturday one) pull large crowds. Patrons include not just the people from 
Asap, but also migrant workers from the oil palm plantations, the hydropower stations, 
and even occasionally city folk from Sibu, Miri and Bintulu who can now access the 
previously inaccessible area by road. 
The reduced number of hunters, but the same demand for hunted pig and muntjac, as 
well as the increased demand from transient, migrant and visiting people, means that 
the overall demand for meat is higher than before. From the hunter’s point of view this 
means that there is always an insatiable market for bushmeat. The short times between 
market days means that kills can turn over quickly. As the number of non-local patrons 
to the market increased, the hunters began to get demand for specific kinds of 
bushmeat. Fishermen also get requests from city folk for the more expensive upriver 
fish such as the empurau, semah and tevengalan.  
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Figure 6.6: Bakun Jetty market. Cars of patrons can be seen filling up the car park and extending up the access 
road (Photo taken by Aerial Shutter Services). 
As demand grew, ‘traditional’ hunting principles began to break down, with the 
obsolescence of their knowledge of the lands. For the hunters, species that are not 
normally hunted for food in the past, such as pangolins or sun bears, become more 
prized (Figure 6.7). A small number of hunters have even specialised (possibly driven by 
varying degrees of desperation and greed) to specifically head to the hunting grounds 
just to hunt for pangolins. As pangolins sometimes try to evade capture by climbing trees, 
these hunters hunt with chainsaws, and would not hesitate to cut trees down to get to 
the pangolins which were being sold at RM1,200 each at 2015 prices (see Chapter 5.3.2). 
A walk through the market would reveal that entire family units of bearded pigs are 
often exterminated. While sun bears have traditionally been shot for food, these 
animals are now also worth more because of the interest of new ethnic Chinese 
customers interested in gall bladders and Chinese nationals’ appetite for the bear paws, 
traditionally reserved for royalty and one of the ‘Eight rarities’ in Chinese cuisine (Cihai, 
2009). Porcupines are also highly sought after for bezoar stones. Although most of the 
hunting is done with hunting dogs, the dogs are not always trained to detect porcupines, 
because of the fear of losing them to porcupine quills. This is an interesting, and 
somewhat irrational, perspective as hunting dogs are all trained to chase down and 
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corner, but not approach the game animals if they are still alive. Cornered bearded pigs 
or sun bears are just as likely, perhaps even more likely, to injure a dog than porcupines. 
 
Figure 6.7: Market kills at Bakun Jetty market. Many illegal kills can be seen, such as langurs, sun bears and 
binturongs. 
The large amount of game meat being hunted, especially to meet the demand for 
bearded pigs, muntjacs and pythons, have given rise to another group of people who 
are providing a service of convenience to the people at the resettlement site – unofficial 
retailers of frozen wild meat. These businesses are set up below their own doors in the 
longhouse blocks, are poorly lit, and have at least four large (750L) chest freezers 
containing the various kinds of wild meat and large fish, especially tapah. Verbal 
contracts are regularly made with friends who are hunters for stock to fill up the freezers. 
Mark-ups are by 50%, so bearded pigs, which are sold for RM10 a kilo at Bakun jetty 
direct from the hunter, are sold at RM15 a kilo in the village retailer. Bush meat is 
ordered on special occasions - but these happen all year round, as the majority Kayan 
and Kenyah longhouse families will hold open houses to mark various events, from the 
buying of a new car, or a child starting school, to birthdays to someone striking the black 
market lottery. Sarawak’s wildlife laws only allows possession of a maximum of 5kg of 
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wild meat, thus these retailers (including a former law enforcement officer) are in 
violation of the law (Wildlife Protection Ordinance, 1998). 
To meet the demand for game, especially bearded pigs, extraction rates can therefore 
be very high. A typical Wednesday market day would see about 15 hunters’ boats 
docked at the jetty, each boat holding at least one adult pig, often including piglets 
(sometimes alive) as well (Figure 6.7). The Saturday market often doubles the number 
of boats, including fishing boats, with customer traffic backed up along the access roads 
and hunters moving their kills to popup stalls ashore to allow boat traffic to flow. Given 
that there are two market days a week, a conservative estimate would see at least 40 
pigs brought to the jetty market per week, which in turn means that more than 2,000 
pigs are shot a year. This estimate does not include the hunting that is done by dissenters 
of the resettlement scheme, who permanently live upstream of the dam on floating 
houses, or the extraction carried out by hunters who are not from the area.  
The same hunters themselves do not turn up at the market every Wednesday and 
Saturday, nor are they in the forest every week. Most hunters also have small gardens 
on the 3-hectare compensation plot, often tended to by their parents when they are out 
in the forests (wives and unemployed sons often follow hunting trips). They are also 
ageing, with the vast majority of hunters being middle-aged. Young men in the 
resettlement scheme see hunting as a form of recreation and a mark of masculinity but 
do not see the activity as a viable long-term means of livelihood. The traditional glamour 
of hunters often being in close association with the maren during social events does not 
seem to enamour these young Dayaks as much as it did their fathers. 
The old guard of hunters are aware that their sons are highly unlikely to take up their 
dangerous and poorly regulated profession, an indicator that a component of traditional 
Orang Ulu culture and identity is beginning to erode. At a barbeque gathering at Uma 
Juman, a number of (slightly inebriated) hunters were in attendance, and many 
expressed the wish for their own sons to go further in school and on to better-paying 
jobs in more controlled environments. “Hunting, the money is boleh tahan lah (meaning 
not too bad). I (sic) only Standard six school. I have no paper. If I shoot two pigs, I can 
get maybe I can get RM700, and some we can eat like this (waves to the ribs on the 
barbecue). My kebun I give to my parents because his is very far.  I do many things. Last 
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time before Bakun I steal log (meaning illegal logging) also. I have gun, but the gun 
licence actually is my father. My son, now belajar (studying) electrical. Maybe after this 
pergi kerja (go to work at) offshore (rigs) lah”. A second one, whose son works in as a 
personal assistant to the director of a local company, added, “We also older now. Cannot 
everyday hunting. Maybe go one week, four days, bring dogs, shoot as many as we can. 
If some find tenggiling (pangolin), good lah. Then come back, relax. Bakun now is very 
steep. Susah (difficult) to carry and move the pig. If not pig, fishing boleh juga (is possible 
as well).” 
When asked how they can still keep up the hunting rates when fewer people are hunting, 
they point to the importance of hunting dogs. Hunters with larger packs of high quality 
hunting dogs are far more successful than hunters with no dogs or poorly trained ones. 
“That’s why young people hunting no good, don’t know teaching the dog (sic)”, is met 
with many nodding heads. Another important factor is the feeling of insecurity of their 
professions, which exist because various actors allow them to. Firstly, they require the 
people of the lands they ‘trespass’ on to allow them to continue to do. Secondly, they 
require that the wildlife authorities allow them to hunt without strict enforcement of 
quotas. Thirdly, they require that access is allowed to them from two avenues. Sarawak 
Forestry cannot turn the catchment of Bakun into national parks which is currently being 
considered (Borneo Post, 2013), and Sarawak Hidro cannot close the access road gates 
for ‘security reasons’, as is normally the case for megadams in Asia. Fourthly, they rely 
on authorities to continue to use their parents’ and grandparents’ ammunition quotas 
in order to have enough rounds to hunt. “Maybe tomorrow all stop, better now shoot 
first”, is the common attitude. 
The meeting with the hunters of Uma Juman also presented a great opportunity to talk 
about the location of hunts. The traditional boundary of this longhouse is included in 
two of the trapping sites – the furthest mainland site (Besuar) and the further island site 
(Avang). Few were willing to directly answer the question as to where they hunt, which 
was understandable as, officially, hunters were meant to hunt in areas that were under 
the control of their own longhouse. A slightly different question elicited some answers. 
“Can you hunt in the NCR of your wife’s longhouse?” 
“Can, like your father, he also Uma Juman but now he do his jelatong in Uma Belor area.” 
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“How about Besuar?” 
“Besuar is good, have many pig, tapi jauh (but quite far)!” 
Therefore, it becomes clearer that hunters would prefer to hunt areas closer to the jetty, 
and their hunts are legitimized by the fact that Orang Ulu marriages are uxorilocal, which 
means that the husbands often move to the wife’s longhouse after marriage. 
Many hunters see themselves as having sacrificed for their family. They often do not 
work their three acre plots because they have either given their plots to their elders or 
other family members to cultivate, or their plots are uncultivable. The reasons for giving 
up their own plots are often either that their parents’ plots are inaccessible or 
uncultivable, or that they are trying to get the family more income by combining plots 
to form larger planting areas. At the same barbecue at Uma Juman, another hunter said 
that if government compensated them with more land, they might stay home to plant 
palm oil or rubber or try aquaculture instead of hunt. In a conversation with two Uma 
Kulit hunters, both expressed disappointment at the execution of the resettlement. One 
is a dissenter who has decided to stay permanently up river, but occasionally makes the 
long journey to the resettlement scheme to meet with friends and get spare parts for 
the generator or outboard engine. He is one of the rare hunters who is young. He 
decided to return to live upriver because he did not do well in school and, as a young 
boy when the longhouse was displaced, he did not have any of the assets that would 
count towards compensation. As a result, he felt that people like him were marginalised 
in the compensation plans of the government. The second hunter moved to the 
resettlement scheme, but felt that the government washed their hands of the displaced 
communities once the people were moved there, a sentiment that was echoed in the 
previous chapter by many people. Hunting is a means of livelihood that he knew and 
could do reasonably well, but so is farming. His reasoning was a combination of the 
various reasons given by other people in the resettlement scheme. If everyone was given 
enough land, then they would buy meat or rear animals instead of hunt, and if he was 
taught how to use his compensation money, he might be a business owner instead of a 
land-poor hunter. 
From this, the roles of local various institutions in enabling hunting, and/or disabling 
other forms of livelihood constructions is revealed. Hunting is an activity that some 
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hunters embark on as (rightly or wrongly) a symbol of their identity, of Orang Ulu as 
people of the forest and as marks of masculinity. Some other hunters hunt because they 
feel they have no choice as they know no other forms of livelihood, as a form of 
economic necessity. This second group would be most heavily influenced by institutions 
and institutional barriers. In both groups, they would most likely be dependent upon 
inherited quotas for ammunition. Hunting is a regulated activity on paper, in Sarawak. 
Therefore, it is an activity that, in theory be enabled, or disabled, depending on the 
strength, and policy direction of the institutions directly involved in this regulation. 
Sarawak Forest Department (SFD) is in charge of conservation and enforcing hunting 
quotas, but their presence is virtually non-existent in the interior of the state, such as 
Bakun Lake. The police force controls access to the lake via a checkpoint at the gate, but 
would find it difficult to stop vehicles because ‘personal consumption’ is an extremely 
vague and highly subjective term. The weakness of SFD and the police as enforcement 
institutions are on display twice every week with bushmeat hunted and sold, even 
though the laws clearly state that bushmeat should only be for personal consumption. 
At the same time, even if SFD actively policed the lake, the lack of alternative livelihoods 
would simply drive the bush meat trade underground, and even encourage rent-seeking 
behaviour among enforcers (Brown and Williams, 2003; Dickson, 2003). On top of that, 
elected representatives also believe in the right to hunt, have participated in hunts, or 
have joined social gatherings where a wide variety of bushmeat is served. Although 
might be that the laws would have to change to legalise commercial hunting within very 
strict parameters, the current situation as it stands means that the position of the state 
and local elected leaders greatly weaken the state institutions, even if they tried to 
police the hunts. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the investigating the effects of the redistribution of human 
settlements, i.e. the resettlement and rearrangement of longhouses from being spread 
out along a river, to being concentrated in another area, such that there is only one 
access point, the Bakun jetty.  
Camera trap data indicated that there was severe impact of human activity on the 
distribution of and activity of the ungulates in lower areas of the lake. While most areas 
had been disturbed at some point by logging, swidden agriculture or hunting, 
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ethnography suggests that hunting is a strong factor in the results from the camera traps. 
Hunting is also often seen as an economic solution to the inability to reconstruct or 
create new types of livelihoods. Hunters think that they have to hunt as the 
government’s poorly executed resettlement plans have left them little choice. Even 
those with decent plots of cultivable land are often compelled to give them up to other 
family members. 
The increased accessibility of Bakun and the distance of the Bakun resettlement scheme 
has also further raised biodiversity and conservation threats in the forests that are 
realised through the hunters. The roads that lead to the jetty have brought city demand 
for bushmeat and alternative medicine directly to the hunters. The inconvenient 
distance of the resettlement scheme from the point of view of the longhouse 
communities has given rise to businesses that can stockpile and absorb large amounts 
of bushmeat which are then sold at marked-up prices to the longhouse folk, who have 
become passive price-takers. 
While the hunters generally are the price-setters of the meat market, they are also 
aware that their livelihoods are unstable, and exist only because they are allowed to 
exist. They rely on the people of the resettlement site to allow them to hunt on lands 
not strictly of their own longhouse origins, and they rely on a collection of different 
actors to continue to grant them access to the necessary access and ammunition to 
continue their livelihoods. For many, the instability of their livelihoods drives them to 
harvest while they still can. Local institutions and the hunters have formed a balance 
where the non-existence of enforcement allow them to hunt, but yet, if they do enforce, 
the hunters would run into significant, possibly even debilitating loss of livelihoods.  
This chapter has shown that as a result of economic symptoms (Chapter 6) which are in 
turn a consequence of problems with livelihood reconstruction, hunting remains a 
strong and prolific profession. Even though the numbers of hunters have shrunk, the 
nature of the remaining hunters (those who need hunting to survive and those who 
regard hunting as a birthright of their gender and ethnic identity) have shifted hunting 
activity from along the lake to the areas nearest the lake, forming a clear hunting 
pressure gradient. These in turn are reflected in the environmental symptoms such as 
extirpation of entire species, and adaptation by the target species in their activity. 
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The next chapter moves from a local scale to state and international scales. It is an 
examination into the politics of the major participant nations in the Bakun Hydroelectric 
Project, and how their own internal politics, coupled with their international relations 
targets influence and affect recipient states such as Sarawak. It will show how domestic 
policies disguised as international aid often end up creating power and financial 
vacuums that erode the power and negotiating base of recipient states.  
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Chapter 7 An Australian-initiated Chinese Dam in Malaysia: 
International Dimensions of Bakun 
 
*This chapter was presented at the Development Studies Conference at the University of 
Oxford on 12th September 2016. The panel, “Political Ecology of Rising China”, has been 
accepted as a special issue in the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and this chapter is 
undergoing review as a paper titled ‘China came, China built, China left? The Sarawakian 
experience with Chinese dam building’ since 1st January 2017. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
China’s corporations (led by state-owned giants such as Sinohydro), under the ‘going 
out’ strategy, are able to offer a much more parsimonious path to infrastructural 
development for politically and economically isolated governments, and at least 
superficially, also provide geopolitical and legal cover for their projects by rigidly sticking 
to Westphalian principles of non-interference in domestic affairs (Panda, 2014). This 
way of implementing aid and development assistance undoubtedly puts China in a 
powerful position relative to recipient governments, as there is no other source of aid 
without rocking the existing political boat which has (presumably) served the 
incumbents well. China’s position of power means that in their projects, they could 
easily choose to approach their corporate social responsibilities by fully embracing them, 
enforce a rejection or anything in between. These factors certainly played out in 
Sarawak.  This chapter essentially looks at two main areas of concern of Chinese 
involvement in hydropower projects in Sarawak and Southeast Asia as a whole. First 
Bakun is the clearest example of how Western green politics, despite their efforts, will 
likely not be able to significantly diminish demand for hydropower in developing 
Southeast Asia, and that Chinese hydropower corporations are well-placed to meet to 
meet this demand instead. Secondly, in the absence of Western green and corporate 
social responsiveness, the onus then partly falls on the Chinese corporations taking over 
these projects, which they clearly failed to fulfil at Bakun, especially in the absence of 
the requisite prodding by the recipient governments of Sarawak and Malaysia. This has 
resulted in adverse impacts on biodiversity and natural fisheries and contributed to the 
entrenching and widening of socioeconomic inequalities among the displaced 
communities.  
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Instead of looking at Chinese involvement in Sarawak as a siloed concept, this chapter 
attempts a more integrative political ecological approach, by also considering how it 
came to be that the Chinese ended up being the only viable alternative to complete the 
construction of Bakun. In choosing a political ecological approach, this thesis necessarily 
admits that the environment is a politicised arena. It then also follows that there are 
groups of actors involved, each with their own interests and agencies, and that the 
power differentials, established by the history of the hydroelectric dam and the lake, 
explain the environmental and socioeconomic symptoms observed post-inundation and 
post-displacement (Bryant, 1997; Bryant, 1992; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Here, 
environmental impacts are related to how a project that was considered a crown jewel 
of Malaysian development policy was but a small means to an end for Chinese domestic 
policy, where the environment and well-being of the displaced communities were not 
part of any considerations.  The foundations for this paper are first laid by the 
introduction of the rationale behind the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE). 
We then look at how green politics turned the Bakun Hydropower Project from an 
Australian-initiated endeavour into a Chinese-led one, including how the process played 
out in the experiences of the displaced indigenous communities. Finally, the paper 
discusses how the prevailing political situation in Sarawak and the stage of CSR 
development in China at the time created the conditions that made it possible for 
Sinohydro to avoid taking a role in mitigating the environmental and socioeconomic 
effects of the Bakun Dam. Five groups of actors are involved: Chinese companies 
involved in hydropower construction led by Sinohydro; Western (mainly Australian) 
corporate interests represented by Australian hydropower companies and Rio Tinto-
Alcan which was meant to buy the electricity from Bakun; the Australian green 
movement and Green political party; Malaysian interests mainly represented by the 
Sarawak State and Malaysian federal governments; and the displaced indigenous 
communities. 
7.2 Setting up a Chinese Stage 
7.2.1 The Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) 
Hydroelectric schemes, especially conventional hydroelectric schemes, also bring about 
several potential problems to governments intending to build them. Rivers have always 
been important to civilisation and human settlements. This is especially true in the 
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interior of Sarawak, where the extremely mountainous terrain has formed practically 
insurmountable natural mobility barriers to even modern modes of land transport 
(Windle and Cramb, 1997). Indigenous Dayak longhouse tribes are thus strung out along 
the massively complex system of rivers, and depend on the rivers for transport and 
confluences with tributaries for fresh water supply and fishing (Alexander, 2014). 
Damming rivers cause water levels to rise, drastically flooding forests, and food and 
fresh water sources (Dudgeon, 2000). Indigenous riverine and farming communities will 
inevitably be displaced. Besides economic losses, these communities also lose their 
historical and cultural spaces and infrastructure (Alexander, 2008). The environmental 
and cultural damage caused by dams can clearly be massive.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, hydropower is renewable energy’s 
marketing success story (Bird et al., 2002). However, evidence is mounting in the tropics 
that greenhouse gases from anaerobic decomposition of submerged biomass still occurs. 
(Rosa et al., 2004; Fearnside, 2002; Fearnside, 1997). This is evident from the Bakun 
hydroelectric dam site, where the smell of hydrogen sulphide is strong when the dam 
starts releasing water from the reservoir, and residues from the spray cover lamp posts, 
vegetation and other infrastructure around it. In contrast, in the rocky boreal parts of 
the world, emissions from hydroelectric dams are typically only a very small fraction of 
those of fossil fuel-fired power stations (Barros, et al., 2011). 
In Sarawak’s case, hydropower is an integral part of SCORE (Sarawak Corridor of 
Renewable Energy). Sarawak has traditionally been considered a poor state, although it 
has the third largest economy among all the Malaysian states, due to a large oil and gas 
industry (Jomo and Wee, 2002: 10). The state accounts for about a quarter of Malaysia’s 
petroleum production, and nearly 60% of natural gas production of what is the world’s 
second-largest exporter of natural gas in the world (Office of the Chief Minister of 
Sarawak, 2015). The income from the high level of productivity, although generated in 
the state, goes instead to the federal government and the state of Sarawak receives just 
5% in oil royalties (Puah, et al., 2012). SCORE is a supply-side prescription meant to boost 
heavy industry, the Gross State Product and incomes by the provision of cheap, 
renewable energy (Lau, 2015). This initiative is a Federal government led project, and 
the first dam and the jewel in the crown is the 2400MW Bakun Hydroelectric mega dam, 
a 2400MW facility powered by a 204m high reservoir (area of Singapore or Dubai or 
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Brussels) (Oxford Business Group, 2015; Sovacool and Bulan, 2011; Osman, 2010). The 
process of executing the construction of the dam was fraught with examples of 
incompetence and reluctance. Forestry officials managed to wrongly gauge the height 
of the dam and in doing so drowned almost 30,000 rescued seedlings of ecologically and 
financially valuable tree species (Sarawak Hidro and Sarawak Forestry Corp, 2013). The 
project was also initially handed to a business associate with political connections to the 
then Prime Minister of Malaysia under a newly established company called Ekran Berhad 
(Sovacool and Bulan, 2013) Smith, 2003). After the ‘completion’ of the biomass removal 
stage which disguised the collection and sales of the valuable timber from the catchment 
area, the company withdrew from the project. Biomass removal however still was not 
completed and another company called Wargana Consortium, headed by the then 
federal member of parliament for the area, took over that section of the construction 
contract (Velaairam, 2013). 
7.2.2 Australian Domestic Politics Interferes with the Bakun Project 
It is often neglected that the Bakun Hydroelectric Project is an Australian-initiated 
project, and as shown later in this paper, the reduction of Australian influence in favour 
of the Chinese did not result in better ecological and socioeconomic outcomes. 
Australian engineers in the 1960s identified potential dam sites, and Australian state-
owned companies Snowy River Hydro (jointly owned by the Commonwealth of Australia, 
and the New South Wales and Victorian governments) and Hydro Tasmania (owned by 
the Tasmanian government) were heavily involved in managing the stages of 
construction, in conjunction with the earliest contract buyer of the electricity, Rio Tinto 
Alcan (Australian-Canadian company; RTA) (Alexander, 2014; Sarawak Energy, 2010). 
RTA was to build an aluminium smelter in the nearest city, Bintulu, and in line with their 
corporate social responsibilities, assisted in the resettlement of the people, including 
the provision of a professional anthropologist to consult with the communities with 
regard to choosing resettlement longhouse locations, as well as in the design of the 
longhouses themselves. On top of that, RTA-funded the Asap-Koyan Development 
Committee (AKDC), which operated as an indigenous-led NGO to help the displaced 
communities, as well as maintain and promote their culture (Rio Tinto, 2013). 
The Australian influence in this project was soon curtailed in this and future dam 
projects in Sarawak for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Australian dam companies were 
147 
 
eventually confined to technical advisory roles, and finally gave up all together under 
pressure from green and human rights groups over the inevitable relocation of the 
longhouse communities. Secondly, cost overruns caused the project to exceed its 
budget massively. The State government insisted on raising pre-agreed electricity prices 
and Rio Tinto Alcan decided to pull out of Sarawak as well (Reuters, 2012). The Chinese 
then wholly took over the project, with Sinohydro completing the Bakun Dam, Three 
Gorges Corporation completing the Murum Dam and Chinalco signing an agreement for 
an aluminium smelter (Herbertson, 2012; Reuters, 2011). 
The role of domestic politics in Australia in the history of Bakun should not be 
underestimated. Environmental politics and the Green movement in Australia gained 
significant prominence in the post-war Australian political landscape in Tasmania from 
the 1960s to the 1980s through the protests against the Franklin and Lake Pedder dams 
(Bennett, 2008).  Tasmania takes its place in power generation history as one of the 
pioneer adopters of hydropower when it was used to light up the city of Launceston in 
1895 - the first in the Southern Hemisphere (Pierce, 2007). Hydropower has since then 
assumed a position as the primary source of power in the state. When the then 
Hydroelectric Commission tried to expand the hydropower footprint, it started a long 
period of protests from the failed attempt to stop three dams that formed Lake Pedder 
but ultimately to the abandonment of the Franklin dam project. The acrimony resulted 
in the downfall of the Tasmania’s state Premier (Thomson, 1985), and culminated in a 
lawsuit between the state government and the newly elected Hawke federal 
administration, the court ruling in the favour of the latter (High Court of Australia, 1983). 
The landmark Commonwealth v Tasmania case in 1983 became a turning point in history 
as it marked the end of hydropower construction in Australia. Green groups in Australia 
eventually came together to form the Australian Greens Party, led by Dr Bob Brown, a 
physician turned politician who was at the forefront of the Tasmanian dam protests. 
The tensions between hydropower construction and the Australian Greens were revived 
by the revelation in Australian media that Hydro Tasmania was involved in the Bakun 
and Murum hydroelectric project, which involved the displacement of the Orang Ulu 
communities along the associated rivers as well as the submergence of vast areas of 
tropical rainforests. The educated members of these communities also organised a trip 
to the various capital cities of Australia to spread the message of their plight and to exert 
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pressure on the Australian federal and Tasmanian state governments to bring Hydro 
Tasmania to task (Yoon, 2012), effectively introducing a new set of Australian actors with 
opposing interests. Within the Australian political scene, the Australian Greens had 
become a significant political force. The Gillard administration was in charge of a hung 
parliament, where the Australian Labor party did not secure a ruling majority. The 
Australian Greens became kingmakers and made deals with Labor to form government. 
On the back of all this, new Greens leader Christine Milne and Bob Brown supported the 
protesters (ENS, 2012) (Figure 7.1).  
“The people of Tasmania are with you and do not want to see Hydro 
Tasmania displace 20,000 people. That is a shocking thing that Hydro 
Tasmania would be taking people out of their villages and destroying their 
livelihoods be working with you and with other Green parties around the 
world to do what we can to not only save only forests around the world and 
rivers but livelihoods of communities and local cultures and saying to Hydro 
Tasmania ‘Get out of Sarawak now.'” – Sen. Christine Milne, Australian 
Greens. 
 
“Here in Tasmania, no more hydro dams are being built because of 
community opposition. But we learn that people from Hydro Tasmania are in 
Sarawak helping develop massive and quite destructive dams. It is my 
responsibility, having fought against destructive dams in Tasmania, to see 
that people who are affected by these dams are not only being heard but 
their wishes met. That’s not happening at the moment.” – Sen. Bob Brown, 
Australian Greens 
 
Clearly from Brown’s ‘it is my responsibility’ remark, he has placed a major Australian 
political force against the Australian involvement in a landmark Malaysian federal 
government project. Hydro Tasmania then had to front an enquiry before they then 
announced that they were pulling out of Sarawak, which achieved at least one of the 
objectives of the Orang Ulu delegation to Australia (Bolger, 2012). Coupled with the 
withdrawal of Rio Tinto-Alcan shortly after, two Australian corporations with sizeable 
corporate social responsibility capabilities and commitments had exited from what was 
still a complicated social situation in Sarawak. The responsibility of finishing the 
hydropower plant construction was now in Chinese hands with Sinohydro. 
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Figure 7.1: Youtube screengrab of Sarawakian protestors meeting with the then Greens leader Christine Milne. In 
this video, she demands that Hydro Tasmania leaves Sarawak. 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enip5030x2s) 
7.3 A Disappearing Act 
7.3.1 Political Conditions and CSR Obligations 
There is been an increasing amount of literature looking at Chinese CSR, the evolution 
of CSR as a Chinese concept and its philosophical differences with Western CSR concepts, 
and other differences in terms of application and compliance. Tan-Mullins and Hoffman 
(2014) briefly reviewed the emergence of the Chinese CSR concept. Chinese CSR came 
about out of trade requirements. Target markets of mass production in the earlier 
periods of Chinese economic and industrial expansion became aware of sub-optimal 
working conditions in Chinese factories. Pressures exerted on suppliers forced factories 
to begin to comply with a Western concept of optimal working conditions. Therefore, 
the first Chinese experience in CSR came in the form of their own workforce being 
recipients or beneficiaries of Western CSR requirements, and Chinese companies did not 
necessarily see that their original work arrangements were improper, but they changed 
practices for competitive trade reasons. Further developments in CSR requirements and 
further uptake of CSR practices by Chinese corporations were driven by the central 
government, again keen that they should not lose their competitive edge in an 
increasingly informed global business and consumer environment. If these, the Western 
imposition as well as the central government push, are put together, from the 
perspective of Chinese businesses, then their CSR activities are necessarily driven by 
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forces external to the core business itself, rather than an initiated reform of business 
practices. One could argue that this holds true even for State-owned enterprises.  
Another external motivation of CSR compliance within China is the emergence of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), especially environmental NGOs (ENGOs), that to 
the government essentially perform the role of environmental inspectors (Whitehead, 
2014). Corporation engagement with NGOs is very much a Western concept. Hence in 
large part, Chinese corporations would not voluntarily initiate engagement with NGOs 
or ENGOs in development sites. In the case of large infrastructure projects, contact is 
maintained only with their clients. In the case of Bakun, this would be the Malaysia and 
Sarawak governments, and the relevant agencies, such as Sarawak Energy. Given the 
necessity of exogenous forces to motivate CSR activities by Chinese corporations, then 
it could follow that, at least in the period of Bakun’s construction and immediate post-
construction period, there needs to be a political environment that would compel 
environmental mitigation and livelihood reconstruction efforts from Sinohydro.  
The history of the Bakun hydroelectric project was always one fraught with difficulties 
and government opaqueness. Construction of the dam had been announced, shelved or 
modified multiple times (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011). At the local scale, longhouse 
communities themselves had been told that they would have to move, then that they 
would not have to. These conflicting announcements created an environment of much 
uncertainty. When the project did go ahead, disputes erupted over compensation, and 
the calculation of compensation, with both sides accusing each other of dishonesty. 
Communities say that they had to go through two valuations of their crops and land, the 
first being two years before relocation, and the second just before, and that they were 
never told to expect two. As they had been expected to move, they neglected their 
gardens and fruit trees, resulting in significant devaluations in the second round. On the 
other hand, some longhouses embarked on large extension projects, creating new 
blocks and apartments in the hopes of being able to claim larger compensation amounts. 
The governments of Malaysia and Sarawak were also opaque about the process of the 
dam building, from financial costings to contract awards to environmental impacts to 
the relocation of communities. There are two environmental impact assessment reports, 
commissioned in 1994 and 2008, and one social impact assessment (Rousseau, 1994), 
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that are not easily available to the public. Perhaps due to the pressure the government 
and Sarawak Energy were under, getting interviews during the fieldwork period (2014-
15) from staff in the relevant departments was quite difficult.  However, much important 
information can still be gleaned from an earlier set of interviews (Sovacool and Bulan, 
2011). In particular, one of the informants pointed out that the results of the contract 
awarding process appear to be dubious. Ekran Berhad was the first company awarded 
the contract to build the dam, even though it really only had expertise in logging. The 
company eventually did leave after it was deemed to have fulfilled the biomass (logging) 
phase of the project. Another company, Sime Darby, better known for its oil palm 
plantation business, was awarded the contract for civil works even though, in the 
informant’s words, it ‘had never done anything remotely like a dam before’. This 
effectively meant that Sime Darby’s joint venture partner, Sinohydro, had practical 
control over the contract. Indeed, one of the reasons that Malaysia ended up having to 
pay for the whole project was because the processes involved in resettlement and 
assessing environmental impacts were not up to international standards as required by 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which was a reversal of an earlier 
recommendation to approve a loan for this project in 1988 (Conable, 1988). Clearly, the 
construction was going ahead without internationally accepted environmental and 
social safeguards. 
A common complaint in countries where Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
developing is that they provide little local employment, with substantial literature from 
Africa written about the Chinese enclaves that have sprouted from imported Chinese 
labour instead of the construction project creating jobs for the local workforce, and the 
politicised tensions between migrant and host populations (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 
2009; Park, 2009; Alden and Davies, 2006). In this respect, the Bakun project is not 
dissimilar. Local labour was not employed, with foreign low-skilled workers from China, 
as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, being brought in. Certainly, cost was a factor. It 
is claimed that the foreign workers were paid less than half of what a local would expect. 
However, Sinohydro’s prominent involvement in the Bakun project, with financing 
support by China Exim bank, meant that there was likely to be a significant Chinese 
migrant labour force.  
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7.3.2 Chinese (Non)Interactions, Marginalised Actors and Environmental 
Symptoms 
Informal interviews with the longhouse community members reveal a long history of 
Australian interactions. Australian researchers have long had a tradition of maintaining 
at least one anthropologist working in upriver areas, from the post-war period onwards. 
Therefore, it is little surprise when some of the displaced locals thought the 
anthropologists working with them to rebuild their livelihoods in the early stages were 
university or museum anthropologists. Admittedly, there is sometimes a little confusion. 
Australian missionaries brought Christianity to Borneo and established the de facto state 
church (Sidang Injil Borneo, or SIB) (Tan, 2016). As such, there is a significant attitude 
towards Australians for being benevolent foreign influences. A gap exists in the 
perception of Australians between the common folk and the community leaders of the 
delegation that arrived in Australia to protest against Hydro Tasmania as they spoke 
positively of the Australian consultants, and there is a general feeling that these 
consultants were doing good things for them in a trying period of time. For the things 
that did go wrong, such as compensation cash and land issues, access to the lake etc, 
they blamed the Federal and State governments instead, and not the foreign firms 
constructing the dam. However, Chinese involvement in the reconstruction process was 
conspicuous by its absence in these conversations.  
Conversations about the differences between Australian and Chinese involvement 
typically start with an acknowledgement of Australian presence and consulting process. 
This often draws out other stories about their previous interactions, sometimes from 
decades ago, with missionaries or other anthropologists from Australian universities. A 
number also recalled the name of the Rio Tinto consultant in charge of resettlement and 
reconstruction, as well as a community meeting hosted for high-level executives Rio 
Tinto in which promises were made for positive developments in reconstructions for the 
displaced communities. When it came to talking about after the departure of the 
Australians, there was little to say about the Chinese, usually apart from the 
acknowledgement that they seemed to have become the ones in charge, although 
almost no-one has ever met any of the Chinese executives or workers apart from the 
occasional passing by of Chinese trucks. Thoughtful, unsure and even stunned silences 
followed questions on whether they thought the Chinese should have taken over the 
reconstruction process the Australians had so abruptly left behind and the eventual 
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concession that they probably could have done so. So successful were the Chinese in 
isolating themselves, that they managed to 1) make people forget that there were 
corporate social responsibilities that they should have fulfilled; and 2) in managing to 
the former, they, in turn, deflected all the misgivings and anger towards the government. 
It is also worth noting that the small indigenous group that protested Australian 
involvement did not protest the Chinese involvement. The Australian departure from 
Sarawak created a corporate social responsibility void that Chinese interests had failed 
to fill. 
The inadequacy in addressing livelihood reconstruction resulted in a number of social 
effects that resulted in knock-on effects on the environment. Effective resettlement 
livelihood reconstruction requires finding solutions to a number of factors of 
impoverishment (Cernea, 1997; concepts covered in Chapter 4). These factors often 
need to all be addressed together, as the interconnectedness of these concepts means 
that the presence of one factor will bring about the others (Cernea, 1998). In the case 
of the communities displaced by the Bakun hydropower project, the primary livelihoods 
of the people were made up of shifting cultivation for rice and vegetables, fishing and 
hunting of mainly ungulates such as deer and bearded pigs for protein, and a small 
amount of cash cropping of rubber, cocoa and pepper. This was accomplished over large 
areas of land, which allowed for long, sustainable fallow periods to address land fertility. 
The relocation uprooted the fifteen communities from the Bakun catchment area of 
almost 15,000 square kilometres to a much smaller resettlement site of 4,000 hectares, 
with each apartment limited to a plot of three hectares of land to cultivate (Sovacool 
and Cooper, 2013). Complaints about the uncultivability and inaccessibility of the new 
plots soon arose and became a problem for the local government and a stick for the 
opposition to beat the elected leaders with (Chapter 5).  
Distance to traditional hunting and fishing grounds also became problematic quickly. 
The two rivers that run around the resettlement site, Sungai Asap and Sungai Koyan, 
became polluted with waste and effluents, and in any case, would never have been able 
to support the fishing requirements of fifteen longhouses. This meant that native 
customary lands remained the only source of protein. Returning to these lands would 
pose serious problems, and widen the inequality between the haves and haves-not. The 
fundamentals of the inequality rift lie in two areas – starting capital and assets, and 
154 
 
geography. The topography of the Bakun area is extremely steep and mountainous. As 
a result, the inundation by the reservoir does not form a ‘classical’ round lake, but a 
relatively narrow and extremely long one.  The customary land for the longhouse 
nearest to the jetty is but a five-minute boat ride away, but the customary land for the 
longhouse furthest away takes a whole day. Over the course of fieldwork for this project, 
the boat trip required 400L of fuel to and fro to get to the location of the displaced 
longhouse furthest away. For hunters from the latter, this means the need to get bigger 
boats, more hunting dogs, more powerful outboard motors, and bigger and better 
insulators to keep the game and fish from spoiling, and spend more time out. This 
requires significant outlay which few could afford. It denies reasonable access to 
community resources, is a form of marginalisation and causes the loss of livelihoods of 
these hunters and fishermen, with a knock-on effect of food insecurity to the wider 
community. Hunters and fishermen eventually reacted by working in the areas closer to 
the dam, in the customary lands of other longhouses, despite the historical taboos and 
the conflicts that these could lead to. The effects on the biota are significant. A camera 
trap survey of medium to large mammals done for the project (Chapter 6) shows that 
bearded pig and mousedeer activities and abundances are unusual in the sites close to 
the jetty while normal activity and abundances recover with upstream distance. Islands 
also provide a level of isolation or entrapment for species, and on one of two islands 
surveyed, bearded pigs, the most popular game, were absent. Fisheries have also started 
declining. The formation of the considerably still lake created islands of fast-flowing 
water, where streams and waterfalls meet the lake and concentrated but easy-to-
deplete populations of fish. According to local fishermen, the sizes of the staple catfish 
species have greatly decreased in the popular fishing areas near the jetty. One fisherman 
poisoned a whole tributary just to prevent others from profiting from his longhouse’s 
stream. A small number of people have tried to start aquaculture but, like hunting, only 
those who can afford the starting capital can embark on this endeavour, and this turns 
fish from a public to a private resource. 
Just as quickly as they appeared, the Chinese disappeared from Belaga as soon as the 
project was handed over. As far as the government was concerned, the compensation 
has been paid, and the people resettled in a place with schools, electricity and running 
water. For the longhouse communities, their problems were just beginning. Electrical 
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bills now had to be paid to the state utility company. Free hydroelectricity was 
apparently promised at the beginning but they were paying for power from diesel 
generators. Where once they had free-flowing streams, they now had to contend with 
an inadequate supply from a water treatment plant that was frequently choked from 
sediment and sometimes distributed muddy water into the pipelines. Problems with 
water quality and quantity persisted well into 2015 when fieldwork ended. Many land 
plots were also uncultivable and inaccessible. These problems prompted one prominent, 
outspoken Dayak politician, who also holds a PhD in Anthropology from the Australian 
National University, to lament that the residents at the BRS were treated like ‘nobody’s 
child’ (Sibon, 2012). At no point did the Chinese initiate any attempts to assist in post-
resettlement activities. 
7.4 SCORE’s Crown Jewel is but a Chinese Pebble: Perspectives from 
the Elite 
To understand the root and the source of the predicament, one must understand the 
perspectives and objectives of the respective governments and how these synergise. 
The rupture of the relationship between the Australian corporations and the Malaysians 
in the process of the construction of the Bakun dam is a case in point. Australians, in 
particular, a specific section of the Australian political elite, had strong views against 
dams and displacement, and similarly strong views of the sanctity of natural spaces, 
which the Malaysians do not hold. One can point a finger towards the Australian Greens 
for removing well-resourced and professional CSR actors from the construction process, 
in the resulting sub-optimal outcomes for the environment and displaced communities; 
but, on the other side of the coin, the Malaysians could have required the Chinese to 
pick up the slack, and the Chinese could have initiated the resumption of CSR activities. 
7.4.1 Malaysian Interests 
The Bakun Dam is a part of a larger scheme to boost productivity and achieve greater 
industrialisation of an otherwise largely agrarian Sarawak (Cramb, 2013; Cramb, 2007). 
The Malaysian government and other international bodies are aware of the pitfalls and 
possibility of the country becoming stuck in a middle-income trap (The Business Year, 
2016). Malaysia has a relatively poor, and gradually eroding record in attracting foreign 
direct investments compared to her ASEAN neighbours (Menon, 2014; Menon, 2012; 
Athukorala and Waglé, 2011). To fix this, and to create a ‘business-friendly environment’ 
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by the provision of more reliable and affordable supply of electricity, Malaysia embarked 
on a series of hydroelectric projects both in Peninsular Malaysia as well as in Sarawak 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011). In particular, the scale and ambition of Bakun meant that it 
would become burdened with the label of ‘crown jewel’, turning it from an 
infrastructural project into a symbol of national intent and pride. A secondary aim is to 
produce enough electricity to form a viable energy export industry to the surrounding 
states and territories (Lau, 2015; Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). Energy exports have been 
a consistent theme throughout Malaysia’s development, from the oil exports from 
Peninsula Malaysia, to the natural gas exports mainly from Sarawak, to the smaller, but 
still significant coal exports from Sabah (Malaysia Productivity Corporation, 2014; Leete, 
2007). Electricity can thus be argued to be an extension of the energy export industry.  
The construction of hydropower plants also has a second economic advantage in that 
although, the initial capital outlay can be high, running costs for fuel are eliminated, 
especially in Sarawak. The state is noted for the year-long consistency of river flows even 
in drier seasons. Indeed, the earliest surveys done in the 1960s under the auspices of 
the Colombo Plan by Australian engineers identified Sarawak as the best area in the 
region for hydropower, “and not just Borneo … meaning it would be a huge waste not 
to tap into it…” (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011). Using this and other tax incentives, the 
Malaysians are trying to attract energy, capital and labour-intensive industries to invest 
in the coastal development nodes (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). This is meant to help the 
economy move beyond a primary agricultural production industry towards downstream, 
value-added manufacturing industries. 
The thinking behind the design of SCORE is almost purely from a state level 
macroeconomic point of view. The information pages in the SCORE website cover a lot 
of information from the planned power supplies to the industries assigned to each 
development node to the ethnic diversity of Sarawak. The promises of ready supplies of 
affordable land, utilities and university-trained graduates are prominently displayed. 
Strikingly, the visuals are overwhelmingly skewed towards coastal and urban settings. 
What is not mentioned is that 40% of Sarawakians are rural with many wanting to stay 
rural and that the development of ‘ecotourism’ is on the reservoir that flooded the 
forested landscapes on Sarawak’s interior. The term “hydropower” is mentioned only 
twice, and Bakun is not mentioned in any of the informational text. At the time of writing, 
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a second hydropower station, Murum, is online, and preparations are underway for the 
third dam, Baleh. The construction of Murum also involved displacement of longhouse 
communities.  
Attitudes of the Sarawak and Malaysian governments towards resources in the interior 
of Sarawak has always been exploitative and extractive. Sarawak is the largest state in 
Malaysia and was covered mostly by tropical rainforest. Among the endemic tree 
species are numerous valuable hardwood timber species (Ekran, 1994). Since the 1980s, 
Sarawak has been one of the global epicentres of deforestation (Gaveau et al., 2014). In 
2010, the state accounted for 0.5% of the world’s rainforest by area, but 25% of the 
global tropical log exports (International Tropical Timber Organisation, 2010). A satellite 
imagery analysis in 2013 concluded that by then, Sarawak only had 5% of its original 
forests left intact (Global Witness, 2013). The same attitudes can be seen with Bakun 
when an interviewee commented that the construction of the dam turned ‘worthless 
water’ into ‘valuable electricity’ (Sovacool, 2011a). Government level discourse has 
traditionally used ‘native’ to refer to ‘backward rural Dayaks’, and development 
invariably would involve centralising their previously disparate living locations and 
changing traditional shifting cultivation to intensive, estate plantations (Cramb, 2013). 
This perspective is common throughout Southeast Asia, and substantial literature has 
been written on this from Indonesia as well (Elmhirst, 2012). Hence, the construction of 
Bakun would accomplish multiple objectives, including energy production, timber 
harvesting (during the biomass removal stage) and the chance to centralise the 
longhouse communities for easier governance (Jehom,2008). 
7.4.2 Chinese Interests 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy, first announced in 2001, was borne out of an observation 
that the heavily export-driven Chinese economy was very exposed to financial crises 
elsewhere in the world (Yelery, 2014). ‘Going out’ was seen as a way to diversify Chinese 
investments as well as to create new markets and demand for Chinese industrial output. 
As other researchers have pointed out, hydropower prominently features among the 
industries that have successfully embraced this set of policies. Others, such as journalist 
Jonathan Watts, noted speculatively the connections between the rise of global Chinese 
hydropower construction with the career histories of President Hu Jintao and Premier 
158 
 
Wen Jiabao as a hydropower engineer (including a period of time with Sinohydro) and 
geologist respectively (Watts, 2010).  
One of the reasons often cited for aggressive hydropower export was the saturation 
within the Chinese domestic market (Bosshard, 2009). This saturation can be said to the 
inadvertent result of Chinese domestic social policy. As a result of the construction of 
the Three Gorges Dam, critics of large-scale hydropower construction now have a focal 
point for their attacks. Both President Hu and Premier Wen skipped the opening 
ceremony of the dam (Mithen, 2012). The latter, described as a ‘populist by instinct’, 
also intervened in the construction plans of further hydropower dams in China, resulting 
in only a third of planned projects actually being allowed to start (Stanway, 2012). 
Clearly, this would have caused a situation where there was a glut of suppliers with only 
a third of forecasted projects to bid on. It would then be unsurprising that the 
hydropower industry would be among the most enthusiastic and aggressive adopters of 
the going out policy. 
One defining aspect of Chinese infrastructural aid or construction is commonly 
described as ‘no strings attached’ (Heng, 2012; McDonald et al., 2009; Yang, 2009). The 
Chinese government and corporations heading out of China for projects pursue a policy 
of ‘non-interference’, which essentially guarantees that the Chinese government will not 
intervene or participate in any domestic or governance matters within host countries 
(Strauss, 2009). This is diametrically opposed to common Western (World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund) aid, which often prescribes political conditions that have 
to be met (McElhinny and Heineken, 2013). A second condition is that the Chinese 
government pursues a policy of mutual economic benefit, which began from Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘win-win’ foreign aid reform (Yelery, 2014). Nevertheless, recipient 
governments have the negotiating room to ‘attach strings’, and some authors have 
noted Chinese flexibility in this respect (Hensengerth, 2013; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 
2013). Ultimately, it can be argued that China’s foreign aid policy is an extension of its 
domestic policy. For example, it is common policy for Exim bank projects to require that 
at least half of all required supplies must come from Chinese enterprises (Mohan and 
Lampert, 2013; House of Commons, 2009). Chinese aid is also heavily skewed towards 
construction, with Chinese corporations assuming the responsibility of building 
infrastructure, providing a base from which other Chinese businesses can secure further 
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benefit and a source of employment for Chinese citizens (Sun, 2014; Corkin, et al., 2008; 
Centre for Chinese Studies, 2006). The stringent requirements for heavy dependence on 
Chinese equipment, engineering and manpower also indicate an indifferent attitude to 
transferring knowledge and expertise to recipient countries (Nissanke and Söderberg, 
2012). These are again very different from Western aid philosophy, which is more 
grounded in liberal democratic ideology, as opposed to China’s disinterest in democracy 
and interest in profit-seeking (Alden and Davies, 2006). Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 
(2010) argue that China shifted from an ideological basis for foreign aid to an economic 
one. It may also be possible, however, to think that the Chinese foreign aid philosophy 
is still ideologically grounded, in that the Chinese tendency towards pragmatism in 
foreign policy, and the belief that they are themselves an example of an economic 
success in the absence of transparency, liberal democracy and yielding to Western 
interference, is in itself an ideology. 
Malaysia’s eagerness to complete the Bakun hydroelectric dam, a project that had been 
deemed politically impossible, and the scale of financial requirements for building 
possibly the toughest construction undertaking in the country, makes it an ideal 
candidate for the Chinese to assist. In addition, the Malaysians had done a social impact 
assessment, and two environmental impacts assessments, providing a level of 
paperwork foundations. The Chinese could then leave the issues from these as domestic 
matters to the Malaysian and Sarawak governments to address on their own terms. 
Chinese corporations then further benefitted from this experience by being awarded 
the contract to build a second dam upstream from Bakun, the Murum Dam. This clearly 
fits with the Chinese concept of ‘win-win’ in the ‘going out’ strategy. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In 2016, Sinohydro established a permanent office in Kuala Lumpur, the financial capital 
of Malaysia (Edward, 2016). This signals a very real possibility of further dams being built 
in Malaysia and Indochina, on top of their existing commitments. Many worry that 
further environmental destruction and community displacement could be in the 
pipeline. On the hand, there may be reasons to be optimistic. In the pragmatic way that 
Chinese factories reacted to demand better working conditions, Chinese corporations, 
especially the larger state-owned enterprises such as Sinohydro, and the Chinese 
government are also reacting to the global scrutiny of Chinese hydropower exports 
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(Bosshard, 2010). Sinohydro now has a comprehensive environmental policy agreement, 
including environmental protection, community consultation, and restoration of 
community livelihoods and income (International Rivers, 2012). Execution remains to be 
seen and may have to wait for brand new projects to come online. It may also be worth 
noting that Chinese overseas aid and investment towards resources and energy 
infrastructure may begin to decline as the Chinese economy evolves, such that 
consumption and services, inherently commodity non-intensive industries. This 
movement would reduce the requirement for resources, and China could conceivably 
begin to exert more stringent governance requirements to recipient nations (Dollar, 
2016). 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that conception of the idea that led to the 
Bakun Hydroelectric Dam and the other hydropower sites are Australian in origin and 
that the Australians left the projects under domestic pressure without providing an 
alternative solution. For Malaysia, a combination of factors, both external and internal, 
had channelled onto a path with left the Chinese as the only viable alternative to 
complete the planned construction. 
Within the ‘chain of explanation’ framework, examinations start from the local or 
individual scale and trace finances or political circumstances, or ‘zoom out’, into national, 
regional and state scales. Machinations at governmental and inter-governmental level 
almost always reflect domestic political situations or economic requirements. In 
Australia, there had to be a balance between a Cold War mentality of out-competing 
communist influences and the emerging political power of the Green party and anti-dam 
environmentalists. The Chinese on the other hand were also trying to extend their 
influence through what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’ (Nye, 1990), as well as finding 
outlets for excess industrial capacity and migrant manpower. These lay the groundwork 
for the unintended environmental and economic consequences discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6. The next and final chapter links all the scales and to each other and fully 
synthesises and visualises the ‘chain of explanation’, and finishes by introducing some 
policy directions, and practical solutions that have resulted from the work in this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 Synthesis and Conclusion 
 
Although political ecology’s fluidity and interdisciplinarity makes it a difficult field to 
properly define and set theoretical boundaries on, Raymond Bryant and Sinéad Bailey 
(1987) brought up three common working assumptions: 
First, costs and benefits brought about by environmental upheaval are never distributed 
equally. Every individual in a society has a pre-existing set of conditions that affect their 
political, social, and economic standing and outlook, and these differences account for 
the uneven cost-benefit outcomes. 
Following on from above, this unequal distribution, through the different adaptation or 
maladaptation strategies picked by individuals or societies, will either reinforce or 
possibly reduce existing social and economic inequalities. The different environment 
forces upon the communities and the individual new economic choices that either 
neither could adapt to, or only some can adapt to. Therefore, environmental upheaval 
also necessarily results in perturbations in the pre-existing political economy.  
Finally, a combination of the two factors above often results in the realignment, or 
repositioning of power relations of the various actors associated with the environment, 
which can range from global to individual. In this final chapter, I summarise and put 
together the preceding three chapters into a single narrative following Blaikie’s chain of 
explanation (see Chapter 3) to conclude the dissertation. 
8.1 Individual and Local Scale 
8.1.1 Economic Symptoms 
The empirical chapters began with the examination and discovery of the new economic 
conditions post-displacement. The most common complaints about the resettlement 
were economic ones, regarding the difficulties in livelihood reconstruction, and the 
perceived unfairness in compensation both in terms of land and money. The first 
entrenched inequality emerged as education, as it became apparent that the people 
who were left in the longhouses were often the older folk who did not go to school, or 
the younger ones who did not do well enough in school to be able to earn a good wage 
in the cities. For the Kayan families generally keen on inter-longhouse competitiveness, 
education became a battleground for glory, with Uma Belor and Uma Juman leading the 
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race, and have been featured in the state media. Those who do very well in school are 
celebrated, as are members of the longhouse who are in the teaching profession. As the 
level of education typically correlates with income and mobility, the situation has played 
out such that in longhouses such as Uma Belor, where there are younger people who 
are underemployed, but which at the same time has produced members such as a 
diplomat based in Los Angeles, or research fellows at universities, who are highly 
successful economically but based outside of the longhouse environment. Therefore, 
there is often a strong feeling of being ‘left out’ or ‘left behind’. 
The economic choices left to the people who remain the resettlement scheme are to 
either work the land, or try to return to their ancestral lands to hunt or fish. Due a 
combination of the inadequate amount of suitable land to farm, with lands being too 
small or too uncultivable, and the inaccessibility of some plots of land, with no access 
roads, younger people tended to give up their share of the compensation land to their 
elders, such that they could either plant in more accessible land, or occasionally, be able 
to combine the smaller plots to form larger ones. This meant working the land eventually 
became the domain of the womenfolk and the elderly. The exception here is the male 
members of some longhouses, who are usually the aristocratic class, who are planting 
oil palm. This means that for the remaining people, the best remaining option is to head 
to the river to fish or hunt. 
The resettlement and inundation of the banks of the Balui have created new 
environments for the hunters too, and these clash with the traditional expectations 
placed on the hunters. The fifteen longhouses that were moved are strung out along the 
upper Balui, with Uma Bawang and the rest of the Kayan (and the one Lahanan) 
longhouses generally closest to the Bakun rapids and Belaga town, and the Kenyah 
longhouses settling upstream of their Kayan counterparts. Each longhouse was aware 
of the boundaries between themselves and adjacent longhouses, and economic 
activities, such as fishing, hunting and planting had to be kept within these boundaries. 
However, there exists now a new reality. When living along the river, the starting point 
for hunting trips used to be the longhouse, essentially in the heart of a longhouse 
community’s economic territory. Today, the starting point for hunting trips is the Bakun 
jetty. Also because of the terrain of this part of Borneo, the lake surface is relatively 
narrow, but extremely long, instead of a roughly circular or elliptical one. Herein lies a 
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second entrenched inequality. If hunters were to comply with traditional requirements 
to hunt within their own territory, then those whose longhouses are nearest to the jetty 
would be advantaged, while those furthest away, such as Uma Kulit, would be greatly 
disadvantaged. It takes a whole day to reach Uma Kulit, and an empty boat to and fro 
would already need over four hundred litres of petrol. With a full load of hunters, their 
companions, dogs and a full load of kills, they would require large boats, multiple large 
engines and even more fuel. This cost is exponential as even fuel itself is a significant 
load and the boats would be expending fuel just to carry the excess fuel. Therefore, the 
traditional order eventually broke down and hunters would begin hunting from areas 
not within traditional expectations. There are also reduced numbers of hunters due to 
the inability to afford the capital costs to start hunting in the first place. 
Traditionally, hunting is one of the most important activities in Orang Ulu societies. It 
was an economic activity that many men engaged in, as it was easy to access hunting 
grounds. Gun licenses were also issued easily in the past (Chapter 5.3.1). This generation 
of hunters and gun owners are now old, and the weapons are passed on to their sons, 
who almost always do not have new licenses of their own. Contemporary hunters are 
thus, strictly speaking, illegal. Due to the reduced number of hunters, as well as the 
possibility of earning more cash, the remaining hunters also hunt and possess beyond 
the allowed quota of 5kg, as well as supply to unofficial retailers, and cater to the 
demand for bushmeat from city folk. Furthermore, the future of their physical access to 
the lake is insecure as the authorities have released a notice of consideration to turn 
Bakun into a national park, which would rule out any possibility of hunting in those areas. 
Faced with such levels of uncertainty, and occupying very weak legal and power 
positions, hunters respond by starting to hunt wherever is easiest, in as large quantities 
as possible, as well as hunt high-value species, such as pangolins. The loss of traditional 
hunting lands directly contributes to the disempowerment of hunters and is beginning 
to erode their status in the community, this is a demographic whose future is so 
intimately intertwined with their habitats.  
8.1.2 Environmental Symptoms  
From the biodiversity research (Chapter 6), the first consequence of the formation 
Bakun Lake is the altered abundances of various animal groups. One is the 
hyperabundance of primates on the islands surveyed. This is consistent with existing 
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evidence in South America with howler and capuchin monkeys and herbivores (Terborgh, 
et al., 1997). Bearded pigs, normally among the most commonly sighted mammals in 
Bornean landscapes, appear to have been completely exterminated from one island as 
well.  
A second consequence is the alteration of activities of bearded pigs and mousedeer. 
Bearded pigs, which are the preferred meat of Orang Ulu communities, exhibit 
significantly greater nocturnal activity compared to the other sites. On Pahak, 
mousedeer exhibited greater diurnal activity in contrast to the other sites. 
Finally, the data also show that muntjac and bearded pig populations recover by a 
significant amount at Besuar, the site furthest away, indicating that by this point it might 
be uneconomical to hunt. As Avang also showed relatively high abundances of muntjac 
and sambar, then it may be reasonable to suggest that pigs were selectively targeted by 
the chalet, and that it is around Pahak beyond which hunting starts showing diminishing 
economic returns. The data from both the camera trap survey and ethnography both 
conform to the hypothesis that hunters are only working up to a certain point on the 
lake. 
Both symptoms and environmental symptoms form feedback loops with each other, and 
this is where ecology plays a strong role in the ‘political ecology’ of the dam. Due to the 
lack of livelihood opportunities for occupations such as farming, many head back 
towards the lake in order to reconstruct what was familiar. As hunting pressure 
congregated towards the jetty, then fauna communities were affected in the way that 
was discussed in Chapter 6, by changing behaviour and abundance to the point of 
extinction. As competition increased from a shrinking resource base, some hunters 
resorted to hunting rare but high-yield species, such as pangolins, using unconventional 
methods, such as felling trees with pangolins in them. Even though hunters occupy a 
unique role in Orang Ulu society, the prestige the occupation carries does not necessarily 
translate into greater or better economic situations. Combined with the lack of policing 
of quotas and species hunted at Bakun Lake, the changes in the environment caused by 
hunting would in turn entrench economic inequalities, which hunters try to alleviate by 
continuing to hunt and further diminish the biodiversity on the banks and islands of the 
lake.   
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8.2 Society and State (Sarawak) Scale 
Hunting is an activity that caters to society’s demands, specifically, demands for 
bushmeat. Although much of the population of the communities have moved out of the 
longhouses to work elsewhere, demand for bushmeat may not necessarily be reduced 
significantly. Firstly, the taste for bushmeat is retained. Even though a number of 
families keep domesticated pigs, it is made distinctly clear that domesticated pigs (uting 
in Kayan) are for ritual purposes and their flesh is inferior to bearded pigs (bavui in 
Kayan). During Bungan occasions, the domestic pig is sacrificed and cooked. As these 
occasions sometimes involve the attendance of large numbers of people, bearded pigs 
are also cooked, but as separate dishes. It is not unusual to see people preferably going 
for bavui meat instead of uting meat, and some of the older members of my extended 
longhouse family at Uma Belor would rather have fish than uting. Even the members of 
the longhouse who work elsewhere, and the food outlets at the market of the 
resettlement scheme would sell bavui as their meat option, and not uting. 
The possession of a shotgun is a sign of masculinity, even one may not actively hunt. 
However, all men which I bring as field assistants to do the ecological surveys will bring 
their guns if they are in possession of one. It did not matter that they knew that there 
would be no hunting on ecological surveys – every self-respecting Orang Ulu man with 
a gun will bring it on any trip that involves entering a forested area as a mark of his 
masculinity. By extension, any man who has a gun, and who has the ability and means 
to hunt on his own, will get involved in this activity, whether it is part-time recreational 
hunting, or full-time occupational harvesting of bushmeat. One could therefore say that 
for men, there is almost an expectation that they can hunt, and that the value in an 
animal is often only realised by killing it in order to take possession of it. For example, 
my excitement at seeing the one and only slow loris in the forests (having been first 
trained as a primatologist studying slow lorises) throughout the fieldwork period was 
quickly tempered by my Kenyah field assistant asking, “Is that the animal you have been 
asking to go surveying for? You like it? I shoot it down for you?” This association between 
hunting and masculinity (and leadership) extends to not just regular longhouse folk but 
also politicians. Among the favourite recreational activities of Dayak politicians are to 
head to Bakun, camp and hunt. One particular member also called me to ask if I could 
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help him purchase an infra-red hunting trail sensor system from Australia, in order to 
aid his chances of scoring kills. This request was not fulfilled.  
From the above, we can make further inferences about the nature of the state. The 
‘state’ here refers to Sarawak. In Blaikie and Brookfield’s chain of explanation, the 
nature of the state is characterized by the strength of the government, the capabilities 
of the administrators, and the clarity of land tenure. The evidence collected in this study 
reveal that administrative and financial management abilities of state agencies are also 
questionable. In theory, the method of compensation seems straightforward. In terms 
of monetary compensation, all the fixed assets are accounted for and calculated based 
on a given amount that is predetermined per item category. However, the repeated 
revaluations and subsequent devaluations understandably caused much consternation 
within the longhouse communities. In terms of land, the people were first meant to be 
resettled to Sungai Penyuan, that was closer to Bakun, and were also promised ten acres 
of land. This patch of land was subsequently given over to concessions instead and the 
communities eventually moved into a smaller and more inferior area, and compensation 
land per family was reduced to three acres. On top of that, the level of neglect to these 
communities after displacement even prompted a politician (who is with the ruling 
Barisan Nasional) to describe them as being treated like ‘nobody’s child’. These severely 
impacted the abilities of the resettled communities to reconstruct and adapt their 
livelihood skills to the new environment, and eventually drove the hunters and 
fishermen back towards where the Balui used to be. 
Finally, the relocation has made tenure on the banks and islands of Bakun very uncertain. 
It is unclear who is allowed in, and what sort of activities what sort of people are allowed 
to carry out on which section of the lake. Anyone can enter Bakun to the jetty, as 
evidenced by the variety of people at the jetty markets, and there is nothing to control 
their movement to the forests. As mentioned earlier, the shape of the lake has also 
eroded the traditional usage rights to the banks and islands for hunting, and further 
entrenched inequality as the hunters that had to hunt further away were severely 
disadvantaged. Politicians whose constituency includes Bakun, but who do not originate 
from the Balui longhouses, also are seeking to hunt in these areas. In the main, the 
evidence points to the weakness of state institutions. Hunting quotas are clearly not 
enforced, nor are the protection of species in the ‘protected’ and ‘totally protected’ lists, 
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as evidenced by the open sale of such species at the Bakun jetty market. These 
institutions may also not be operating independently of state politics, as politicians are 
hunting in their constituencies as well. There is also no enforcement on gun quotas and 
licenses, such that hunters are hunting without their own licenses and quotas. 
8.3 National Scale (Malaysia) 
The promotion of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE), although centred 
around the state of Sarawak, actually stems from a federal economic strategy (Chapter 
3.3). There is a feeling, rightly, that in order for Malaysia to reach high-income status by 
the 2020 target, the government needs to close the developmental gap between the 
poorer states such as Sarawak with the richer states, such as Selangor and Malacca 
(Sovacool and Cooper, 2013). Sarawak, with its characteristics such as being a major 
tropical timber exporter, having the largest natural gas reserves and being the largest 
state with the most hydropower potential, does look like a good low-hanging fruit to 
pick.  Sarawak has been growing reasonably rapidly, averaging 7.8% per annum in real 
GDP terms from independence to 1997 (Okposin et al., 1999), and over 10% per annum 
up to 2005 (Furuoka, 2014). SCORE would boost Sarawak’s development by attracting 
industries higher up the value chain and move the nation’s labour force a primary sector-
dominated to a secondary sector dominated one. Even so, the task to reach high-income 
status by 2020 looks unreachable and the State government conceded eventually that 
2030 is a more realistic prospect (Borneo Post, 2015). 
While the development plans are in theory reasonably elegant, there are some issues, 
which put Malaysia in a less advantageous negotiating position. Firstly, the deadline set 
by the government to reach high-income status is getting closer. Time is running out to 
meet this target. Secondly, Malaysia’s economy has always been particularly vulnerable 
to global events and is unable to avoid hard hits from cyclical recessions (Athukorala, 
2010; Abdul Kadir, 2007). This makes it hard for Malaysia to accumulate the resources 
to pay into the usually long lead times and large construction costs of large dam projects. 
Indeed, previous attempts at starting Bakun had been aborted because of cyclical 
recessions. Thirdly, foreign direct investment rates are poor, so the country is hard-
pressed to generate high levels of funding within short periods of time and would have 
to take on large debts. Fourth, Malaysia has no technical expertise in hydropower 
infrastructure, which meant that they would have to pay over expatriate talent, and 
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hope that their expertise flows down, to any local manpower that would be working 
with them. With the shortage of both time and money, it is not unreasonable to expect 
a level of urgency within the government to push the project through. In this case, the 
project was pushed through without internationally approved social and environmental 
safeguards, so IMF and World Bank assistance would not be approved (Sovacool and 
Bulan, 2011). Yet, once the project was started, as a ‘crown jewel’ project of national 
pride and importance, it would have to be seen through to the end. 
8.4 International Scale 
The original idea for the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam, and the one that planted the seed 
for the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy, is an Australian one under the Colombo 
Plan, which was founded by a group of Commonwealth nations to develop Southeast 
Asia’s economic capacity as part of an effort to keep Communism out of the region 
(Auletta, 2000). Construction of the included Australian expertise and much of the 
power was to have been purchased by Rio Tinto Alcan, which also provided 
anthropologists to consult with the displaced natives on the reconstruction of their 
longhouses in the resettlement site. However, all these changed when Rio Tinto abruptly 
left due to disagreements with the Sarawak government, and Hydro Tasmania was 
forced to withdraw from the project by environmental and human rights activists 
angered by the forced displacement of indigenous communities. The Australian vacuum 
was plugged by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Sinohydro led the construction of the 
dam while the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (CHALCO) embarked on an 
aluminium smelter partnership with a Malaysian firm, Press Metal Bhd., to take over 
what would have been power supplied to Rio Tinto Alcan. These changes also affected 
the dynamics of the displacement. While the longhouse tribes remember interacting 
with Australian consultants, the Chinese very successfully isolated themselves from the 
local communities, even bringing in Chinese construction workers instead of employing 
local manpower. 
In recent decades, researchers in International Relations have begun writing about the 
increasing role domestic politics have played in shaping foreign policies. This has clearly 
played out in the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam. Chapter 7 laid out the how the shifting 
politics in Australia saw the rise of the anti-hydropower Greens, and how they played a 
role in the loss of Australian support and oversight in Sarawak. This created a vacuum at 
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Bakun where an incomplete project needed to be funded and completed, even under 
conditions that are non-compliant to new, tighter environmental and social standards 
set by Western funding agencies. All these created the conditions familiar to the Chinese, 
who stepped in to complete the projects. The Chinese have a long record of funding and 
building overseas projects elsewhere that have similarly suffered funding rejections, 
especially in Africa (International Rivers, 2012). Chinese conditions (Panda, 2014; Strauss, 
2009) for funding such projects mainly centre around domestic interests of both 
themselves and the client nations. In accordance with Westphalian principles, the 
Chinese would not interfere with the domestic politics around the dam of the client. The 
Chinese, on the other hand, would require that at least half of all procurement come 
from Chinese industries, and that migrant Chinese workers form at least a significant 
part of the workforce. There is also no agreement for technology transfer. Indeed, often 
Chinese dams have build-operate-transfer contracts, where the Chinese themselves do 
not just build, but also operate the dams themselves (Siciliano et al., 2016). Therefore, 
such projects are clearly meant to benefit the Chinese domestically by using foreign 
projects as labour and industrial output sinks. Local manpower have little to no chance 
build capacity and be ready to operate the dams, or even to participate in building 
subsequent ones. As client nations such as Malaysia are usually those that have been 
rejected for other conventional sources of funding, the Chinese are in a much stronger 
power position. 
8.5 Conclusion, Policy Implications and Applications 
To conclude, this study uses ‘Blaikie’s chain of explanation’ to look at the political 
ecology of the Bakun Hydroelectric Project, in combination with Michael Cernea’s 
impoverishment risks at the local and individual level. Within contemporary framings of 
political ecology, Blaikie’s version of political ecology has been criticized for being too 
strictly hierarchical or linear, and that the levels and scales described in the chain 
somewhat neglects the social construction of the various sociospatial components being 
described (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003: 3). Nevertheless, the approach allows 
integrative studies to form a framework that shows the interactions between each scale 
and between actors. In this thesis, the ‘chain’ has been modified from the unidirectional, 
hierarchical example shown in Chapter 2 to show the complexity and feedback ‘chains’ 
of the interactions.   
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At the society, state and national scale, it finds that the weakness in state and national 
institutions and societal perceptions of wildlife and hunting play important roles. A 
consideration of the dam in its historical context brings in issues with Malaysia’s 
economic vulnerabilities (with the flip-flopping of the World Bank’s position on financing 
dams) as well as the roles and interferences of the domestic issues of Malaysia’s first 
foreign partner and initiator of the Bakun project, Australia, on the construction of the 
dam and the resettlement and livelihood reconstruction process of the displaced 
communities. The combination of these issues led Malaysia down a path where China 
was the only viable and willing party to fund and complete the project. The change in 
situation in terms of corporate social responsibility and corporate assistance and 
expertise in the reconstructive process was a drastic one, and the Sarawak government 
was not able to pick up the slack. The relocation (and distance), the withdrawal of 
Australian support and lack of Chinese support, and the inability of the state government 
to compensate for the lost expertise translated to an economic triple whammy for the 
displaced communities. Those who were unable to handle the changes, returned to the 
lake to try and recover what they could in terms of familiar modes of economic 
production. The rearranged, jetty-centric hunting pressure meant that target species 
became hunted out or changed their activity patterns, further reducing the likelihood of 
hunters being able to lift themselves out of economic ruts in the long run. While the 
project covered only terrestrial sources of protein, it is highly likely that similar impacts 
would be seen for fishing grounds. The reconstructed and modified diagrammatic 
representation of the chains of explanation for the Bakun Hydroelectric Project is below 
(Figure 8.1).  
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Figure 8.1: The chains of explanation for the political ecology shows how the failure of economic reconstruction 
results in environmental effects, and how these can be attributed to failures and power differentials at greater 
scales, from state to national to international. 
8.5.1 Policy Implications and Applications 
Following on from this study, a proof-of-concept project was started in Uma Belor, 
beginning with the family that I lived with, that livelihood reconstruction is possible if 
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government level assistance and direct investment funding is sought for in a targeted 
manner. In the early stages of field work, the government began pushing the concept 
of government-assisted co-operatives. This could be formed by private consortiums 
such as small oil palm planters, or by families. My longhouse family had ventured into 
tourism with limited success, and as such, funding took time to accumulate and it was 
not easy to upkeep facilities and the appeal of their homestay and floating house on 
the lake. 
I encouraged them to register for the initiative, and the family’s co-operative was 
officially formed in 2014, and known as Koperasi U&I, using the initials of their elderly 
parents, Ubong and Igang. One of the requirements in order to maintain registration 
was to have properly audited books and financial records. I had helped to start a 
ledger and taught basic book-keeping to them. The following year, they had won a 
small grant to renew the beds in the homestay and bring in more comfortable, spring 
mattresses, replacing the thin foam sheets that is a common mattress material in 
Malaysia. As their backroom stabilised, we started engaging the political class, and 
invited them to an official opening at the floating house, and it was attended by the 
federal member of parliament and the various longhouse chiefs in the area. The lake 
has always been seen by the government as having huge tourism potential, and thus 
the floating house picked up significant coverage in the news media, as well as in 
government tourism websites. 
Networks were built through political characters. Further assistance soon arrived in 
terms of gravity feed water filters, from a Kuching Chinese businessman who also 
wanted to win government contracts supplying these to rural areas. Another offered 
to apply a new form of wood-plastic panelling to the wooden exterior walls, and yet 
others offered boat engines and extra petrol generator sets. Private commercial 
interests are seeing the floating chalet as a test bed for their products and a way to get 
the attention of the political leaders who are interested in, or require these for their 
rural projects. In turn, this saved a lot of capital for the family, and more of the 
revenue can be ploughed back into capital accumulation or other facilities. Within the 
first year, of registration, they were able to buy a new minibus to ferry tourists. In 
2015, audits showed that they were taking about RM105,000 in revenue. The 2016 
audit had seen it jump 50% to RM153,000. The floating chalet is now consistently 
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booked out for most of the year for fishing tours, visits by political leaders and the 
occasional wedding photoshoot. They are now embarking on building a second chalet 
on the lake, under their own financial power. Capitalising on the international 
coverage among NGOs on megadams and their associated lakes, I had reached out to a 
French NGO called HUDDA (Human Development and Dams), for assistance. In 
October 2017, HUDDA flew two members of the family to France as Sarawak 
representatives for the first conference for and attended by communities displaced by 
lakes. I had made them a corporate presentation and coached them, and at the end, 
they were selected by the investment arm of HUDDA, HUDDA-Invest, as a target for 
funding and assistance for further development, including sending French hospitality 
trainers. The investment, pending successful meetings, could be up to half a million 
euros, channelled directly to entrepreneurs in the resettlement scheme setting up 
auxiliary businesses to support the core tourism businesses on the lake and in the 
homestays. This would help the business raise the level of their clientele and help 
greatly raise revenues. 
The expansion of the business also meant that they are slowly becoming an employer 
of the manpower in the resettlement scheme. With some prodding from me, local 
people from the resettled communities are employed, as well as Indonesian or Filipino 
migrant workers to help with constructing new facilities or guarding the floating chalet. 
For bigger events, women and girls are employed in the kitchen. One of their sons who 
has a diploma in electrical engineering but is having problems with finding 
employment in the city also keeps his skills relevant by helping to wire the new chalet 
and install solar panels on the old floating chalet. The government is realising the 
success of this venture, and has encouraged Uma Belor to form a longhouse-wide 
homestay co-operative, with the possibility of up to one million Malaysian ringgit in 
funding. My family’s co-operative helped initiate and push the process along, but will 
not fully merge with this one, to main their business independence and momentum. 
Other adjustments had to be made to address ecological concerns that directly relate 
to the tourism industry. For example, on jungle treks, tourists would want to see the 
charismatic species, such as mammals and hornbills, and fishing enthusiasts would 
want to be able to consistently catch and enjoy the thrill of fighting a fish at the end of 
a line. To that end, a local fishery conservation system known as the tagang system is 
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being introduced to regulate fishing in some areas, and prohibit the activity in breeding 
grounds. Hunters have also been shown what birds and animals look like through 
binoculars, how birdwatchers are willing to spend to see hornbills or frogmouths, and 
how it is a much better and profitable occupation to lead Europeans to stake out salt 
licks for ungulates rather than shoot them there. While the business has not 
progressed to that stage, it has been made clear to them that efforts are being made 
to get there, and most importantly, in the new industry, their skills in tracking animals 
will not become obsolete, but instead be ever more important. 
8.5.2 Conclusion 
It takes two hands to clap. Instead of pushing all the responsibility onto Chinese 
enterprises, host governments also need to ensure that Chinese enterprises stick to their 
commitments. Host governments also need to reassess their energy mix requirements, 
with other forms of renewable energy. In Sarawak’s example, solar and wind have been 
shown to be viable energy alternatives, especially becoming more advanced and readily 
available (Shirley and Kammen, 2015). Where there is no demand, then there will be no 
supply. Western powers may also need to reconsider their hard-line tendencies on 
projects that involve displacement, as the Bakun Dam experience shows that a forced 
withdrawal in some cases may lead to even more sub-optimal outcomes for the projects 
that they leave behind. A little more pragmatism and understanding of the Asian political 
culture may be in order. South-east Asian governments in Indochina and the Malay 
Peninsula, including Singapore, are led either by illiberal or authoritarian democracies, 
or strongmen dictators. In these cases, protests to stop dam construction invariably fail. 
What is required is level-headed, pragmatic leadership to ensure the least destructive 
outcome for communities and the environment. 
The use of the political ecology approach, which in this case combines empirical 
biodiversity and ecological data with more traditional ethnographic methods, as well a 
modified chain of explanation model reveals that the force that most directly affects the 
environment post-displacement are the hunters of the resettled communities. Through 
mis-steps in the relocation efforts, as well as political factors completely out of their 
control, and not even in their state, they found themselves in a position where they 
perceive and experience great difficult difficulties in transitioning from a life along a river 
to a centralised, cleared, resettlement township where it is not possible to profitably 
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apply their skills. It is therefore natural that they should attempt to return to the lake to 
rediscover their mode of economic production. Due to the changes in geography, they 
experience yet more difficulties, and their efforts greatly affect the environment and 
economic potential of the area. 
The separate project carried out with my host family at Uma Belor, with tourism point 
to the fact that is it is possible to reconstruct livelihoods in resettlement areas such as 
Bakun, also by transforming the chains of explanation into ‘chains of solutions’. By 
replace ‘problematic’ levels and stages with a corresponding solution, it is possible to 
turn political ecology from an academic exercise into a practical, applied one. 
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Attached here is the manuscript of chapter 7 as it was submitted to the Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs. 
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China came, China built, China left?: The Sarawakian 
experience with Chinese dam building. 
 
Shun Deng Fam 
 
Abstract 
The Chinese entered the Sarawakian hydropower scene in a big way, with their first 
project being the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam, the crown jewel of the state’s development 
scheme, SCORE (Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy). In helping Sarawak construct 
this massive 2,400 MW dam, Sinohydro directly contributed to the displacement of 
about 10,000 indigenous people, the flooding of 700 square kilometres of tropical 
rainforests in one of the most biodiverse biomes in the world, and the fragmentation of 
formerly productive fisheries that were evolved to live in fast flowing water. Bakun Lake 
suffers from massive logjams as a result of the fluctuations of the lake levels. The 
formation of the elongated dendritic lake means that different communities have 
different levels of access to their ancestral lands, ranging from an hour, to a whole day 
and 400 litres of petrol resulting in various degrees of exploitation of resources 
depending of travelling time. 
Sinohydro employed little to no local indigenous help, preferring to import Chinese 
construction workers. This results in an isolation of the Chinese company from the local 
communities which they displaced. Prior to their pulling out of the project, Hydro 
Tasmania and Rio Tinto Alcan had been working with the communities to provide 
resettlement assistance, through consultations of the rebuilding of the new longhouses, 
for example. On the other hand, Sinohydro did not involve themselves with the 
resettlement process, nor did they help with the environmental mitigation process. This 
isolation is to such an extent that during informal interviews, many of the local 
indigenous people were aware of Australian help, blamed their government for the 
resettlement troubles but looked surprised when asked about their thoughts of the lack 
of Chinese involvement in their compensation programs, given the prior Australian 
assistance efforts. Instead, unhappiness with the results of resettlement is completely 
directed to their own government. This paper discusses 1) how Western anxiety to 
dissociate from such projects create markets for Chinese enterprises, which do not 
always result in optimal outcomes; 2) how Western dissociation anxiety places the 
Chinese corporations in a position of power which is used to isolate themselves from 
responsibility to the environment and livelihood reconstruction of communities 
displaced by these projects. 
 
Shun Deng Fam is a Prime Minister Australia Asia scholar at the Research School of 
Humanities and the Arts at the Australian National University, and a visiting fellow at 
204 
 
Division of Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge. He was previously 
trained as an ecologist and is interested in how energy geopolitics, international 
relations and culture affects environmental conservation. 
 
Introduction 
Urban and Nordensvard (2014) wrote that three conditions have caused China to start 
exporting technology such as hydropower on massive scales: access to resources, access 
to new markets and technological advances. First, there is a need to continue to fuel 
economic growth by expanding its resource base, which is quickly depleting after years 
of rapid economic growth. The Chinese government facilitates such access via the 
“Going Out Strategy” and state-assisted financing, which encourages Chinese companies 
to invest in overseas energy and resource sectors. Secondly, sectors such as hydropower 
have become saturated within the low margin Chinese domestic market and, as such, 
the first generation of large state-owned companies operating under liberalized markets 
needed to move towards international markets.  Thirdly, Chinese engineering standards 
have also improved rapidly within sectors such as energy generation, and this has 
provided them with the technology and skills to meet demand in a lucrative global 
energy market (Bosshard, 2007). Increasing public awareness of the dangers of carbon 
emissions, climate change, and renewable energy also help create the conditions for 
exporting hydropower technology. All these factors combined to result in Chinese power 
generation equipment exports becoming one of the best performers in the Chinese 
export economy. In 2000, power generation equipment exports totalled $26.8 billion 
and by 2010 it had become China’s second largest export, accounting for $309.8 billion 
(Dinh et al., 2013:52). 
As of November 2014 (International Rivers, 2014), there are 308 dams completed, under 
construction or proposed worldwide with Chinese involvement, of which 123 are in 
South-east Asia (forming 40% of Chinese dams worldwide). Of the South-east Asian 
dams, one in Brunei is for maintaining water supplies while one in Vietnam is for 
irrigation, while many others are for hydropower. The explosion in Chinese dam-building 
endeavour is startling when one realizes that, prior to the turn of the millennium, there 
had only been six Chinese-constructed dams outside of China.  
China’s corporations (led by state-owned giants such as Sinohydro), under the ‘going 
out’ strategy, are able to offer a much more parsimonious path to infrastructural 
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development for politically and economically isolated governments and, at least 
superficially, also provide geopolitical and legal cover for their projects by rigidly sticking 
to Westphalian principles of non-interference in domestic affairs (Panda, 2014). This 
way of implementing aid and development assistance undoubtedly puts China in a 
powerful position relative to recipient governments, as there is no other source of aid 
without rocking the existing political boat which has (presumably) served the 
incumbents well. China’s position of power means that, in their projects, they could 
easily choose to approach their corporate social responsibilities by fully embracing them, 
enforce a rejection, or anything in between. These factors certainly played out in 
Sarawak.  This paper essentially looks at two main areas of concern of Chinese 
involvement in hydropower projects in Sarawak and Southeast Asia as a whole. First, 
Bakun is the clearest example of how Western green politics, despite their efforts, will 
likely not be able to significantly diminish demand for hydropower in developing 
Southeast Asia, and that Chinese hydropower corporations are well-placed to meet to 
meet this demand instead. Secondly, in the absence of Western green and corporate 
social responsiveness, the onus then partly falls on the Chinese corporations taking over 
these projects, which they clearly failed to fulfil at Bakun, especially in the absence of 
the requisite prodding by the recipient governments of Sarawak and Malaysia. This has 
resulted in adverse impacts on biodiversity, natural fisheries and contributed to the 
entrenching and widening of socioeconomic inequalities among the displaced 
communities.  
Instead of looking at Chinese involvement in Sarawak as a siloed concept, this paper 
attempts a more integrative political ecological approach, by also considering how it 
came to be that the Chinese ended up being the only viable alternative to complete the 
construction of Bakun. In choosing a political ecological approach, this paper necessarily 
admits that the environment has to be a politicised one to be with. It then also follows 
that there are groups of actors involved, each with their own interests and agencies, and 
that the power differentials, established by the history of the hydroelectric dam and the 
lake explains the environmental and socioeconomic symptoms observed post-
inundation and post-displacement (Bryant, 1997; Bryant, 1992; Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987). Here, environmental impacts are related to how a project that was considered a 
crowning jewel of Malaysian development policy was but a small means to an end for 
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Chinese domestic policy, where the environment and well-being of the displaced 
communities were not part of any considerations.  The foundations to this paper are 
first laid by the introduction the rationale behind the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable 
Energy (SCORE). We then look at how green politics turned the Bakun Hydropower 
Project from an Australian-initiated endeavour into a Chinese-led one, including how 
the process played out in the experiences of the displaced indigenous communities. 
Finally, the paper discusses how the prevailing political situation in Sarawak and stage 
of CSR development in China at the time created the conditions that made it possible 
for Sinohydro to avoid taking a role in mitigating the environmental and socioeconomic 
effects of the Bakun Dam. Five groups of actors are involved: Chinese companies 
involved in hydropower construction led by Sinohydro; Western (mainly Australian) 
corporate interests represented by Australian hydropower companies and Rio Tinto-
Alcan which was meant to buy the electricity from Bakun; the Australian green 
movement and Greens political party; Malaysian interests mainly represented by the 
Sarawak State and Malaysian federal governments; and the displaced indigenous 
communities. 
Setting up a Chinese Stage 
The Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) 
Hydroelectric schemes, especially conventional hydroelectric schemes, also bring about 
several potential problems to governments intending to build them. Rivers have always 
been important to civilisation and human settlements. This is especially true in the 
interior of Sarawak, where the extremely mountainous terrain has formed practically 
insurmountable natural mobility barriers to even modern modes of land transport 
(Windle and Cramb, 1997). Indigenous Dayak longhouse tribes are thus strung out along 
the massively complex system of rivers and depend on the rivers for transport and 
confluences with tributaries for fresh water supply and fishing (Alexander, 2014). 
Damming rivers cause water levels to rise, drastically flooding forests, and food and 
fresh water sources (Dudgeon, 2000). Indigenous riverine and farming communities will 
inevitably be displaced. Besides economic losses, these communities also lose their 
historical and cultural spaces and infrastructure (Alexander, 2008). The environmental 
and cultural damage caused by dams can clearly be massive.  
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A great part of hydropower’s attraction to policy makers can be attributed to the 
marketing of ‘renewable’ or ‘green’ energy (Bird et al., 2002). Clearly, in hydropower, no 
fuel is combusted in electricity generation. In recent years, however, much 
environmental opposition arose to counter these ‘green’ claims. Although no fossil fuel 
is burnt to generate electricity, it is possible for hydroelectric plants to produce higher 
levels of greenhouse gases than some fossil fuel-fired plants (Fearnside, 1997). 
Greenhouse gases in hydroelectric plants are produced by the anaerobic decomposition 
that happens underwater, especially in tropical areas where there are large areas of 
rainforests or other areas such as farmland that contain large amounts of plant biomass 
(Rosa et al., 2004; Fearnside, 2002). This is evident at the Bakun hydroelectric dam site, 
where the smell of hydrogen sulphide is strong when the dam starts releasing water 
from the reservoir, and residues from the spray cover lamp posts, vegetation and other 
infrastructure around it. In contrast, in the rocky boreal parts of the world, emissions 
from hydroelectric dams are typically only a very small fraction of fossil fuel-fired power 
stations (Barros, et al., 2011). 
In Sarawak’s case, hydropower is an integral part of SCORE (Sarawak Corridor of 
Renewable Energy). Sarawak has traditionally been considered a poor state, although it 
has the third largest economy among all the Malaysian states, due to a large oil and gas 
industry (Jomo and Wee, 2002: 10). The state accounts for about a quarter of Malaysia’s 
petroleum production, and nearly 60% of natural gas production of what is the world’s 
second largest exporter of natural gas in the world (Office of the Chief Minister of 
Sarawak, 2015). The income from the high level of productivity, although generated in 
the state, goes instead to the federal government and the state of Sarawak receives just 
5% in oil royalties (Puah, et al., 2012). SCORE is a supply-side prescription meant to boost 
heavy industry, the Gross State Product and incomes by the provision of cheap, 
renewable energy (Lau, 2015). This initiative is a Federal government led project, and 
the first dam and the jewel in the crown is the Bakun Hydroelectric mega dam, a 
2400MW facility powered by a 204m high reservoir that covers 700sq km (area of 
Singapore or Dubai or Brussels) (Oxford Business Group, 2015; Sovacool and Bulan, 2011; 
Osman, 2010). The process of executing the construction of the dam was fraught with 
examples of incompetence and reluctance. Forestry officials managed to wrongly gauge 
the height of the dam and in doing so drowned almost 30,000 rescued seedlings of 
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ecologically and financially valuable tree species (Sarawak Hidro and Sarawak Forestry 
Corp, 2013). The project was also initially handed to a business associate with political 
connections to the then Prime Minister of Malaysia under a newly established company 
called Ekran Berhad (Sovacool and Bulan, 2013) Smith, 2003). After the ‘completion’ of 
the biomass removal stage which disguised the collection and sales of the valuable 
timber from the catchment area, the company withdrew from the project. Biomass 
removal however still was not completed and another company called Warghana 
Consortium, headed by the then federal member of parliament for the area, took over 
that section of the construction contract (Velaairam, 2013). 
Australian Domestic Politics Interferes with the Bakun Project 
It is often neglected that the Bakun Hydroelectric Project is an Australian-initiated 
project, and as shown later in this paper, the reduction of Australian influence in favour 
of the Chinese did not result in better ecological and socioeconomic outcomes. 
Australian engineers in the 1960s identified potential dam sites, and Australian state-
owned companies Snowy River Hydro (jointly owned by the Commonwealth of Australia, 
and the New South Wales and Victorian governments) and Hydro Tasmania (owned by 
the Tasmanian government) was heavily involved in managing the stages of construction, 
in conjunction with the earliest contract buyer of the electricity, Rio Tinto Alcan 
(Australian-Canadian company; RTA) (Alexander, 2014; Sarawak Energy, 2010). RTA was 
to build an aluminium smelter in the nearest city Bintulu, and in line with their corporate 
social responsibilities, assisted in the resettlement of the people, including the provision 
of a professional anthropologist to consult with the communities with regards to 
choosing resettlement longhouse locations, as well as in the design of the longhouses 
themselves. On top of that, RTA funded the Asap-Koyan Development Committee 
(AKDC), which operated as an indigenous-led NGO to help the displaced communities, 
as well as maintain and promote their culture (Rio Tinto, 2013). 
The Australian influence in this project was soon curtailed in this and future dam 
projects in Sarawak for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Australian dam companies were 
eventually confined to technical advisory roles, and finally gave up all together under 
pressure from green and human rights groups over the inevitable relocation of the 
longhouse communities. Secondly, cost overruns, caused the project to exceed its 
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budget massively. The State government insisted on raising pre-agreed electricity prices 
and Rio Tinto Alcan decided to pull out of Sarawak as well (Reuters, 2012). The Chinese 
then wholly took over the project, with Sinohydro completing the Bakun Dam, Three 
Gorges Corporation completing the Murum Dam and Chinalco signing an agreement for 
an aluminium smelter (Herbertson, 2012; Reuters, 2011). 
The role of domestic politics in Australia in history of Bakun should not be 
underestimated. Environmental politics and the Green movement in Australia achieved 
gained significant prominence in the post-war Australian political landscape in Tasmania 
from the 1960s to the 1980s through the protests against the Franklin and Lake Pedder 
dams (Bennett, 2008).  Tasmania takes its place in power generation history as one of 
the pioneer adopters of hydropower when it was used to light up the city of Launceston 
in 1895 - the first in the Southern Hemisphere (Pierce, 2007). Hydropower has since then 
assumed a position as the primary source of power in the state. When the then 
Hydroelectric Commission tried to expand the hydropower footprint, it started a long 
period of protests from the failed attempt to stop three dams that formed Lake Pedder 
but ultimately to the abandonment of the Franklin dam project. The acrimony resulted 
in the downfall of the Tasmania’s state Premier (Thomson, 1985), and culminated in a 
lawsuit between the state government and the newly elected Hawke administration 
that ruled in the favour of the latter (High Court of Australia, 1983). The landmark 
Commonwealth v Tasmania case in 1983 became a turning point in history as it marked 
the end of hydropower construction in Australia. Green groups in Australia eventually 
came together to form the Australian Greens, led by Dr. Bob Brown, a physician turned 
politician who was at the forefront of the Tasmanian dam protests. 
The tensions between hydropower construction and the Australian Greens were revived 
by the revelation in Australian media that Hydro Tasmania was involved in the Bakun 
and Murum hydroelectric project, which involved the displacement of the Orang Ulu 
communities along the associated rivers as well as the submergence of vast areas of 
tropical rainforests. The educated members of these communities also organized a trip 
to the various capital cities of Australia to spread the message of their plight and to exert 
pressure on the Australian federal and Tasmanian state governments to bring Hydro 
Tasmania to task (Yoon, 2012), effectively introducing a new set of Australian actors with 
opposing interests. Within the Australian political scene, the Australian Greens had 
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become a significant political force. The Gillard administration was in charge of a hung 
parliament, where the Australian Labor party did not secure a ruling majority. The 
Australian Greens became kingmakers and made deals with Labor to form government. 
On the back of these, new Green leader Christine Milne and Bob Brown supported the 
protesters (ENS, 2012).  
“The people of Tasmania are with you and do not want to see Hydro 
Tasmania displace 20,000 people. That is a shocking thing that Hydro 
Tasmania would be taking people out of their villages and destroying their 
livelihoods be working with you and with other Green parties around the 
world to do what we can to not only save only forests around the world and 
rivers but livelihoods of communities and local cultures and saying to Hydro 
Tasmania ‘Get out of Sarawak now.'” – Sen. Christine Milne, Australian 
Greens. 
 
“Here in Tasmania, no more hydro dams are being built because of 
community opposition. But we learn that people from Hydro Tasmania are in 
Sarawak helping develop massive and quite destructive dams. It is my 
responsibility, having fought against destructive dams in Tasmania, to see 
that people who are affected by these dams are not only being heard but 
their wishes met. That’s not happening at the moment.” – Sen. Bob Brown, 
Australian Greens 
Clearly from Brown’s ‘it is my responsibility’ remark, he has placed a major Australian political 
force against the Australian involvement in a landmark Malaysian federal government project. 
Hydro Tasmania then had to front an enquiry before they then announced that they were pulling 
out of Sarawak, which achieved at least one of the objectives of the Orang Ulu delegation to 
Australia (Bolger, 2012). Coupled with the withdrawal of Rio Tinto-Alcan shortly after, two 
Australian corporations with sizeable corporate social responsibility capabilities and 
commitments had exited from what was still a complicated social situation in Sarawak. The 
responsibility of finishing the hydropower plant constructed was now in Chinese hands with 
Sinohydro. 
A Disappearing Act 
Political Conditions and CSR Obligations 
There is been an increasing amount of literature looking at Chinese CSR, the evolution 
of CSR as a Chinese concept and its philosophical differences with Western CSR concepts, 
and other differences in terms of application and compliance. Tan-Mullins and Hoffman 
(2014) briefly reviewed the emergence of a Chinese CSR concept. Chinese CSR came 
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about out of trade requirements. Target markets of mass production in the earlier 
periods of Chinese economic and industrial expansion became aware of sub-optimal 
working conditions in Chinese factories. Pressures exerted on suppliers forced factories 
to begin to comply to a Western concept of optimal working conditions. Therefore, the 
first Chinese experience in CSR came in the form of their own workforce being recipients 
or beneficiaries of Western CSR requirements and that Chinese companies did not 
necessarily see that their original work arrangements were improper, but that they 
changed practices for competitive trade reasons. Further developments in CSR 
requirements and further uptake of CSR practices by Chinese corporations were driven 
by the central government, again keen that they should not lose their competitive edge 
in an increasingly informed global business and consumer environment. If these, the 
Western imposition as well as the central government push, are put together, from the 
perspective of Chinese businesses, then their CSR activities are necessarily driven by 
forces external to the core business itself, rather than an initiated reform of business 
practices. One could argue that this holds true even for State-owned enterprises.  
Another external motivation of CSR compliance within China is the emergence of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), especially environmental NGOs (ENGOs), that to 
the government, essentially perform the role of environmental inspectors (Whitehead, 
2014). Corporation engagement with NGOs are very much a Western concept. Hence in 
large part, Chinese corporations would not voluntarily initiate engagement with NGOs 
or ENGOs in development sites. In the case of large infrastructure projects, contact is 
only maintained with their clients. In the case of Bakun, this would be the Malaysia and 
Sarawak governments, and the relevant agencies, such as Sarawak Energy. Given the 
necessity of exogenous forces to motivate CSR activities by Chinese corporations, then 
it could follow that whether or not, at least in the period of time of Bakun’s construction 
and immediate post-construction period, there needs to be a political environment that 
would compel environmental mitigation and livelihood reconstruction efforts from 
Sinohydro.  
The history of the Bakun hydroelectric project was always one fraught with difficulties 
and government opaqueness. Construction of the dam had been announced, shelved or 
modified multiple times (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011). At the local scale, longhouse 
communities themselves had been told that they would have to move, then not to move. 
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These conflicting announcements created an environment of much uncertainty. When 
the project did go ahead, disputes erupted over compensation, and the calculation of 
compensation, with both sides accusing each other of dishonesty. Communities say that 
they had to go through two valuations of their crops and land, the first being two years 
before relocation, and the second just before, and that they were never told to expect 
two. As they had been expected to move, they neglected their gardens and fruit trees, 
resulting in significant devaluations in the second round. On the other hand, some 
longhouses embarked on large extension projects, creating new blocks and apartments 
in the hopes of being able to claim larger compensation amounts. 
The governments of Malaysia and Sarawak were also opaque about the process of the 
dam building, from financial costings to contract awards to environmental impacts to 
relocation of communities. There are two environmental impact assessment reports 
commissioned in 1994 and 2008, and one social impact assessment (Rousseau, 1994), 
that are not easily available to the public. Perhaps due to the pressure the government 
and Sarawak energy were under, getting interviews during the fieldwork period (2014-
15) from staff in the relevant departments was quite difficult.  However, much important 
information can still be gleaned from an earlier set of interviews (Sovacool and Bulan, 
2011). In particular, one of the informants pointed out that the results of the contract 
awarding process appear to be dubious. Ekran Berhad was the first company awarded 
the contract to build the dam, even though it really only had expertise in logging. The 
company eventually did leave after it was deemed to have fulfilled the biomass (logging) 
phase of the project. Another company, Sime Darby, better known for its oil palm 
plantation business, was awarded the contract for civil works even though they, in the 
informant’s words, ‘had never done anything remotely like a dam before’. This 
effectively meant that Sime Darby’s joint venture partner, Sinohydro, had practical 
control over the contract. Indeed, one of the reasons that Malaysia ended up having to 
pay for the whole project was because the processes involved in resettlement and 
assessing environmental impacts were not up to international standards as required by 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which was a reversal of an earlier 
recommendation to approve a loan for this project in 1988 (Conable, 1988). Clearly, the 
construction was going ahead without internationally accepted environmental and 
social safeguards. 
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A common complaint in countries where Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
developing is that they provide little local employment, with substantial literature from 
Africa written about the Chinese enclaves that have sprouted from imported Chinese 
labour instead of the construction project creating jobs for the local workforce, and the 
politicised tensions between migrant and host populations (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 
2009; Park, 2009; Alden and Davies, 2006). In this respect, the Bakun project is not 
dissimilar. Local labour was not employed, with foreign low-skilled workers from China, 
as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, being brought in. Certainly, cost was a factor. It 
is claimed that the foreign workers were paid less than half of what a local would expect. 
However, Sinohydro’s prominent involvement in the Bakun project, with financing 
support by China Exim bank, meant that there was likely to be a significant Chinese 
migrant labour force.  
Chinese (Non)Interactions, Marginalized Actors and Environmental Symptoms 
Informal interviews with the longhouse community members reveal a long history of 
Australian interactions. Australian researchers have long had a tradition of maintaining 
at least one anthropologist working in upriver areas, from the post-war period onwards. 
Therefore, it is little surprise when some of the displaced locals thought the 
anthropologists working with them to rebuild their livelihoods in the early stages were 
university or museum anthropologists. Admittedly, there is sometimes a little confusion. 
Australian missionaries brought Christianity to Borneo and established the de facto state 
church (Sidang Injil Borneo, or SIB) (Chee-Beng, 2016). As such, there is a significant 
attitude towards Australians for being benevolent foreign influences. A gap exists in 
perception of Australians between the common folk and the community leaders of the 
delegation that arrived in Australia to protest against Hydro Tasmania as they spoke 
positively of the Australian consultants and there is a general feeling that these 
consultants were doing good things for them in a trying period of time. For the things 
that did go wrong, such as compensation cash and land issues, access to the lake etc, 
they blamed the Federal and State governments instead, and not the foreign firms 
constructing the dam. However, Chinese involvement in the reconstruction process was 
conspicuous by its absence in these conversations.  
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Conversations about the differences between Australian and Chinese involvement 
typically start with an acknowledgement of Australian presence and consulting process. 
This often draws out other stories about their previous interactions, sometimes from 
decades ago, with missionaries or other anthropologists from Australian universities. A 
number also recalled the name of the Rio Tinto consultant in charge of resettlement and 
reconstruction, as well as a community meeting hosted for high level executives Rio 
Tinto in which promises were made for positive developments in reconstructions for the 
displaced communities. When it came to talking about after the departure of the 
Australians, there was little to say about the Chinese, usually apart from the 
acknowledgement that they seemed to have become the ones in charge, although 
almost all have never met any of the Chinese executives or workers apart from the 
occasional passing by of Chinese trucks. Thoughtful, unsure and even stunned silences 
followed questions on whether they thought the Chinese should have taken over the 
reconstruction process the Australians had so abruptly left behind and the eventual 
concession that they probably could have done so. So successful were the Chinese in 
isolating themselves, that they managed to 1) make people forget that there were 
corporate social responsibilities that they should have fulfilled; and 2) in managing to 
the former, they in turn deflected all the misgivings and anger towards the government. 
It is also worth noting that the small indigenous group that protested Australian 
involvement did not protest the Chinese involvement. The Australian departure from 
Sarawak created a corporate social responsibility void that Chinese interests had failed 
to fill. 
The inadequacy in addressing livelihood reconstruction resulted in a number of social 
effects that resulted in knock-on effects on the environment. Effective resettlement 
livelihood reconstruction requires finding solutions to a number of factors of 
impoverishment: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization and 
healthlessness (Cernea, 1997). These factors often need to all be addressed together, as 
the interconnectedness of these concepts means that the presence of one factor will 
bring about the others (Cernea, 1998). For example, marginalization in a new 
resettlement area could lead joblessness and the crippling of one’s finances which cause 
homelessness, landlessness and healthlessness. In the case of the communities 
displaced by the Bakun hydropower project, the primary livelihoods of the people were 
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made up of shifting cultivation for rice and vegetables, fishing and hunting of mainly 
ungulates such as deer and bearded pigs for protein and a small amount of cash cropping 
of rubber, cocoa and pepper. This was accomplished over large areas of land, which 
allowed for long, sustainable fallow periods to address land fertility. The relocation 
uprooted the fifteen communities from the Bakun catchment area of almost 15,000 
square kilometers to a much smaller resettlement site of 4,000 hectares, with each 
apartment limited to a plot of three hectares of land to cultivate (Sovacool and Cooper, 
2013). Complaints about the uncultivability and inaccessibility of the new plots soon 
arose and became a problem for the local government and a stick for the opposition to 
beat the elected leaders with.  
Distance to traditional hunting and fishing grounds also became problematic quickly. 
The two rivers that run around the resettlement site, Sungai Asap and Sungai Koyan, 
became polluted with waste and effluents, and in any case, would never have been able 
to support the fishing requirements of fifteen longhouses. This meant that native 
customary lands remained the only source of protein. Returning to these lands would 
pose serious problems, and widens the inequality between the haves and haves-not. 
The fundamentals of the inequality rift lie in two areas – starting capital and assets, and 
geography. The topography of the Bakun area is extremely steep and mountainous. As 
a result, the inundation by the reservoir does not form a ‘classical’ round lake, but a 
relatively narrow, and extremely long one.  The customary land for the longhouse 
nearest to the jetty is but a five-minute boat ride away, but the customary land for the 
longhouse furthest away takes a whole day. Over the course of fieldwork for this project, 
the boat trip required 400L of fuel to and fro to get to the location of the displaced 
longhouse furthest away. For hunters from the latter this means the need to get bigger 
boats, more hunting dogs, more powerful outboard motors, and bigger and better 
insulators to keep the game and fish from spoiling, and spend more time out. This 
requires significant outlay which few could afford. It denies reasonable access to 
community resources, is a form of marginalization and causes the loss of livelihoods of 
these hunters and fishermen, with a knock-on effect of food insecurity to the wider 
community. Hunters and fishermen eventually reacted by working in the areas closer to 
the dam, in the customary lands of other longhouses, in spite of the historical taboos 
and the conflicts that these could lead to. The effects on the biota is significant. A camera 
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trap survey of medium to large mammals done for the project which this paper is also a 
part of, shows that animal activities are exclusively nocturnal in the site closest to the 
jetty while diurnal activity recovers with upstream distance (unpublished data). Islands 
also provide a level of isolation or entrapment for species and, on one of two islands 
surveyed, bearded pigs, the most popular game, were absent. Fisheries have also started 
declining. The formation of the considerably still lake created islands of fast-flowing 
water, where streams and waterfalls meet the lake, and concentrated but easy-to-
deplete populations of fish. According to local fishermen, the sizes of the staple catfish 
species have greatly decreased in the popular fishing areas near the jetty. One fisherman 
poisoned a whole tributary just to prevent others from profiting from his longhouse’s 
stream. A small number of people have tried to start aquaculture, but like hunting, only 
those who can afford the starting capital can embark on this endeavour, and this turns 
fish from a public to a private resource. 
Just as quickly as they appeared, the Chinese disappeared from Belaga as soon as the 
project was handed over. As far as the government was concerned, the compensation 
has been paid, and the people resettled in a place with schools, electricity and running 
water. For the longhouse communities, their problems were just beginning. Electrical 
bills now had to be paid to the state utility company. Free hydroelectricity was 
apparently promised at the beginning but they were paying for power from diesel 
generators. Where once they had free-flowing streams, they now had to contend with 
an inadequate supply from a water treatment plant that frequently choked from 
sediment and sometimes distributed muddy water into the pipelines. Problems with 
water quality and quantity persisted well into 2015 when fieldwork ended. Many land 
plots were also uncultivable and inaccessible. These problems prompted one prominent, 
outspoken Dayak politician, who also holds a PhD in anthropology, to lament that the 
residents at the BRS were treated like ‘nobody’s child’ (Sibon, 2012). At no point did the 
Chinese initiate any attempts to assist in post-resettlement activities. 
SCORE’s Crown Jewel is but a Chinese Pebble: Perspectives from the Elite 
To understand the root and the source of the predicament, one must understand the 
perspectives and objectives of the respective governments and how these synergise. 
The rupture of the relationship between the Australian corporations and the Malaysians 
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in the process of the construction of the Bakun dam is a case in point. Australians, in 
particular a specific section of the Australian political elite, had strong views against 
dams and displacement, and similarly strong views of the sanctity of natural spaces, 
which the Malaysians do not hold. One can point a finger towards the Australian Greens 
for removing well-resourced and professional CSR actors from the construction process, 
in the resulting sub-optimal outcomes for the environment and displaced communities. 
However on the other side of the coin, the Malaysians could have required the Chinese 
to pick up the slack, and the Chinese could have initiated the resumption of CSR activities. 
Malaysian Interests 
The Bakun Dam is a part of a larger scheme to boost productivity and achieve greater 
industrialisation of an otherwise largely agrarian Sarawak (Cramb, 2013; Cramb, 2007). 
A secondary aim is to produce enough electricity to form a viable energy export industry 
to the surrounding states and territories (Lau, 2015; Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). Energy 
exports has been a consistent theme throughout Malaysia’s development, from the oil 
exports from Peninsula Malaysia, to the natural gas exports mainly from Sarawak to the 
smaller, but still significant coal exports from Sabah (Malaysia Productivity Corporation, 
2014). Electricity can thus be argued to be an extension of the energy export industry.  
The construction of hydropower plants also has a second economic advantage in that 
although the initial capital outlay can be high, running costs for fuel are eliminated, 
especially in Sarawak. The state is noted for the year-long consistency of river flows even 
in drier seasons. Indeed, the earliest surveys done in the 1960s, under the auspices of 
the Colombo Plan by Australian engineers, identified Sarawak as the best area in the 
region for hydropower, “and just Borneo … meaning it would be a huge waste not to tap 
into it…” (Sovacool and Bulan, 2011). Using this and other tax incentives, the Malaysians 
are trying to attract energy, capital and labour intensive industries to invest in the 
coastal development nodes (Sovacool and Bulan, 2012). This is meant to help the 
economy move beyond a primary agricultural production industry towards downstream, 
value-added manufacturing industries. 
The thinking behind the design of SCORE is almost purely from a state level 
macroeconomic point of view. The information pages in the SCORE website cover a lot 
of information from the planned power supplies to the industries assigned to each 
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development node to the ethnic diversity of Sarawak. The promises of ready supplies of 
affordable land, utilities and university-trained graduates are prominently displayed. 
Strikingly, the visuals are overwhelmingly skewed towards coastal and urban settings. 
What is not mentioned is that 40% of Sarawakians are rural with many wanting to stay 
rural, and that the development of ‘ecotourism’ is on the reservoir that flooded the 
forested landscapes on Sarawak’s interior. The term “hydropower” is mentioned only 
twice, and Bakun is not mentioned in any of the informational text. At the time of writing, 
a second hydropower station, Murum, is online and preparations are underway for the 
third dam, Baleh. The construction of Murum also involved displacement of longhouse 
communities.  
Attitudes of the Sarawak and Malaysian governments towards resources in the interior 
of Sarawak has always been exploitative and extractive. Sarawak is the largest state in 
Malaysia and was covered mostly by tropical rainforest. Among the endemic tree 
species are numerous valuable hardwood timber (Ekran, 1994). Since the 1980s, 
Sarawak has been one of the global epicentres of deforestation (Gaveau et al., 2014). In 
2010, the state accounted for 0.5% of the world’s rainforest by area, but 25% of the 
global tropical log exports (International Tropical Timber Organisation, 2010). A satellite 
imagery analysis in 2013 concluded that by then, Sarawak only had 5% of its original 
forests left intact (Global Witness, 2013). The same attitudes can be seen with Bakun, 
when an interviewee commented that the construction of the dam turned ‘worthless 
water’ into ‘valuable electricity’ (Sovacool, 2011a). Government level discourses have 
traditionally used ‘native’ to refer to ‘backward rural Dayaks’, and development 
invariably would involve centralising their previously disparate living locations and 
changing traditional shifting cultivation to intensive, estate plantations (Cramb, 2013). 
Hence, the construction of Bakun would accomplish multiple objectives, including 
energy production, timber harvesting (during the biomass removal stage) and the 
chance to centralise the longhouse communities for easier governance (Jehom,2008). 
Chinese Interests 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy, first announced in 2001, was borne out of an observation 
that the heavily export-driven Chinese economy was very exposed to financial crises 
elsewhere in the world (Yelery, 2014). ‘Going out’ was seen as a way to diversify Chinese 
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investments as well as to create new markets and demand for Chinese industrial output. 
As other researchers have pointed out, hydropower prominently features among the 
industries that have successfully embraced this set of policies. Others, such as journalist 
Jonathan Watts, noted speculatively the connections between the rise of global Chinese 
hydropower construction with the career histories President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao as a hydropower engineer (including a period of time with Sinohydro) and 
geologist respectively (Watts, 2010).  
One of the reasons often cited for aggressive hydropower export was the saturation 
within the Chinese domestic market (Bosshard, 2009). This saturation can be said to the 
inadvertent result of Chinese domestic social policy. As a result of the construction of 
the Three Gorges Dam, critics of large-scale hydropower construction now have a focal 
point for their attacks. Both President Hu and Premier Wen skipped the opening 
ceremony of the dam (Mithen, 2012). The latter, described as a ‘populist by instinct’, 
also intervened in the construction plans of further hydropower dams in China, resulting 
in only a third of planned projects actually being allowed to start (Stanway, 2012). 
Clearly, this would have caused a situation where there was a glut of suppliers which 
only a third of forecasted projects to bid on. It would then be unsurprising that the 
hydropower industry would be among the most enthusiastic and aggressive adopters of 
the going out policy. 
One defining aspect of Chinese infrastructural aid or construction is commonly 
described as ‘no strings attached’ (Heng, 2012; McDonald et al., 2009; Yang, 2009). The 
Chinese government and corporations heading out of China for projects pursue a policy 
of ‘non-interference’, which essentially guarantees that the Chinese government will not 
intervene or participate in any domestic or governance matters within host countries 
(Strauss, 2009). This is diametrically opposed to common Western (World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund) aid, which often prescribes political conditions that have 
to be met (McElhinny and Heineken, 2013). A second condition is that the Chinese 
government pursues a policy of mutual economic benefit, which began from Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘win-win’ foreign aid reform (Yelery, 2014). Nevertheless, recipient 
governments have the negotiating room to ‘attach strings’, and some authors have 
noted Chinese flexibility in this respect (Hensengerth, 2013; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 
2013). Ultimately, it can be argued that China’s foreign aid policy is an extension of its 
220 
 
domestic policy. For example, it is common policy for Exim bank projects to require that 
at least half of all required supplies must come from Chinese enterprises (Mohan and 
Lampert, 2013; House of Commons, 2009). Chinese aid is also heavily skewed towards 
construction, with Chinese corporations assuming the responsibility of building 
infrastructure, providing a base from which other Chinese businesses can secure further 
benefit and a source of employment for Chinese citizens (Sun, 2014; Corkin, et al., 2008; 
Centre for Chinese Studies, 2006). The stringent requirements for heavy dependence on 
Chinese equipment, engineering and manpower also indicates an indifferent attitude to 
transferring knowledge and expertise to recipient countries (Nissanke and Söderberg, 
2012). These are again very different from Western aid philosophy, which is more 
grounded in liberal democratic ideology, as opposed to China’s disinterest in democracy 
and interest in profit-seeking (Alden and Davies, 2006). Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 
(2010) argue that China shifted from an ideological basis for foreign aid to an economic 
one. However, it may also be possible to think that the Chinese foreign aid philosophy 
is still ideologically grounded, in that the Chinese tendency towards pragmatism in 
foreign policy, and the belief that they are themselves an example of an economic 
success in the absence of transparency, liberal democracy and yielding to Western 
interference, is in itself an ideology. 
Malaysia’s eagerness to complete the Bakun hydroelectric dam, a project that had been 
deemed politically impossible, and the scale of financial requirements for building 
possibly the toughest construction undertaking in the country, makes it an ideal 
candidate for the Chinese to assist. In addition, the Malaysians had done a social impact 
assessment, and two environmental impacts assessments, providing a level of 
paperwork foundations. The Chinese could then leave the issues from these, as 
domestic matters, to the Malaysian and Sarawak governments to address on their own 
terms. Chinese corporations then further benefitted from this experience by being 
awarded the contract to build a second dam upstream from Bakun, the Murum Dam. 
This clearly fits with the Chinese concept of ‘win-win’ in the ‘going out’ strategy. 
Conclusion 
In 2016, Sinohydro established a permanent office in Kuala Lumpur, the financial capital 
of Malaysia (Edward, 2016). This signals a very real possibility of further dams being built 
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in Malaysia and Indochina, on top of their existing commitments. Many worry that 
further environmental destruction and community displacement could be in the 
pipeline. On the hand, there may be reason to be optimistic. In the pragmatic way that 
Chinese factories reacted to demand for better working conditions, Chinese 
corporations, especially the larger state-owned enterprises such as Sinohydro, and the 
Chinese government are also reacting to the global scrutiny of Chinese hydropower 
exports (Bosshard, 2010). Sinohydro now has a comprehensive environmental policy 
agreement, including environmental protection, community consultation, and 
restoration of community livelihoods and income (International Rivers, 2012). Execution 
remains to be seen and may have to wait for brand new projects to come online. It may 
also be worth noting that Chinese overseas aid and investment towards resources and 
energy infrastructure may begin to decline, as the Chinese economy evolves such that 
consumption and services, inherently commodity non-intensive industries. This 
movement would reduce the requirement for resources, and China could conceivably 
begin to exert more stringent governance requirements to recipient nations (Dollar, 
2016). 
It takes two hands to clap. Instead of pushing all the responsibility onto Chinese 
enterprises, host governments also need ensure Chinese enterprise stick to their 
commitments. Host governments also need to reassess their energy mix requirements, 
with other forms of renewable energy. In Sarawak’s example, solar and wind have been 
shown to be viable energy alternatives, especially becoming more advanced and readily 
available (Shirley and Kammen, 2015). Where there is no demand, then there will be no 
supply. Western powers may also need to reconsider their hardline tendencies on 
projects that involve displacement, as the Bakun Dam experience shows that a forced 
withdrawal in some cases may lead to even more sub-optimal outcomes for the projects 
that they leave behind. A little more pragmatism and understanding of the Asian political 
culture may be in order. Southeast Asian governments in Indochina and the Malay 
Peninsula, including Singapore, are led either by authoritarian democracies or 
strongmen dictators. In these cases, protests to stop dam construction invariably fail. 
What is required is level-headed, pragmatic leadership to ensure the least destructive 
outcome for communities and the environment. 
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